Georgi Gardiner. Banal Skepticism and the Errors of Doubt: On Ephecticism about Rape Accusations
2021, Midwest Studies in Philosophy
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: AnonymousAbstract:
Ephecticism is the tendency towards suspension of belief. Epistemology often focuses on the error of believing when one ought to doubt. The converse error—doubting when one ought to believe—is relatively underexplored. This essay examines the errors of undue doubt. I draw on the relevant alternatives framework to diagnose and remedy undue doubts about rape accusations. Doubters tend to invoke standards for belief that are too demanding, for example, and underestimate how farfetched uneliminated error possibilities are. They mistake seeing how incriminating evidence is compatible with innocence for a reason to withhold judgement. Rape accusations help illuminate the causes and normativity of doubt. I propose a novel kind of epistemic injustice, for example, wherein patterns of unwarranted attention to farfetched error possibilities can cause those error possibilities to become relevant. Widespread unreasonable doubt thus renders doubt reasonable and makes it harder to know rape accusations. Finally, I emphasise that doubt is often a conservative force and I argue that the relevant alternatives framework helps defend against pernicious doubt-mongers.Comment : Applies epistemology's relevant alternatives theory to diagnosis why rape accusations are doubted so much. It outlines the theory first, so no need for a pre-read. Identifies the tricks and mistakes of "doubt mongers", who refuse to believe despite good evidence. Good for an applied philosophy, feminism, or upper-level epistemology course. Also good to interject current topics / MeToo into a course. Comes with a "cheat sheet" (i.e. a handout that outlines the published essay, to make teaching it easier). A word and PDF version of the cheat sheet are here: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1Uyki8vj7_FkVHcmThrAbEiw5-BtRSF0n Applies epistemology's relevant alternatives theory to diagnosis why rape accusations are doubted so much. It outlines the theory first, so no need for a pre-read. Identifies the tricks and mistakes of "doubt mongers", who refuse to believe despite good evidence. Good for an applied philosophy, feminism, or upper-level epistemology course. Also good to interject current topics / MeToo into a course. Comes with a "cheat sheet" (i.e. a handout that outlines the published essay, to make teaching it easier). A word and PDF version of the cheat sheet are here: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1Uyki8vj7_FkVHcmThrAbEiw5-BtRSF0nGertler, Brie. Renewed Acquaintance2012, In: Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar (ed.). Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 89-123-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Lukas Schwengerer
Summary: This chapter elaborates and defends a set of metaphysical and epistemic claims that comprise what is called the acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge of the phenomenal qualities of experience. The hallmark of this approach is the thesis that, in some introspective judgments about experience, (phenomenal) reality intersects with the epistemic, that is, with the subject's grasp of that reality. While this approach is a descendant of Russell's acquaintance theory, it is epistemically more modest than that theory. The chapter shows that the acquaintance approach's hallmark thesis does not carry the ambitious epistemic implications often associated with acquaintance views. And the chapter defends that thesis from objections stemming from what is required for an epistemically substantial grasp of the phenomenal, and from Stalnaker's worry that, if the thesis were true, information about the phenomenal would be incommunicable.Comment : An in-depth discussion of the acquaintance approach to introspection, providing a clear explanation and defense of the approach.Goodship, Laura. On Dialethism1996, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):153 – 161-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
The paper discusses two problems with Graham Priest's version of dialetheism: the thesis that one cannot be rationally obliged to both accept and reject something, and the use of a Contraction-less conditional in dealing with Curry paradoxes. Some solutions are suggested.
