Barnes, Elizabeth, Ross Cameron. Back to the Open Future
2011, Philosophical Perspectives 25(1): 1-26.
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Added by: Emily PaulAbstract: Many of us are tempted by the thought that the future is open, whereas the past is not. The future might unfold one way, or it might unfold another; but the past, having occurred, is now settled. In previous work we presented an account of what openness consists in: roughly, that the openness of the future is a matter of it being metaphysically indeterminate how things will turn out to be. We were previously concerned merely with presenting the view and exploring its consequences; we did not attempt to argue for it over rival accounts. That is what we will aim to do in this paper.Comment: This could be set as a further reading in an undergraduate metaphysics course, or an undergraduate course on the metaphysics of time. It would also work well as a core reading in a postgraduate course on the metaphysics of time paired with the authors' 'The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism, and Ontology'.Barnes, Elizabeth, Ross Cameron. The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism, and Ontology2009, Philosophical Studies 146(2): 291-309.
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Added by: Emily PaulAbstract: In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.Comment: This text might seem to be advanced because of the many issues it handles, but it's written so clearly that I think it could (if taught in detail as a core text) be suitable for an intermediate metaphysics class. In particular, the class could be split into three groups, with each group tasked with researching one of bivalence, determinism and eternalism, and explaining i) how they are alleged to conflict with the open future, and ii) how Barnes and Cameron argue that they aren't in fact in conflict with the thesis that the future is open.Kachi, Daisuke. Do time travelers suffer from paradoxes?2009, Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15(2): 95-98.
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Added by: Laura JimenezAbstract: In this paper I give consideration to some apparent impossibilities for the time travelers to the past. After criticizing the views of D. Lewis and K. Vihvelin, I will show in what sense they are really impossible.Comment: Really introductory and short paper. It focuses on three issues: changing the past, autofanticide, and autoparenthood. Recommended as an introductory and basic reading for undergraduate students.Paul, L. A. Temporal Experience2010, The Journal of Philosophy 107(7): 333-359.
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Added by: Emily PaulIntroduction: The question I want to explore is whether experience supports an antireductionist ontology of time, that is, whether we should take it to support an ontology that includes a primitive, monadic property of nowness responsible for the special feel of events in the present, and a relation of passage that events instantiate in virtue of literally passing from the future, to the present, and then into the past.Comment: For an intermediate/advanced philosophy of time course, this paper would be brillliant for a unit on psychological arguments in philosophy of time - which of course is a growing research area within philosophy of time. In a standard metaphysics course, this would make for a good further reading in philosophy of time. Students tend to favour the A-theory, and this is a very powerful argument for the B-theory that also lays out the different views in a crystal clear way.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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