Gardiner, Georgi. The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof
2019, Philosophy & Public Affairs 47(3): 288–318.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
According to a common conception of legal proof, satisfying a legal burden requires establishing a claim to a numerical threshold. Beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often glossed as 90% or 95% likelihood given the evidence. Preponderance of evidence is interpreted as meaning at least 50% likelihood given the evidence. In light of problems with the common conception, I propose a new ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for legal standards of proof. Relevant alternative accounts of knowledge state that a person knows a proposition when their evidence rules out all relevant error possibilities. I adapt this framework to model three legal standards of proof—the preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond reasonable doubt standards. I describe virtues of this framework. I argue that, by eschewing numerical thresholds, the relevant alternatives framework avoids problems inherent to rival models. I conclude by articulating aspects of legal normativity and practice illuminated by the relevant alternatives framework.Comment: This can introduce upper-level epistemology students to the relevant alternatives theory. For epistemology training, it pairs well with David Lewis "Elusive Knowledge" or (for a more applied approach) can also be paired with an essay on the proof paradox.
Gardiner, Georgi. The She Said, He Said Paradox and the Proof Paradox
2021, In Zachary Hoskins and Jon Robson (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge, pp. 124–143.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
This essay introduces the ‘she said, he said’ paradox for Title IX investigations. ‘She said, he said’ cases are accusations of rape, followed by denials, with no further significant case-specific evidence available to the evaluator. In such cases, usually the accusation is true. Title IX investigations adjudicate sexual misconduct accusations in US educational institutions; I address whether they should be governed by the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard of proof or the higher ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard. Orthodoxy holds that the ‘preponderance’ standard is satisfied if the evidence adduced renders the litigated claim more likely than not. On this view, I argue, ‘she said, he said’ cases satisfy the ‘preponderance’ standard. But this consequence conflicts with plausible liberal and feminist claims. In this essay I contrast the ‘she said, he said’ paradox with legal epistemology’s proof paradox. I explain how both paradoxes arise from the distinction between individualised and non-individualised evidence, and I critically evaluate responses to the ‘she said, he said’ paradox.Comment: This can be paired with an essay on the proof paradox in legal epistemology. Gardiner has a "cheat sheet" on her website for teaching this essay.
Gardiner, Georgi. Corroboration
2023, American Philosophical Quarterly 60(2): 131–148.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
Corroborating evidence supports a proposition that is already supported by other initial evidence. It bolsters or confirms the original body of evidence. Corroboration has striking psychological and epistemic force: It potently affects how people do and should assess the target proposition. This essay investigates the distinctive powers of corroborating evidence. Corroboration does not simply increase the quantifiable probability of the adjudicated claim. Drawing on the relevant alternatives framework, I argue that corroboration winnows remaining uneliminated error possibilities. This illuminates the independence, weight, and non-fungibility of corroborating evidence. I compare corroborating evidence to prudential safeguards, like fire doors, that forfend against non-epistemic harms. I thereby sketch a general, non-quantificational model of risk management. Finally, I turn to legal corroboration requirements and the epistemic significance of corroboration for legal proof.Comment: Can be used to either introduce the Relevant Alternatives Theory or as part of a sequence on legal epistemology. Gardiner has a "cheat sheet" on her website for teaching this essay.
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