Comment: Good as a primary reading on a course on truth, paradox, philosophy of language, or on deflationism more generally. Any course that treats deflationary accounts of truth in any detail would deal with the prosentential theory of truth, and this is one of the most historically important presentations of that theory. This is particularly useful in courses on paradox, as it is a rare articulation of the idea that the liar paradox is not "deep" and does not require large revisions to classical logic. Would be best used in advanced undergraduate or graduate courses.
Grover, Dorothy. Inheritors and Paradox
1977, Journal of Philosophy 74(10): 590-604
Added by: Jamie Collin
Summary: Classic account of the way in which the prosentential theory of truth handles the liar paradox. Prosententialists take 'It is true that' to be a prosentence forming operator that anaphorically picks out content from claims made further back in the anaphoric chain (in the same way that pronouns such as 'he', 'she' and 'it' anaphorically pick out referents from nouns further back in the anaphoric chain). Liar sentences have no proposition-stating antecedents in the anaphoric chain. As a result, the problem of the liar does not arise.
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