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Added by: Christopher James MastermanAbstract:
Kit Fine and Robert Adams have independently introduced a distinction between two ways in which a proposition might be true with respect to a world. A proposition is true at a world if it correctly represents the world. A proposition is true in a world, if it exists in that world and correctly represents it. In this paper, I clarify this distinction between outer and inner truth, defend it against recent charges of unintelligibly and argue that outer truth tracks counterfactual possibility while inner truth tracks counter-actual possibility. This connection allows us to clarify the relationship between possibility, possible actuality and the thesis of serious actualism, which is the thesis that nothing could have had a property without existing. I show that this undermines serious actualists' scruples against reading sentences like `Even if Socrates had not existed, he might have' as expressing true and genuinely de re propositions about Socrates. More generally, the connection I draw provides the serious actualist with a justification for treating actually existing but contingent objects differently from how he treats merely possible objects
Comment : This text would be perfect for an advanced undergraduate or masters course on modal metaphysics and/or modal logic. It requires previous knowledge of actualism vs. possibilism debate, the literature on singular propositions, and possible worlds, as well as a familiarity with quantified modal logic. It works as a good replacement for Adams's Actualism and Thisness (1981), covering many of issues Adams covers often more accessibly.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
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Added by: Christopher MastermanAbstract:
Vetter's Potentiality is an exposition and development of a new account of possibility and necessity, given in terms of potentialities. In this critical notice, I give an outline of some of the key claims of the book. I then raise some issues for the extent to which Vetter's view can accommodate genuine de re modalities, especially those of possible existence and non-existence.
Comment : Would work excellently in conjunction with Vetter's Potentiality (OUP), particularly in any undergraduate or masters course on modality which incorporates discussion of dispositionalist views of modality.Difficulty: IntermediateRecommended use: FurtherComments (0): read and add advice on using this textExport citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
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Added by: Christopher MastermanAbstract:
Comment : This article would work well in any masters course, or advanced undergraduate course, covering the metaphysics of logic of modality, particularly Williamson's views on these topics. This is a good replacement for Philip Bricker's article "The Methodology of Modal Logic as Metaphysics" which covers the same topic.Difficulty: AdvancedRecommended use: SpecialisedComments (0): read and add advice on using this textExport citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
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Added by: Christopher MastermanPublisher’s Note:
Philosophical theories often hinge on claims about what is necessary or possible. But what are possibilities and necessities, and how could we come to know about them? This book aims to help demystify the methodology of philosophy, by treating such claims not as attempted descriptions of strange facts or distant 'possible worlds', but rather as ways of expressing rules or norms.
Comment : Excellent addition to any course on modal metaphysics which wants to incorporate non-descriptive approaches to modality. Chapter 1 is a particularly good historical overview of conventionalism about modality and perfect for a more introductory course. Chapters 2 - 5 focuses on outlining Thomasson's own view and discusses objections and would be perfect for a more detailed or advanced course. Similarly with Chapters 6 - 8 which discuss the ontological, epistemological and methodology advantages of her view.Difficulty: IntermediateRecommended use: Introductory, Overview, SpecialisedComments (0): read and add advice on using this textExport citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format