Added by: Sara Peppe
Abstract: The debate on scientific realism has raged among philosophers of science for decades. The scientific realist’s claim that science aims to give us a literally true description of the way things are, has come under severe scrutiny and attack by Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. All science aims at is to save the observable phenomena, according to van Fraassen. Scientific realists have faced since a main sceptical challenge: the burden is on them to prove that the entities postulated by our scientific theories are real and that science is still in the ‘truth’ business.
Comment: This article provides a very clear explanation of the scientific realism/Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism debate highlighting scientific realists' main difficulty, i.e find a proof that entities posited by science are real. Presupposes some background on the above mentioned themes.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Massimi, Michaela. Why There are No Ready-Made Phenomena: What Philosophers of Science Should Learn From Kant
2008, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 63:1-35.
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