Sullivan, Meghan, Peter Van Inwagen. Metaphysics
2016, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Introduction: It is not easy to say what metaphysics is. Ancient and Medieval philosophers might have said that metaphysics was, like chemistry or astrology, to be defined by its subject matter: metaphysics was the 'science' that studied 'being as such' or 'the first causes of things' or 'things that do not change'. It is no longer possible to define metaphysics that way. First, a philosopher who denied the existence of those things that had once been seen as constituting the subject-matter of metaphysics - first causes or unchanging things - would now be considered to be making thereby a metaphysical assertion. Second, there are many philosophical problems that are now considered to be metaphysical problems (or at least partly metaphysical problems) that are in no way related to first causes or unchanging things - the problem of free will, for example, or the problem of the mental and the physical. The first three sections of this entry examine a broad selection of problems considered to be metaphysical and discuss ways in which the purview of metaphysics has expanded over time. The central problems of metaphysics were significantly more unified in the Ancient and Medieval eras. Which raises a question - is there any common feature that unites the problems of contemporary metaphysics? The final two sections of the entry discuss some recent theories of the nature and methodology of metaphysics, including those that consider metaphysics as an impossible enterprise.Comment : Essential article for introducing metaphysics to undergraduete students.The article offers a clear overview of the main problems of metaphysics as well as of the historical evolution from antient to contemporary metaphysics.Sullivan, Meghan. Are There Essential Properties? No.2016, in Elizabeth Barnes (ed.) Current Controversies in Metaphysics, Routledge: 45-61.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: This paper describes motivations for the view that some objects have essential properties: properties which they must have in any world/situation where they exist (without qualification). I raise objections to the motivations for so-called ``hardcore essentialism''. And I articulate and defend an alternative theory: explanation-relative essentialism.Comment : Very useful for an intermediate Metaphysics course. Could be good to include this reading after teaching about modality, as a way to apply possible worlds talk to a new topic: are there certain properties that objects/entities must have in every possible world, in order to be that very object/entity? It could also be useful to teach de re/de dicto necessity first.Sullivan, Meghan. Modal Logic as Methodology2014, Sullivan, Meghan (2014). Modal Logic as Methodology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):734-743.-
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Added by: Christopher MastermanAbstract:
Comment : This article would work well in any masters course, or advanced undergraduate course, covering the metaphysics of logic of modality, particularly Williamson's views on these topics. This is a good replacement for Philip Bricker's article "The Methodology of Modal Logic as Metaphysics" which covers the same topic.Thalos, Mariam. A modest proposal for interpreting structural explanations1998, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49(2): 279-295.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Social sciences face a well-known problem, which is an instance of a general problem faced as well by psychological and biological sciences: the problem of establishing their legitimate existence alongside physics. This, as will become clear, is a problem in metaphysics. I will show how a new account of structural explanations, put forward by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, which is designed to solve this metaphysical problem with social sciences in mind, fails to treat the problem in any importantly new way. Then I will propose a more modest approach, and show how it does not deserve the criticism directed at a prototype by Jackson and PettitComment : An interesting argument for the value of structual explanations in sociology. Useful in the context of a discussion of reductionism or of the proper classification of social sciences as real science.The Chan School. Chapter 26: The Zen (ch’an) School of Sudden Enlightenment1963, In Chan,Wing-tsit (ed.), A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton University Press-
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Added by: Xintong WeiAbstract:
A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy covers the entire historical development of Chinese philosophy from its ancient origins to today, providing the most wide-ranging and authoritative English-language anthology of Chinese thought available. This superb book brings together key selections from all the great thinkers and schools in every period—ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary—and presents these texts in their entirety. Each selection is accompanied by explanatory aids and scholarly documentation that shed invaluable light on all aspects of Chinese thought. Featuring elegant and faithful translations of some of the most important classical writings, some translated here for the first time, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy is an indispensable resource for students, scholars, and anyone interested in Chinese philosophy and culture.Comment : available in this BlueprintThomasson, Amie. Ontology Made Easy2015, OUP USA.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Existence questions have been topics for heated debates in metaphysics, but this book argues that they can often be answered easily, by trivial inferences from uncontroversial premises. This 'easy' approach to ontology leads to realism about disputed entities, and to the view that metaphysical disputes about existence questions are misguided.Comment : An interesting presentation of a way to avoid ontological disputes. Would work well as a conclusion to a course or section on ontology, to show students there might be a way to simply avoid these debates if desired.Thomasson, Amie. Answerable and Unanswerable Questions2009, In MetaMetaphysics, eds. David Chalmers, Ryan Wasserman, and David Manley. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 444-471.-
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Added by: Jamie Collin
Summary: Thomasson argues that merely verbal disputes arise in metaphysics when ontologists misuse the words 'thing' and 'object'. Application conditions fix the conditions under which a claim can be applied or refused, but some ontological disputes involve using the terms 'thing' and 'object' in such a way that they lack application conditions. When this happens there is no way to determine the truth values of the claims being made.Comment : This would be useful in a course on metaphysics, ontology or metametaphysics. It gives an interesting and plausible articulation of the idea that some metaphysical disputes are illegitimate in some sense (an intution that some students share). This isn't an easy paper, but it is clearly written and suitable for advanced undergraduates or graduates.Thomasson, Amie L.. Research Problems and Methods in Metaphysics2012, In Robert Barnard & Neil Manson (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. Continuum International.-
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Nora Berenstain
Abstract: This article offers a guide to a key area on metaphysics and covers the fundamental questions asked in metaphysics - areas that have continued to attract interest historically as well as topics that have emerged more recently as active areas of research. It is especially focused on research methods and problems.Thomasson, Amie L.. The controversy over the existence of ordinary objects2010, Philosophy Compass 5 (7):591-601.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum
Abstract: The basic philosophical controversy regarding ordinary objects is: Do tables and chairs, sticks and stones, exist? This paper aims to do two things: first, to explain why how this can be a controversy at all, and second, to explain why this controversy has arisen so late in the history of philosophy. Section 1 begins by discussing why the 'obvious' sensory evidence in favor of ordinary objects is not taken to be decisive. It goes on to review the standard arguments against the existence of ordinary objects - including those based on problems with causal redundancy, parsimony, co-location, sorites arguments, and the special composition question. Section 2 goes on to address what it is about the contemporary approach to metaphysics that invites and sustains this kind of controversy, and helps make evident why debates about ordinary objects lead so readily to debates in metametaphysics about the nature of metaphysics itself.Comment : This is an excellent overview of arguments for and against the existence of ordinary objects.Thomasson, Amie L.. Norms and Necessity2020, Thomasson, Amie L. (2020). Norms and Necessity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oup Usa.-
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Added by: Christopher MastermanPublisher’s Note:
Philosophical theories often hinge on claims about what is necessary or possible. But what are possibilities and necessities, and how could we come to know about them? This book aims to help demystify the methodology of philosophy, by treating such claims not as attempted descriptions of strange facts or distant 'possible worlds', but rather as ways of expressing rules or norms.
Comment : Excellent addition to any course on modal metaphysics which wants to incorporate non-descriptive approaches to modality. Chapter 1 is a particularly good historical overview of conventionalism about modality and perfect for a more introductory course. Chapters 2 - 5 focuses on outlining Thomasson's own view and discusses objections and would be perfect for a more detailed or advanced course. Similarly with Chapters 6 - 8 which discuss the ontological, epistemological and methodology advantages of her view.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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