Siegel, Susanna. Do Visual Experiences have contents?
2010, in Nanay, Bence (eds.) Perceiving the World, Oxford University Press
Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Abstract: This paper argues that despite the differences between perception and belief, perception involves states that are importantly similar to beliefs: conscious visual experiences. According to the Content View, these experiences have contents in the form of accuracy conditions. The paper develops and defends the Content View, discusses its significance, and argues that contrary to what is often supposed, the Content View is compatible with Naive Realist disjunctivism.
Comment: This can be used as background reading for a course on epistemology of perception, insofar as the author presents clearly the Content View and its main implications (especially section 1).
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