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Foot, Philippa. Euthanasia
1977, Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (2):85-112. Reprinted in her Virtues and vices. Oxford: Blackwell.

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Added by: Simon Fokt
Abstract:
Synopsis generated from the paper: Foot argues that euthanasia is not a merely quiet or easy death. An act of euthanasia, including a deliberate omission, is a choice of another person’s death for that person’s own sake, because life is no longer a good for them. Life is normally a benefit even when it contains much pain, handicap, or unhappiness, but the connection between life and good breaks when a life no longer contains a minimum of ordinary human goods, as in some extreme illness, or when consciousness has sunk so low that life is neither a good nor, unless there is suffering, an evil. Foot then asks when such acts are morally permissible. She distinguishes justice, which concerns rights, from charity, which concerns the good of others, and she separates active from passive and voluntary from nonvoluntary euthanasia. Nonvoluntary active euthanasia is never justified, because the right to life includes a duty of noninterference that is not cancelled by the judgment that someone would be better off dead. Nonvoluntary passive euthanasia is not ruled out by that duty, except where a special right to life-preserving service exists, for instance under a doctor’s contract. Voluntary euthanasia, active or passive, need not infringe rights if the person has waived them. Where justice does not forbid the act, charity generally speaks in favor of it, since the aim is the good of the one who dies, though a wish to die is not itself proof that death is for their good. In practice, Foot notes that withholding life-prolonging treatment is already common. Allowing infants with Down’s syndrome to die because they burden others is not euthanasia in her sense. She supports something like a living will for previously expressed wishes, but warns against legalizing active euthanasia: it is open to abuse, and in a rich society it could erode the expectation that the old and the ill will be looked after.
Comment: This text is of central interest in teaching about moral issues related to euthanasia. The text introduces the vital distinctions between active and passive, voluntary and nonvoluntary euthanasia, and argues in favour of moral permissibility of all but the active nonvoluntary type.
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Foot, Philippa. Virtues and Vices
1978, Oxford University Press.

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Added by: Laura Jimenez, Contributed by: Nomy Arpaly
Publisher's Note: This collection of essays, written between 1957 and 1977, contains discussions of the moral philosophy of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, and some modern philosophers. It presents virtues and vices rather than rights and duties as the central concepts in moral philosophy. Throughout, the author rejects contemporary anti? naturalistic moral philosophies such as emotivism and prescriptivism, but defends the view that moral judgements may be hypothetical rather than (as Kant thought) categorical imperatives. The author also applies her moral philosophy to the current debates on euthanasia and abortion, the latter discussed in relation to the doctrine of the double effect. She argues against the suggestion, on the part of A. J. Ayer and others, that free will actually requires determinism. In a final essay, she asks whether the concept of moral approval can be understood except against a particular background of social practices.
Comment: Foot stands out among contemporary ethical theorists because of her conviction that virtues and vices are more central ethical notions than rights, duties, justice, or consequences. Since the author discusses multiple relevant topics (abortion, euthanasia, free will/determination, and the ethics of Hume and Nietzsche) this book is a really complete reading for Ethics courses. The book can be used in both, undergraduate and postgraduate courses, but the last eight essays are more suitable for postgraduates.
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Frowe, Helen. The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction
2011, London: Routledge.

