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Brock, Gillian, Soran Reader. Needs-Centred Ethical Theory
2002, Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):425-434
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Added by: Deryn Mair Thomas
Abstract:

Our aims in this paper are: (1) to indicate some of the many ways in which needs are an important part of the moral landscape, (2) to show that the dominant contemporary moral theories cannot adequately capture the moral significance of needs, indeed, that the dominant theories are inadequate to the extent that they cannot accommodate the insights which attention to needs yield, (3) to offer some sketches that should be helpful to future cartographers charting the domain of morally significant needs, and (4) to consider some anticipated objections to our project and offer some replies.

Comment: This paper outlines a novel approach to ethical theory which places needs as its center. In doing so, the authors engage with three other dominant moral theories of consequentialism, deontological ethics, and virtue ethics, and highlight the ways that a needs-based moral theory may address some of their shortcomings. For this reason, the text may be useful in the context of introductory ethics to highlight the merits and drawbacks of major ethical theories, but also to draw attention to the question of whether there is more work to be done in ethical philosophy. The paper is written in a clear and straightfoward style, and therefore will likely be accessible to a wide range of ability levels.

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Reader, Soran. Needs and Moral Necessity
2007, New York: Routledge
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Added by: Deryn Mair Thomas
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Needs and Moral Necessity analyses ethics as a practice, explains why we have three moral theory-types, consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics, and argues for a fourth needs-based theory.

Comment: In this book, Reader defends a needs-based ethical theory and places it in the context of existing ethical theories. Her style of philosophy is straightforward and for the most part, absent of jargon, making it a very good resource for introductory teaching contexts. At the same time, her arguments are nuanced and developed, and it could just as easily be useful in the context of more advanced students. This book offers a critique of the dominant ethical theories existing in contemporary philosophical literature, and for this reason, could be useful in introductions to western social and political philosophy to teach alongside the traditional approaches to moral theory and to get students to challenge the hegemony of those approaches. It might also be useful as a way to discuss methodology and writing style in philosophy: Reader's approach and style of writing is very accessible to non-philosophers, but she still advances a fairly complex argument. Therefore, it could serve as an illustration of how written philosophy need not be technical or opaque in order to advance interesting claims.

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Reader, Soran, Gillian Brock. Needs, Moral Demands and Moral Theory
2004, Utilitas 16 (3):251-266
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Added by: Deryn Mair Thomas
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In this article we argue that the concept of need is as vital for moral theory as it is for moral life. In II we analyse need and its normativity in public and private moral practice. In III we describe simple cases which exemplify the moral demandingness of needs, and argue that the significance of simple cases for moral theory is obscured by the emphasis in moral philosophy on unusual cases. In IV we argue that moral theories are inadequate if they cannot describe simple needs-meeting cases. We argue that the elimination or reduction of need to other concepts such as value, duty, virtue or care is unsatisfactory, in which case moral theories that make those concepts fundamental will have to be revised. In conclusion, we suggest that if moral theories cannot be revised to accommodate needs, they may have to be replaced with a fully needs-based theory.

Comment: In this paper, Brock and Reader present a novel argument for the moral saliency of the concept of need. In doing so, they challenge the reduction of need to other concepts in existing moral theory. The text would be well paired with Reader's "Needs and Moral Necessity" (or used instead) as a way to discuss alternative perspectives on moral theory which depart from traditional ethical accounts (i.e. consequentialism, deontology, virtue ethics). The text might also be well paired with Reader's "The Other Side of Agency" to discuss the virtues of patient-centred (rather than agent-centred) moral theory.

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