Comment : A useful supplement to any discussion of dialetheism, as the origin of what is now known in the literature as the "Goodship project". Some familiarity with Priest's account is required for context.Grasswick, Heidi. Feminist Social Epistemology2013, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: Survey article on feminist epistemology and its intersection with social epistemology. Includes discussion on topics such as the historical development of feminist epistemology as well as on epistemic injustice and the epistemology of ignorance.Comment : It can be used as introductory/overview reading for a course on feminism, as well as social epistemology.Gyekye, Kwame. An Essay on African Philosophical Thought. The Akan Conceptual Scheme1987, Temple University Press-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Sara Peppe and Björn FreterPublisher’s Note:
In this sustained and nuanced attempt to define a genuinely African philosophy, Kwame Gyekye rejects the idea that an African philosophy consists simply of the work of Africans writing on philosophy. It must, Gyekye argues, arise from African thought itself, relate to the culture out of which it grows, and provide the possibility of a continuation of a philosophy linked to culture. Offering a philosophical clarification and interpretation of the concepts in the ontology, philosophical psychology, theology, and ethics of the Akan of Ghana, Gyekye argues that critical analyses of specific traditional African modes of thought are necessary to develop a distinctively African philosophy as well as cultural values in the modern world.Comment (from this Blueprint): A classical work of modern African philosophy and, because of its analysis of the conceptual scheme, highly relevant for the context of African philosophy and language.Haack, Susan. The Justification of Deduction1976, Mind 85 (337): 112-119.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Jie Gao
Abstract: It is often taken for granted by writers who propose - and, for that matter, by writers who oppose - 'justifications' of inductions, that deduction either does not need, or can readily be provided with, justification. The purpose of this paper is to argue that, contrary to this common opinion, problems analogous to those which, notoriously, arise in the attempt to justify induction, also arise in the attempt to justify deduction.Comment : This paper argues that justification for deduction, like justification for induction, also has the problem of circularity. It is suitable for teachings on topic of justification for inference in a course on philosophy of logic.Haack, Susan. Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology1995, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Jie Gao
Publisher's Note: In this important work, Haack develops an original theory of empirical evidence or justification, and argues its appropriateness to the goals of inquiry. In so doing, Haack provides detailed critical case studies of Lewis's foundationalism; Davidson's and Bonjour's coherentism; Popper's 'epistemology without a knowing subject'; Quine's naturalism; Goldman's reliabilism; and Rorty's, Stich's, and the Churchlands' recent obituaries of epistemology.Comment : This book includes excellent critique of pure coherentist and pure foundationalist theories of knowledge, with defense of Hacck's integrated doctrine of "foundherentism". As it is highly recommended by Putnam, this book is a fine introduction and a significant contribution to contemporary epistemology. It includes powerful and highly detailed criticism to a range of contemporary philosophers - Sir Karl Popper, W. V. O. Quine, Richard Rorty, Alvin Goldman, and Paul and Patricia Churchland among others - that can be used when views of those philosophers are examined in teaching.Haack, Susan. A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification2008, in Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon, Kim, Fant, Jeremy, and McGrath Matthew (eds.), Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd Edition-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In the debate over the structure of epistemic justification, epistemologists have opposed foundationalism to coherentism. In this paper, the author argues for "Foundherentism".Comment : Great as a further reading in an undergraduate epistemology course on the topic of the structure of the epistemic justification.Harman, Elizabeth. Does moral ignorance exculpate?2011, Ratio 24 (4):443-468.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Corbin Covington
Abstract: Non-moral ignorance can exculpate: if Anne spoons cyanide into Bill's coffee, but thinks she is spooning sugar, then Anne may be blameless for poisoning Bill. Gideon Rosen argues that moral ignorance can also exculpate: if one does not believe that one's action is wrong, and one has not mismanaged one's beliefs, then one is blameless for acting wrongly. On his view, many apparently blameworthy actions are blameless. I discuss several objections to Rosen. I then propose an alternative view on which many agents who act wrongly are blameworthy despite believing they are acting morally permissibly, and despite not having mismanaged their moral beliefs.1Harp, Randall, Kareem Khalifa. Why Pursue Unification? A Social-Epistemological Puzzle2015, Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30(3): 431-447.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Many have argued that unified theories ought to be pursued wherever possible. We deny this on the basis of social-epistemological and game-theoretic considerations. Consequently, those seeking a more ubiquitous role for unification must either attend to the scientific community's social structure in greater detail than has been the case, and/or radically revise their conception of unification.Comment : An interesting argument about how scientific practice influences the rationality of theory choice. Would be suited to any course where these issues are discussed.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
-
-
-
This site is registered on Toolset.com as a development site. -
-
-
-
-
-