Zagzebski, Linda. The inescapability of Gettier Problems
1994, Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174): 65-73.
Added by: Jie Gao
Conclusion: Almost every contemporary theory of justification or warrant aims only to give the conditions for putting the believer in the best position for getting the truth. The best position is assumed to be very good, but imperfect, for such is life. Properly functioning faculties need not be working perfectly, but only well enough; reliable belief-producing mechanisms need not be perfectly reliable, only reliable enough; evidence for a belief need not support it conclusively, but only well enough; and so on. As long as the truth is never assured by the conditions which make the state justified, there will be situations in which a false belief is justified. I argue that with this common, in fact, almost universal assumption, Gettier cases will never go away.
Comment: This is a great paper on the Gettier problem for epistemic justification. It is often used in combination with the original paper by Gettier in elucidating the nature of the Gettier problem. Suitable for undergraduate epistemology courses.
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