Figdor, Carrie. Neuroscience and the multiple realization of cognitive functions
2010, Philosophy of Science 77 (3):419-456.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Carrie FigdorAbstract:
Article: Many empirically minded philosophers have used neuroscientific data to argue against the multiple realization of cognitive functions in existing biological organisms. I argue that neuroscientists themselves have proposed a biologically based concept of multiple realization as an alternative to interpreting empirical findings in terms of one-to-one structure/function mappings. I introduce this concept and its associated research framework and also how some of the main neuroscience-based arguments against multiple realization go wrong.Comment: This is a direct reply to Bechtel and Mundale (1999) and I know some more aware people have paired it with that paper in the classroom. It's philosophy of neuroscience, philosophy of mind.
Figdor, Carrie. The Psychological Speciesism of Humanism
2020, Philosophical Studies 178: 1545–1569
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Added by: Björn Freter, Contributed by: Carrie FigdorAbstract: Humanists argue for assigning the highest moral status to all humans over any non-humans directly or indirectly on the basis of uniquely superior human cognitive abilities. They may also claim that humanism is the strongest position from which to combat racism, sexism, and other forms of within-species discrimination. I argue that changing conceptual foundations in comparative research and discoveries of advanced cognition in many non-human species reveal humanism’s psychological speciesism and its similarity with common justifications of within-species discrimination.Comment: This paper argues against the idea that human cognitive capacities justify higher moral status for humans over nonhuman animals. It also argues that this justification for human moral superiority is structurally the same as a common justification for the superiority (moral and otherwise) of some human groups over others (such as in sexism or racism).
Fileva, Iskra. Moral Testimony and Collective Moral Governance
2023, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):722-735.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Ethan LandesAbstract:
I suggest that a moderate version of pessimism about moral testimony succeeds. However, I claim also that all major pessimist accounts—Understanding, Affect, Virtue, and Autonomy—fail. Having argued for these claims, I propose a new pessimist alternative.
Comment: The paper would offer a good overview of the current state of the moral testimony literature, specifically focusing on moral arguments against moral testimony. The paper moves through the literature quickly and breezily, explaining the key positions then offering a counterargument. It requires minimal knowledge of the literature, although it does presuppose some familiarity with what testimony is meant to be.
Finlayson, Lorna. The Political is Political: Conformity and the Illusion of Dissent in Contemporary Political Philosophy
2015, London: Rowman and Littlefield International
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Added by: Carl Fox, Contributed by: Emily DysonPublisher's Note: Nobody should really have to point out that political philosophy is political. Yet in this highly original and provocative book Lorna Finlayson argues that in fact it is necessary to do so. Offering a critique of mainstream liberal political philosophy through close, critical engagement with a series of specific debates and arguments, Finlayson analyzes the way in which apparently neutral methodological devices such as 'charitable interpretation' and 'constructive criticism' function so as to protect against challenges to the status quo. At each stage, Finlayson demonstrates that political philosophy is suffering from a complex process of 'depoliticization.' Even in cases where it appears that the dominant framework of liberal political philosophy is being strongly challenged - as, for example, in the case of the 'realist' critique of 'ideal theory' - this book argues that the debate is set up in such a way as to impose strict limits on the kind of dissent that is possible. Only by dragging these hidden presuppositions into the foreground can we arrive at a clear-eyed appreciation of such debates, and perhaps look beyond the artificially constricted landscape in which they seek to confine us.Comment: Good further or advanced reading on the methodology of political philosophy, and an incredibly illuminating critical complement to a Rawls-heavy syllabus. Finlayson provides an interesting and challenging critique of liberal presuppositions that are widespread in political philosophy. Individual chapters would also make very good further or advanced reading in their own right, especially the chapters on Rawls, the norm of philosophical charity, speech acts and silencing, and political realism.
Finn, Suki. De-gendering and De-sexing Motherhood
2024, Think, 23:68, 69–77.
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, Contributed by: DRL Anniversary ConferenceAbstract:
Each one of us who has come into this world (so far) has done so via birth. Everyone therefore has a birthing ‘parent’, but not all would consider that respective person to be their parent. For example, those who have been adopted might instead consider the person (or people) who adopted them to be their parent(s). There are, therefore, ways to become a parent that do not involve giving birth, and instances of giving birth that do not result in becoming a parent. But what about motherhood, more specifically? Must mothers be women, and must mothers have given birth? What makes a ‘mother’ – is it always and only the person who makes us? It is these questions that I explore here, in order to find a trans-inclusive approach to parental designations.
Finn, Suki. Limiting Logical Pluralism
2019, Synthese (198): 4905–4923
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
In this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited. I argue that the content of this basic meta-logic must include the analogue of logical rules Modus Ponens and Universal Instantiation. I show this through a detailed analysis of the ‘adoption problem’, which manifests something special about MP and UI. It appears that MP and UI underwrite the very nature of a logical rule of inference, due to all rules of inference being conditional and universal in their structure. As such, all logical rules presuppose MP and UI, making MP and UI self-governing, basic, unadoptable, and required in the meta-logic for the adequacy of any logical system.Comment: This is an accessible discussion to logical pluralism and its relation to foundational issues in the epistemology of logic—notably the Adoption Problem. As such it can be included in any syllabus focused on special topics in the philosophy of logic. It does not require much background knowledge of logic or formal systems.
