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Cardona, Carlos Alberto. Kepler: Analogies in the search for the law of refraction
2016 2016, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:22-35.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Juan R. Loaiza
Publisher's Note: This paper examines the methodology used by Kepler to discover a quantitative law of refraction. The aim is to argue that this methodology follows a heuristic method based on the following two Pythagorean principles: (1) sameness is made known by sameness, and (2) harmony arises from establishing a limit to what is unlimited. We will analyse some of the author's proposed analogies to find the aforementioned law and argue that the investigation's heuristic pursues such principles.

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Hesse, Mary. The Structure of scientific inference
1974 1974, University of California Press.
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Publisher's Note: A danger of a heavily formalist approach to the structure of science is that it may lose sight of the concrete actualities on which scientific inference is exercised. On the other hand, and excessively descriptive and relativist approach fails to achieve a general systematization of models of inference. This book tries to steer a middle course between these extremes. Hesse first discusses some epistemological problems bequeathed by positivists analyses of science and also considers the problem of inductive justification of theories in relation to evidence. Following Keynes and Carnap she argues that the axioms of probability constitute the best postulate system for a logic of confirmation.

Comment: Highly recommended for undergraduates. It covers many important points of the topic: confirmation theory, generalizations, causal laws… It is useful for courses in philosophy of science but it could also serve as a further reading for courses in epistemology.

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Massimi, Michela, Duncan Pritchard. What is this thing called science?
2014 2014, in M. Massimi (ed.), Philosophy and the Sciences for Everyone. Routledge
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Summary: This chapter offers a general introduction to philosophy of science. The first part of the chapter takes the reader through the famous relativist debate about Galileo and Cardinal Bellarmine. Several important questions on the topic are explored, such as what makes scientific knowledge special compared with other kinds of knowledge or the importance of demarcating science from non-science. Finally, the chapters gives an overview on how philosophers such as Popper, Duhem, Quine and Kuhn came to answer these questions.

Comment: This chapter could be used as in introductory reading to review the nature of scientific knowledge and the most important debates about the scientific method. It is recommendable for undergraduate courses in philosophy of science. No previous knowledge of the field is needed in order to understand the content. The chapter is an introduction to the rest of the book Philosophy and the Sciences for Everyone. Some discussions explored here, such as the problem of underdetermination or Tomas Kuhn's view of scientific knowledge are central to the following chapters in philosophy of cosmology.

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Parker, Wendy S.. When Climate Models Agree: The Significance of Robust Model Predictions
2011 2011, Philosophy of Science 78 (4):579-600.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: This article identifies conditions under which robust predictive modeling results have special epistemic significance---related to truth, confidence, and security---and considers whether those conditions hold in the context of present-day climate modeling. The findings are disappointing. When today's climate models agree that an interesting hypothesis about future climate change is true, it cannot be inferred---via the arguments considered here anyway---that the hypothesis is likely to be true or that scientists' confidence in the hypothesis should be significantly increased or that a claim to have evidence for the hypothesis is now more secure

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