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- Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Simon Prosser
Abstract: The view that physical objects do not, in fact, possess colour properties is certainly the dominant position amongst scientists working on colour vision. It is also a reasonably popular view amongst philosophers. However, the recent philosophical debate about the metaphysical status of colour properties seems to have taken a more realist turn. In this article, I review the main philosophical views – eliminativism, physicalism, dispositionalism and primitivism – and describe the problems they face. I also examine how these views have been classified and suggest that there may be less disparity between some of these positions than previously thought
Comment: Useful survey article on colour and colour perception.
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Gow, Laura. Colour
2014, Philosophy Compass 9: 803-813.
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