Fischel, Joseph J.. Screw Consent: A Better Politics of Sexual Justice
2019, University of California Press
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Added by: Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-MoorePublisher’s Note:
Joseph J. Fischel argues that the consent paradigm, while necessary for effective sexual assault law, diminishes and perverts our ideas about desire, pleasure, and injury. In addition to the criticisms against consent levelled by feminist theorists of earlier generations, Fischel elevates three more: consent is insufficient, inapposite, and riddled with scope contradictions for regulating and imagining sex. Fischel proposes instead that sexual justice turns more productively on concepts of sexual autonomy and access.Comment (from this Blueprint): This reading documents a troubling implication of certain views about consent and deceit so is useful for a real-life application of the debate.
Fischer, Bob. The Ethics of Eating Animals: Usually Bad, Sometimes Wrong, Often Permissible
2019, New York: Routledge
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Added by: Björn FreterPublisher’s Note:
Intensive animal agriculture wrongs many, many animals. Philosophers have argued, on this basis, that most people in wealthy Western contexts are morally obligated to avoid animal products. This book explains why the author thinks that’s mistaken. He reaches this negative conclusion by contending that the major arguments for veganism fail: they don’t establish the right sort of connection between producing and eating animal-based foods. Moreover, if they didn’t have this problem, then they would have other ones: we wouldn’t be obliged to abstain from all animal products, but to eat strange things instead—e.g., roadkill, insects, and things left in dumpsters. On his view, although we have a collective obligation not to farm animals, there is no specific diet that most individuals ought to have. Nevertheless, he does think that some people are obligated to be vegans, but that’s because they’ve joined a movement, or formed a practical identity, that requires that sacrifice. This book argues that there are good reasons to make such a move, albeit not ones strong enough to show that everyone must do likewise.Comment (from this Blueprint): A philosophical overview on bad arguments for eating animals and on eating animals the rights [sic] way - text to be read juxtaposed to the Bernard Williams and Melanie Joy.
Fisher, Jennifer. On the Philosophy of Logic
2007, Cengage Learning.
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Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Matt ClemensPublisher's Note: Jennifer Fisher's On the Philosophy of Logic explores questions about logic often overlooked by philosophers. Which of the many different logics available to us is right? How would we know? What makes a logic right in the first place? Is logic really a good guide to human reasoning? An ideal companion text for any course in symbolic logic, this lively and accessible book explains important logical concepts, introduces classical logic and its problems and alternatives, and reveals the rich and interesting philosophical issues that arise in exploring the fundamentals of logic.Comment: This book provides an introduction to some traditional questions within philosophy of logic. Moreover, it presents some non-classical logics. It includes an introduction to formal classical logic, so no previous technical knowledge is required. Adequate for a first course on philosophy of logic, either as main or further reading.
Fleming, David. Positioning the Museum for Social Inclusion
2002, In Museums, Society, Inequality, Richard Sandell (ed.). Routledge
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Added by: Quentin Pharr and Clotilde TorregrossaAbstract:
Museums, Society, Inequality explores the wide-ranging social roles and responsibilities of the museum. It brings together international perspectives to stimulate critical debate, inform the work of practitioners and policy makers, and to advance recognition of the purpose, responsibilities and value to society of museums. Museums, Society, Inequality examines the issues and offers different understandings of the social agency of the museum, presents ways in which museums have sought to engage with social concerns and instigate social change, and imagines how museums might become more useful to society in future. This book is essential for all museum academics, practitioners and students.Comment (from this Blueprint): When thinking about how class and status influences our aesthetic practices and preferences, it is also important to consider how they also influence the way we display our aesthetic products and culture, and the way we offer access to such displays. David Fleming is one of the foremost UK advocates for accessible museums and he firmly believes that museums can and should be powerful agents of social change. In this particular chapter he clearly introduces what he believes to be the four main reasons why museums in the UK have been socially exclusive, especially regarding class: 1) who runs museums, 2) what they contain, 3) how they have been run, and 4) for whom they have been run. As Fleming shows, privileged classes have been favoured across all these aspects, at the detriment of all others. He refers to this phenomenon as the Great Museum Conspiracy. But Fleming is optimistic and offers practical solutions for bulding a socially inclusive museum based on his own experience at the Tyne and Wear Museums. As such, this chapter can be used both as theoretical background and a case study to consider the social conditions that contribute to the social exclusion of certain classes from their own culture, as well as the economic and material conditions that serve this inequality - an inequality both in terms of access to and representation in aesthetic practices, but also an inequality in terms of the value conferred upon the culture and artefacts of the working classes.
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