Thompson, Evan, Stapleton, Mog. Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories
2009, Topoi 28: 23-30
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, Contributed by: Jimena Clavel
Abstract: This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
Comment: The paper is a good introduction to enactivism within the context of other situated approaches to cognition (i.e., the extended mind thesis, the thesis of embodied cognition, the thesis of embedded cognition). It can be used in an intermediate or advanced course in philosophy of mind or philosophy of cognitive science.
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