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Misak, Cheryl. Pragmatism and Deflationism
2007, in New Pragmatists, ed. C.Misak. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Added by: Jamie Collin

Summary: A contemporary defense of a pragmatist account of truth, which contrasts the view with various versions of deflationism. Misak defends the claim that to grasp the concept of truth by exploring its connections with practices we engage in - including assertion, believing, reason-giving, and inquiry. The pragmatist conception of truth, it is argued, helps to elucidate realism/anti-realism: inquiry is truth-apt when it aims at establishing propositions that are indefeasible.
Comment : A clear and contemporary reading on pragmatist appraoches to truth in a course on theories of truth. Useful for both advanced undergraduate and postgraduate courses.
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Misak, Cheryl. Truth and the End of Inquiry: A Peircean Account of Truth
2004, Oxford University Press

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, Contributed by: Quentin Pharr
Publisher’s Note:
C.S. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, argued that truth is what we would agree upon, were inquiry to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. In this book, Misak argues for and elucidates the pragmatic account of truth, paying attention both to Peirce's texts and to the requirements of a suitable account of truth. An important argument of the book is that we must be sensitive to the difference between offering a definition of truth and engaging in a distinctively pragmatic project. The pragmatic project spells out the relationship between truth and inquiry; it articulates the consequences of a statement's being true. The existence of a distinct pragmatic enterprise has implications for the status of the pragmatic account of truth and for the way in which philosophy should be conducted.
Comment : For students wanting to know more about Peirce's conception of truth, as it relates to the end of inquiry, Misak's book is an excellent first book to study. It is highly readable and authoritative. It is also a great book for understanding some of the major differences between Peirce and James, as early proponents of pragmatism who disagreed on the nature of truth. Prior readings of Peirce's philosophy will help - but, by and large, Misak provides everything that is needed for a first appreciation of the substance of his views. It is also a helpful guide for students to gather a sense of how pragmatists who are not necessarily Jamesians believe we should philosophize and inquire.
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Mohanty, J. N., Chatterjee, Amita, et. al. Indian Logic
2009, In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press

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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Abstract:

The chapter is an overview of Indian logic, with a general introduction followed by specialized sections on four different schools: Nyāya logic, Buddhist logic, Jaina logic, and Navya-Nyāya logic.

Comment : Can be used as a general reference for a course focusing on Indian logic. The various sections are independent, so each can on its own serve as a reading in any course wanting to include discussion of a particular system of logic (e.g. a general logic course, or a course in Indian philosophy).
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Montague, Michelle. Recent work on intentionality
2010, Analysis 70 (4):765 - 782.

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt

Abstract: Much recent work on intentionality has been dedicated to exploring the complex relationship between the intentional properties and the phenomenological properties of mental states. A lot of this work has focused on perception, but with the introduction of cognitive phenomenology, conscious thought and the role cognitive-phenomenological properties may play with respect to conscious thought, are likely to receive an increasing amount of attention.
Comment : This is a stub entry. Please add your comments to help us expand it
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Montague, Michelle. The Life of the Mind
2015, In Paul Coates and Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt

Abstract: What distinguishes a conscious occurrent thought from a non-conscious occurrent thought? I argue that the notion of 'access-consciousness' cannot provide a satisfactory answer and that we must appeal to phenomenological properties. If this is right, a further question arises about what kind of phenomenological features are required. Can we give a satisfactory account of what makes an occurrent thought a conscious thought solely by reference to sensory phenomenology - including both verbal and non-verbal imagery? I argue that we cannot, and that we must appeal to 'cognitive phenomenology' in order to be able to say what distinguishes conscious occurrent thought from non-conscious occurrent thought.

Comment : This is a stub entry. Please add your comments to help us expand it
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Montero, Barbara. The body problem
1999,

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt

Abstract: It seems that a solution to the body problem, or at least one that helps us to better understand the mind-body problem, is not forthcoming. And I take it this indicates that, at least for the time being, we should focus on questions other than the question 'Is the mind physical?' To this end, I would like to suggest a question that, I think, highlights some of the central concerns of both physicalists and dualists. And this is the question of whether the mental is fundamentally non-mental. For it seems that physicalism is, at least in part, motivated by the belief that the mental is ultimately non-mental, that is, that mental properties are not fundamental properties, while a central tenet of dualism, precisely, that they are. Of course the notion of the non-mental is also open ended. And, for this reason, it may be just as difficult to see, what sort of considerations are relevant in determining what counts as non-mental as it is to see what sort of considerations could be relevant in determining what counts as physical. But, of course, this is a project for another paper. One advantage, however, is that, arguably, we do have a grasp of one side of the divide - that is, the mental side. So, perhaps, rather than worrying about whether the mind is fundamentally physical, we should be concerned with whether the mind is fundamentally non-mental. And this, I should mention, is a concern that has little to do with what current physics, future physics, or a final physics says about the world.
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Moody-Adams, Michele M.. How to Disagree Without Being Disagreeable
2019, Catharsis 23

