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Keiser, Jessica. ‘The “All Lives Matter” response: QUD-shifting as epistemic injustice’
2021, Keiser, J., 2021. The “All Lives Matter” response: QUD-shifting as epistemic injustice. Synthese, 199(3), pp.8465-8483.
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Added by: Petronella Randell
Abstract:

Drawing on recent work in formal pragmatic theory, this paper shows that the manipulation of discourse structure—in particular, by way of shifting the Question Under Discussion mid-discourse—can constitute an act of epistemic injustice. I argue that the “All Lives Matter” response to the “Black Lives Matter” slogan is one such case; this response shifts the Question Under Discussion governing the overarching discourse from Do Black lives matter? to Which lives matter? This manipulation of the discourse structure systematically obscures the intended meaning of “Black lives matter” and disincentivizes future utterances of it.

Comment: Useful in a philosophy of language course as an illustration of how questions under discussion evolve in conversation and how this might result in epistemic injustice. Could also be used to start discussions of slogans.
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Langton, Rae, West, Caroline. Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game
1999, Langton, R. and West, C., 1999. Scorekeeping in a pornographic language game. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77(3), pp.303-319.
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Added by: Petronella Randell
Abstract:

If, as many suppose, pornography changes people, a question arises as to how.1 One answer to this question offers a grand and noble vision. Inspired by the idea that pornography is speech, and inspired by a certain liberal ideal about the point of speech in political life, some theorists say that pornography contributes to that liberal ideal: pornography, even at its most violent and misogynistic, and even at its most harmful, is political speech that aims to express certain views about the good life, 2aims to persuade its consumers of a certain political point of view—and to some extent succeeds in persuading them. Ronald Dworkin suggests that the pornographer contributes to the ‘moral environment, by expressing his political or social convictions or tastes or prejudices informally’, that pornography ‘seeks to deliver’ a ‘message’ , that it reflects the ‘opinion’ that ‘women are submissive, or enjoy being dominated, or should be treated as if they did’, that it is comparable to speech ‘advocating that women occupy inferior roles’.3 Pornography on this view is political speech that aims to persuade its listeners of the truth of certain ideas about women, and of course ‘the government must leave to the people the evaluation of ideas’.4 Another answer offers a vision that is not grand and noble, but thoroughly reductive. Pornography is not politically persuasive speech, but speech that works by a process of psychological conditioning. This view seems common enough in the social science literature. Consider, for example, this description of an early experiment, from a time that pre-dates contemporary political debate.

Comment: Good companion piece for Langton and Hornsby (1993), it addresses some common objections to the view of pornography as a subordinating illocutionary act. Useful for a philosophy of language, ethics of feminist philosophy course. Suitable for core or further reading.
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Saul, Jennifer. Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics
2012, Saul, J.M., 2012. Lying, misleading, and what is said: An exploration in philosophy of language and in ethics. Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Petronella Randell
Publisher’s Note:

Comment: Useful for philosophy of language or ethics course as a core text on the lying/misleading distinction. Could also be used to draw out the importance of defining what is said in philosophy of language.
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