Maddy, Penelope. Three Forms of Naturalism
2005, in The Oxford Hanbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, ed. S. Shapiro. New York: Oxford University Press.
Added by: Jamie Collin
Summary: A clear introduction to mathematical naturalism and its Quinean roots; developing and defending Maddy's own naturalist philosophy of mathematics. Maddy claims that the Quinian ignores some nuances of scientific practice that have a bearing on what the naturalist should take to be the real scientific standards of evidence. Historical studies show that scientists sometimes do not take themselves to be committed to entities that are indispensably quantified over in their best scientific theories, hence the Quinian position that naturalism dictates that we are committed to entities that are indispensably quantified over in our best scientific theories is incorrect.
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Comment: Good primary reading in advanced undergraduate or postgraduate courses on metaphysics, naturalism or philosophy of mathematics. This would serve well both as a clear and fairly concise introduction to Quinean naturalism and to the indispensability argument in the philosophy of mathematics.