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Added by: John Baldari
Publisher’s Note:
Publisher: When is it right to go to war? When is a war illegal? What are the rules of engagement? What should happen when a war is over? How should we view terrorism? The Ethics of War and Peace is a fresh and contemporary introduction to one of the oldest but still most relevant ethical debates. It introduces students to contemporary Just War Theory in a stimulating and engaging way, perfect for those approaching the topic for the first time. Helen Frowe explains the core issues in Just War Theory, and chapter by chapter examines the recent and ongoing philosophical? debates on:
  • theories of self defence and national defence
  • Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello, and Jus post Bellum
  • the moral status of combatants
  • the principle of non-combatant immunity
  • the nature of terrorism and the moral status of terrorists.
Each chapter concludes with a useful summary, discussion questions and suggestions for further reading, to aid student learning and revision. The Ethics of War and Peace is the ideal textbook for students studying philosophy, politics and international relations.
Comment: This text is best used in modules or classes introducing or investigating military ethics, war theory, and legal philosophy.
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Frowe, Helen. Non-Combatant Liability in War
2011, In Frowe, Helen and Gerald Lang. How We Fight: Ethics in War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Added by: John Baldari
Abstract:
Publisher: How We Fight: Ethics in War contains ten groundbreaking essays by some of the leading philosophers of war. The essays offer new perspectives on key debates including pacifism, punitive justifications for war, the distribution of risk between combatants and non-combatants, the structure of 'just war theory', and bases of individual liability in war.
Comment: This text is best used in modules or classes introducing or investigating military ethics, war theory, and legal philosophy. This should be a primary text for such classes.
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Frowe, Helen. Defensive Killing: An Essay on War and Self-Defence
2014, Oxford: Oxford University Press

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Added by: John Baldari
Abstract: Most people believe that it is sometimes morally permissible for a person to use force to defend herself or others against harm. In Defensive Killing, Helen Frowe offers a detailed exploration of when and why the use of such force is permissible. She begins by considering the use of force between individuals, investigating both the circumstances under which an attacker forfeits her right not to be harmed, and the distinct question of when it is all-things-considered permissible to use force against an attacker. Frowe then extends this enquiry to war, defending the view that we should judge the ethics of killing in war by the moral rules that govern killing between individuals. She argues that this requires us to significantly revise our understanding of the moral status of non-combatants in war. Non-combatants who intentionally contribute to an unjust war forfeit their rights not to be harmed, such that they are morally liable to attack by combatants fighting a just war.
Comment: This text should be used in modules focused on self-defense, responsibility, and justice.
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Frowe, Helen. The Duty to Remove Statues of Wrongdoers
2019, Journal of Practical Ethics, 7(3): 1-31

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Added by: Ten-Herng Lai
Abstract:
This paper argues that public statues of persons typically express a positive evaluative attitude towards the subject. It also argues that states have duties to repudiate their own historical wrongdoing, and to condemn other people’s serious wrongdoing. Both duties are incompatible with retaining public statues of people who perpetrated serious rights violations. Hence, a person’s being a serious rights violator is a sufficient condition for a state’s having a duty to remove a public statue of that person. I argue that this applies no less in the case of the ‘morally ambiguous’ wrongdoer, who both accomplishes significant goods and perpetrates serious rights violations. The duty to remove a statue is a defeasible duty: like most duties, it can be defeated by lesser-evil considerations. If removing a statue would, for example, spark a violent riot that would risk unjust harm to lots of people, the duty to remove could be outweighed by the duty not to foreseeably cause unjust harm. This would provide a lesser-evil justification for keeping the statue. But it matters that the duty to remove is outweighed, rather than negated, by these consequences. Unlike when a duty is negated, one still owes something in cases of outweighing. And it especially matters that it is outweighed by the predicted consequences of wrongful behaviour by others.
Comment (from this Blueprint): This paper highlights several important things. First, statues are blunt tools and express pro-attitudes to the persons they represent as a whole. Second, it sets out a clear standard for removal, and defends the conclusion that we should remove many or even most existing statues. Third, to the question “what if removal incites violence?” this paper provides a good answer. Fourth, a legitimate question is what we should do about statues of wrongdoers of the distant past? The discussion on this here is insightful.
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Galgut, Elisa. Raising the Bar in the Justification of Animal Research
2015, Journal of Animal Ethics 5 (1):5-19

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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Anonymous
Abstract:
Animal ethics committees (AECs) appeal to utilitarian principles in their justification of animal experiments. Although AECs do not grant rights to animals, they do accept that animals have moral standing and should not be unnecessarily harmed. Although many appeal to utilitarian arguments in the justification of animal experiments, I argue that AECs routinely fall short of the requirements needed for such justification in a variety of ways. I argue that taking the moral status of animals seriously—even if this falls short of granting rights to animals—should lead to a thorough revision or complete elimination of many of the current practices in animal experimentation.
Comment: This paper can be used in a course on animal research ethics.
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Galgut, Elisa. A Critique of the Cultural Defense of Animal Cruelty
2019, Journal of Animal Ethics 9 (2):184

