Howard-Snyder, Frances. Divine Freedom
2017, Topoi 36(4): 651-656.
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Added by: Emily PaulAbstract: In 'Divine Freedom,' I argue that morally significant incompatibilist freedom is a great good. So God possesses morally incompatibilist freedom. So, God can do wrong or at least can do worse than the best action He can do. So, God is not essentially morally perfect. After careful consideration of numerous objections, I conclude that this argument is undefeated.Comment: Useful for a unit on divine freedom with an intermediate level Philosophy of Religion course - would suit as the primary reading for this, as it gives a great overview and is relatively short, and also presents the central arguments in the debate over divine freedom: the alleged tension between incompatibilist freedom, and the thought that God always chooses the best possible action. It could be good to spend a whole seminar discussing how this tension is created, why it's problematic, and whether it can be resolved.Steward, Helen. Agency Incompatibilism and Divine Agency2015, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7(3): 67-78.
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Added by: Emily PaulAbstract: In this paper, I consider whether an argument for compatibilism about free will and determinism might be developed from the thought that God's agency seems consistent with the rational determination of at least some divine actions by the True and the Good. I attempt to develop such an argument and then consider how to respond to it from the point of view of my own position, which I call Agency Incompatibilism. I argue that a crucial premise in the argument is ambiguous and offer responses to the argument on behalf of the Agency Incompatibilist, on each of the two disambiguations.Comment: This article could be used in a number of ways: (i) in a course on the metaphysics of freedom - after all, even if one is an atheist, it's interesting to examine one's metaphysics of freedom when applied to the divine domain, and this paper does so in a way that also presents a fascinating version of incompatibilism; (ii) in a Philosophy of Religion course element on divine freedom (iii) as a secondary reading relating to both of the above.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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