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McKinnon, Rachel. Trans*formative Experience
2015, McKinnon, Rachel (2015). Trans*formative Experiences. Res Philosophica 92 (2):419-440.
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Added by: Petronella Randell

Abstract: What happens when we consider transformative experiences from the perspective of gender transitions? In this paper I suggest that at least two insights emerge. First, trans* persons’ experiences of gender transitions show some limitations to L. A. Paul’s (2015) decision theoretic account of transformative decisions. This will involve exploring some of the phenomenology of coming to know that one is trans, and in coming to decide to transition. Second, what epistemological effects are there to undergoing a transformative experience? By connecting some experiences of gender transitions to feminist standpoint epistemology, I argue that radical changes in one’s identity and social location also radically affects one’s access to knowledge in ways not widely appreciated in contemporary epistemology.

Comment: This paper would work well as an additional reading on a week about transformative experience, particularly on a module which includes feminist philosophy. The paper argues that the choice to transition can be made rationally, despite this decision being a transformative decision.
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Saint-Croix, Catharine. Privilege and Position: Formal Tools for Standpoint Epistemology
2020, Res Philosophica, 97(4), 489-524
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Abstract:

How does being a woman affect one’s epistemic life? What about being black? Or queer? Standpoint theorists argue that such social positions can give rise to otherwise unavailable epistemic privilege. “Epistemic privilege” is a murky concept, however. Critics of standpoint theory argue that the view is offered without a clear explanation of how standpoints confer their benefits, what those benefits are, or why social positions are particularly apt to produce them. But this need not be so. This article articulates a minimal version of standpoint epistemology that avoids these criticisms and supports the normative goals of its feminist forerunners. With this foundation, we develop a formal model in which to explore standpoint epistemology using neighborhood semantics for modal logic.

Comment (from this Blueprint): The paper contains a very extensive introduction to standpoint theory and its history, making it well suited for a course on modal logic (showcasing an application) or on formal epistemology. Formal elements are introduced with a lot of examples and informal discussion, so the paper might also be used in a course focusing on standpoint theory, although familiarity with (some) formal semantics is still a prerequisite.
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Saint-Croix, Catharine. Activist Epistemology
2024, In R. Cook and A. Yap (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic. University of Minnesota Press

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Added by: Franci Mangraviti and Viviane Fairbank
Abstract:
I propose a model on which epistemic frameworks are understood in terms of not only beliefs, but also sets of evidential support relations. We are generally responsive to multiple frameworks, some more compatible than others.The model allows for prioritizing certain frameworks by drawing on van Benthem and Pacuit's work on logics for evidence-based belief. This prioritization allows us to capture the idea that some epistemic frameworks are "held come what may" with nuance and complexity.
Comment: available in this Blueprint
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