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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Nora Heinzelmann
Abstract: Free action and microphysical determination are incompatible but this is so only in virtue of a genuine conflict between microphysical determination with any active behavior. I introduce active behavior as the veridicality condition of agentive experiences and of perceptual experiences and argue that these veridicality conditions are fulfilled in many everyday cases of human and non-human behavior and that they imply the incompatibility of active behavior with microphysical determination. The main purpose of the paper is to show that the view proposed about active behavior leads to a natural compromise between libertarianism and compatibilism, which avoids the flaws of both positions while preserving their central insights.Oshana, Marina. Personal Autonomy and Society1998, Journal of Social Philosophy 29(1): 81–102.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Content: Oshana argues against 'internalist' theories of autonomy that focus exclusively on psychological conditions internal to the agent - what goes on inside her head - and suggests instead that certain social relations must obtain between the agent and those around her for genuine autonomy to be possible.Comment: Oshana argues that personal autonomy is a socio-relational phenomenon partially constructed by external, social relations. She also offers an interesting and detailed critique of internalist accounts, which makes the text very useful in teaching on autonomy and free will in general. The text is best used as a further reading in undergraduate and a more central required reading in postgraduate teaching. It offers a good synopsis of Gerald Dworkin's influential conception of autonomy.
Roskies, Adina L.. Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility2006, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(9): 419-423.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: Recent developments in neuroscience raise the worry that understanding how brains cause behavior will undermine our views about free will and, consequently, about moral responsibility. The potential ethical consequences of such a result are sweeping. I provide three reasons to think that these worries seemingly inspired by neuroscience are misplaced. First, problems for common-sense notions of freedom exist independently of neuroscientific advances. Second, neuroscience is not in a position to undermine our intuitive notions. Third, recent empirical studies suggest that even if people do misconstrue neuroscientific results as relevant to our notion of freedom, our judgments of moral responsibility will remain largely unaffected. These considerations suggest that neuroethical concerns about challenges to our conception of freedom are misguided.Comment: Roskies offers an overview of the debate, providing useful glossary of positions related to it together with a graph representing the relations between them. This can be particularly useful when explaining the differences between the metaphysical, epistemic and ethical claims made in this debate.
Sartorio, Carolina. Causation and Free Will2016, Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist, Contributed by: Jingbo Hu
Publisher's Note: Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways.Comment: This book provides an interesting compatibilist theory for free will and moral responsibility. Chapter One can be used as an introductory material about the Frankfurt-style cases as well as the motivations for compatibilism. Chapter Four can be used as an auxiliary reading for Fischer and Ravizza's reasons-responsiveness theory for it points out some problem of their theory and provides an alternative proposal.
Steward, Helen. A Metaphysics for Freedom2012, Oxford: Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Publisher's note: A metaphysics for freedom argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself--not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. It offers a distinctive, non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom.Comment: Specific chapters (e.g. 1 and 4) would be useful for an advanced philosophy of mind/action course, but also it could be really nice to read the whole book in a dedicated Masters course - reading and discussing one chapter per seminar. Chapter 1 is especially useful because it outlines Steward's position, 'agency incompatibilism' which it could be useful to have students discuss and compare with classical compatibilism and incompatibilism. Chapter 4 is also a great one to use because it discusses animal agency - this could perhaps come towards the end of an intermediate philosophy of mind course - once students have already learned something about agency when considered in relation to humans.
Steward, Helen. The Truth in Compatibilism and the Truth of Libertarianism2009, Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):167 – 179.-
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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist, Contributed by: Will Hornett
Abstract: The paper offers the outlines of a response to the often-made suggestion that it is impossible to see how indeterminism could possibly provide us with anything that we might want in the way of freedom, anything that could really amount to control, as opposed merely to an openness in the flow of reality that would constitute the injection of chance, or randomness, into the unfolding of the processes which underlie our activity. It is suggested that the best first move for the libertarian is to make a number of important concessions to the compatibilist. It should be conceded, in particular, that certain sorts of alternative possibilities are neither truly available to real, worldly agents nor required in order that those agents act freely; and it should be admitted also that it is the compatibilist who tends to give the most plausible sorts of analyses of many of the 'can' and 'could have' statements which seem to need to be assertible of those agents we regard as free. But these concessions do not bring compatibilism itself in their wake. The most promising version of libertarianism, it is argued, is based on the idea that agency itself (and not merely some special instances of it which we might designate with the honorific appellation 'free') is inconsistent with determinism. This version of libertarianism, it is claimed, can avoid the objection that indeterminism is as difficult to square with true agential control as determinism can sometimes seem to be.Comment: Steward's paper is an innovative response to a classic problem for libertarianism in the free will debate. It should be taught in any Free Will module which deals with libertarianism and luck.
Stump, Eleonore. Knowledge, Freedom, and the Problem of Evil1983, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14(1): 49-58-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Introduction: The free-will defense successfully rebuts the claim that the presence of evil in the world is logically incompatible with God's existence. But many people, theists as well as atheists, feel that the free-will defense leaves some of the most important questions about evil unanswered. If there is a God, the nature and quantity of evil in the world still remain a puzzle; and even if they do not support a conclusive argument, they still seem to provide strong evidence against the probability of God's existence. In particular, natural evils such as diseases, congenital defects, earthquakes, and droughts, need to be given some plausible explanation which shows their existence to be compatible with God's goodness. It is the problem of evil in this sense which Swinburne addresses in Chapter 11 of The Existence of God. In what follows, I will describe Swinburne's solution and give reasons for thinking it unacceptable.Comment: This paper is a great way to motivate the 'what about natural evils?' response to the problem of evil. It does this by responding to Swinburne, so it could be good to first set Swinburne's chapter and then see whether can students can organically anticipate some of Stump's lines of argument.
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Nida-Rümelin, Martine. Freedom and the Phenomenology of Agency
2018, Erkenntnis 83 (1):61-87.
Comment: