Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.
Comment: Good paper about the relation of representation and content to computation. Best suited to higher-level courses on the subject.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Egan, Frances. Computational models: a modest role for content
2010, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41(3): 253-259.
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