Comment: This text is useful as a commentary or response to the debate about (un)reasonableness and legitimacy sparked by Rawls. More specifically, it offers a distinction between political and philosophical reasonableness, which the authors use to argue against interpreting or developing Rawls's political liberalism in a less tolerant direction. The section on Barbara Herman's 'Pluralism and the Community of Moral Judgment' helpfully distils a major faultline within liberal political philosophy.
2001, Journal of Political Philosophy 9(1): 38–55.
Added by: Simon Fokt
Diversifying Syllabi: Justice requires us to acknowledge the claims of morally or philosophically unreasonable persons, as long as they are politically reasonable; such people must be tolerated and considered part of the social contract. Toleration as wide public justification is the proper response to the pluralism characteristic of modern democratic societies.
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