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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Anonymous
Abstract:
I argue that cultural practices that harm animals are not morally defensible: Tradition cannot justify cruelty. My conclusion applies to all such practices, including ones that are long-standing, firmly entrenched, or held sacred by their practitioners. Following Mary Midgley, I argue that cultural practices are open to moral scrutiny, even from outsiders. Because animals have moral status, they may not be harmed without good reason. I argue that the importance of religious or cultural rituals to adherents does not count as a sufficiently good reason to harm or kill animals, since rituals are inherently symbolic, and cultures are able to adapt and change, making adherence to cruel traditions unnecessary.
Comment: This paper can be used in a class on animal ethics / rights. It argues that rituals involving harm or cruelty to animals are not justifiable. The paper can be used in a discussion on animal rights issues and multi-culturalism.
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Garcia, Jorge L. A.. Health versus Harm: Euthanasia and Physicians’ Duties
2007, Journal of Medicine and Philsophy, 31 (1): 7-24.

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Added by: Rochelle DuFord
Abstract: This essay rebuts Gary Seay's efforts to show that committing euthanasia need not conflict with a physician's professional duties. First, I try to show how his misunderstanding of the correlativity of rights and duties and his discussion of the foundation of moral rights undermine his case. Second, I show aspects of physicians' professional duties that clash with euthanasia, and that attempts to avoid this clash lead to absurdities. For professional duties are best understood as deriving from professional virtues and the commitments and purposes with which the professional as such ought to act, and there is no plausible way in which her death can be seen as advancing the patient's medical welfare. Third, I argue against Prof. Seay's assumption that apparent conflicts among professional duties must be resolved through 'balancing' and argue that, while the physician's duty to extend life is continuous with her duty to protect health, any duty to relieve pain is subordinate to these. Finally, I show that what is morally determinative here, as throughout the moral life, is the agent's intention and that Prof. Seay's implicitly preferred consequentialism threatens not only to distort moral thinking but would altogether undermine the medical (and any other) profession and its internal ethics.
Comment: This text will mostly be of use to advanced students (or courses) focusing on the ethics of physician assisted suicide or euthanasia. It presents a detailed rebuttal to Seay's "Euthanasia and Physicians' Moral Duties," so it will be of most use to students who have read Seay's text or are deeply familiar with defenses of euthanasia based in consequentialist moral reasoning.
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Gardiner, Georgi. In Defence of Reasonable Doubt
2017, Journal of Applied Philosophy 34(2): 221–41.

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi Gardiner
Abstract:
In criminal trials the state must establish, to a particular standard of proof, the defendant's guilt. The most widely used and important standard of proof for criminal conviction is the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt' standard. But what legitimates this standard, rather than an alternative? One view holds the standard of proof should be determined or justified – at least in large part – by its consequences. In this spirit, Laudan uses crime statistics to estimate risks the average citizen runs of being violently victimised and falsely convicted. He argues that since the former risk is higher, and the aggregate harms are worse, the standard of proof should be substantially lowered. He presents a formula for calculating the preferred standard. In this article I outline various ways Laudan's uses of crime statistics are flawed, and explain how he substantially overestimates risks of victimhood and underestimates costs of false convictions. I also explain why his formula is mistaken, and illuminate consequences Laudan neglects. I conclude that, even if consequences determine the appropriate standard of proof, Laudan's arguments fail to show the standard is too high. I conclude by suggesting that the inadequacies of Laudan's reasoning might be good news for consequence-based justifications of the standard of proof.
Comment: You could assign Larry Laudan (2011), ‘The Rules of Trial, Political Morality and the Costs of Error’ in Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, pp. 195–227, followed by this essay as it provides a direct critique of the former. It shows how dangerous poorly reasoning with numbers can be. Students and teachers do not need to know any statistics or crime data for this essay.
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