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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Joe Slater

Abstract: It is tempting to assume that disagreements about the principles, policies and institutions that shape contemporary political life - especially the disagreements that emerge during contemporary political contests in the United States - are uniquely uncivil. But for much of human history, disagreement about such matters has often been a rough and tumble affair and the best evidence of this emerges in contests for political power. Unflattering epithets about political opponents can be found in hieroglyphics on the tombs of Egyptian pharaohs, and political insult and invective were common in political competitions in ancient Rome. Moreover, with the rise of the modern political campaign and increased sophistication and complexity in the means for transmitting and targeting campaign messages innuendo, rumor, and even outright character assassination, became familiar fixtures of political life.
Comment : Discusses disagreement in politics, and how disagreement can remain respectful. Also considers the decline of civility in discourse in America and why civil disagreement is important.
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Morgan, Mary S.. The curious case of the prisoner’s dilemma: model situation? Exemplary narrative?”
2007, Science Without Laws: Model Systems, Cases, Exemplary Narratives. Science and cultural theory, ed. by Creager, Angela N. H., Lunbeck, Elizabeth, Norton Wise, M., Duke University Press, Durham, 157-185

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Added by: Björn Freter, Contributed by: Anna Alexandrova

Abstract: The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is one of the classic games discussed in game theory,  the  study  of  strategic  decision  making  in  situations  of conflict,  which  stretches  between  mathematics  and  the  social  sciences. Game theory was  primarily developed  during  the  late  1940s  and  into  the  1960s  at  a number of research sites funded by various arms of the U.S. military establishment as part of their Cold War research.

Comment : I assign this piece to give students a sense of where Prisoner's Dilemma comes from and what its ubiquity teaches us about economics (that laws matter less than exemplary situations).
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Morris, Rebecca Lea. Intellectual Generosity and the Reward Structure of Mathematics
2021, Synthese, 199(1): 345-367.

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Added by: Fenner Stanley Tanswell
Abstract:
Prominent mathematician William Thurston was praised by other mathematicians for his intellectual generosity. But what does it mean to say Thurston was intellectually generous? And is being intellectually generous beneficial? To answer these questions I turn to virtue epistemology and, in particular, Roberts and Wood's (2007) analysis of intellectual generosity. By appealing to Thurston's own writings and interviewing mathematicians who knew and worked with him, I argue that Roberts and Wood's analysis nicely captures the sense in which he was intellectually generous. I then argue that intellectual generosity is beneficial because it counteracts negative effects of the reward structure of mathematics that can stymie mathematical progress.
Comment (from this Blueprint): In this paper, Morris looks at ascriptions of intellectual generosity in mathematics, focusing on the mathematician William Thurston. She looks at how generosity should be characterised, and argues that it is beneficial in counteract some of the negative effects of the reward structure of mathematics.
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Morton, Jennifer. Moving Up Without Losing Your Way: The Ethical Costs of Upward Mobility
2019, Princeton University Press

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Added by: Tomasz Zyglewicz, Shannon Brick, Michael Greer
Publisher’s Note:
Upward mobility through the path of higher education has been an article of faith for generations of working-class, low-income, and immigrant college students. While we know this path usually entails financial sacrifices and hard work, very little attention has been paid to the deep personal compromises such students have to make as they enter worlds vastly different from their own. Measuring the true cost of higher education for those from disadvantaged backgrounds, Moving Up without Losing Your Way looks at the ethical dilemmas of upward mobility—the broken ties with family and friends, the severed connections with former communities, and the loss of identity—faced by students as they strive to earn a successful place in society. Drawing upon philosophy, social science, personal stories, and interviews, Jennifer Morton reframes the college experience, factoring in not just educational and career opportunities but also essential relationships with family, friends, and community. Finding that student strivers tend to give up the latter for the former, negating their sense of self, Morton seeks to reverse this course. She urges educators to empower students with a new narrative of upward mobility—one that honestly situates ethical costs in historical, social, and economic contexts and that allows students to make informed decisions for themselves. A powerful work with practical implications, Moving Up without Losing Your Way paves a hopeful road so that students might achieve social mobility while retaining their best selves.
Comment (from this Blueprint): In this book Jennifer Morton, a philosopher of education and political philosopher, revisits the question of upward mobility and the difficulties under-privileged college students face in completing college. She argues that they face huge, yet-unacknowledged costs: "ethical costs," that impact not just them but their wider (often-marginalized) communities. Her theses in this book therefore touch not just on the individual experiences of marginalized college kids but also on broader issues of social oppression and social change. To make her claims Morton draws on her own lived experiences as an immigrant and a philosopher teaching in a public institution. One might describe this empirical method as autoethnography, although she does not. She also draws upon interviews conducted with the population of students she's interested in, "strivers." Morton's book addresses the phenomenon of upward mobility, the ethical purposes and drawbacks of going to college, and dignifies the experiences of people from marginalized backgrounds who want to make a better life for them and their communities.
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