Gardiner, Georgi. The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof
2019, Philosophy & Public Affairs 47(3): 288–318.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
According to a common conception of legal proof, satisfying a legal burden requires establishing a claim to a numerical threshold. Beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often glossed as 90% or 95% likelihood given the evidence. Preponderance of evidence is interpreted as meaning at least 50% likelihood given the evidence. In light of problems with the common conception, I propose a new ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for legal standards of proof. Relevant alternative accounts of knowledge state that a person knows a proposition when their evidence rules out all relevant error possibilities. I adapt this framework to model three legal standards of proof—the preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond reasonable doubt standards. I describe virtues of this framework. I argue that, by eschewing numerical thresholds, the relevant alternatives framework avoids problems inherent to rival models. I conclude by articulating aspects of legal normativity and practice illuminated by the relevant alternatives framework.Comment: This can introduce upper-level epistemology students to the relevant alternatives theory. For epistemology training, it pairs well with David Lewis "Elusive Knowledge" or (for a more applied approach) can also be paired with an essay on the proof paradox.
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