Bennett, Karen. Mental Causation
2007, Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: Concerns about 'mental causation' are concerns about how it is possible for mental states to cause anything to happen. How does what we believe, want, see, feel, hope, or dread manage to cause us to act? Certain positions on the mind-body problem - including some forms of physicalism - make such causation look highly problematic. This entry sketches several of the main reasons to worry, and raises some questions for further investigation.
Comment: This would serve as a very useful introductory/survey text, fitting well in the early weeks of a undergraduate course in the philosophy of mind, since it contains a nice discussion of dualism and functionalism. It would also work well as part of an undergraduate course in metaphysics if such a course were to include a week on the mind-body problem, causation, or an overview of key positions in the philosophy of mind.