Gardiner, Georgi. Corroboration
2023, American Philosophical Quarterly 60(2): 131–148.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
Corroborating evidence supports a proposition that is already supported by other initial evidence. It bolsters or confirms the original body of evidence. Corroboration has striking psychological and epistemic force: It potently affects how people do and should assess the target proposition. This essay investigates the distinctive powers of corroborating evidence. Corroboration does not simply increase the quantifiable probability of the adjudicated claim. Drawing on the relevant alternatives framework, I argue that corroboration winnows remaining uneliminated error possibilities. This illuminates the independence, weight, and non-fungibility of corroborating evidence. I compare corroborating evidence to prudential safeguards, like fire doors, that forfend against non-epistemic harms. I thereby sketch a general, non-quantificational model of risk management. Finally, I turn to legal corroboration requirements and the epistemic significance of corroboration for legal proof.Comment: Can be used to either introduce the Relevant Alternatives Theory or as part of a sequence on legal epistemology. Gardiner has a "cheat sheet" on her website for teaching this essay.
Gardiner, Georgi, Zaharatos, Brian. The Safe, the Sensitive, and the Severely Tested: A Unified Account
2022, Synthese 200(5): 1–33
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
This essay presents a unified account of safety, sensitivity, and severe testing. S’s belief is safe iff, roughly, S could not easily have falsely believed p, and S’s belief is sensitive iff were p false S would not believe p. These two conditions are typically viewed as rivals but, we argue, they instead play symbiotic roles. Safety and sensitivity are both valuable epistemic conditions, and the relevant alternatives framework provides the scaffolding for their mutually supportive roles. The relevant alternatives condition holds that a belief is warranted only if the evidence rules out relevant error possibilities. The safety condition helps categorise relevant from irrelevant possibilities. The sensitivity condition captures ‘ruling out’. Safety, sensitivity, and the relevant alternatives condition are typically presented as conditions on warranted belief or knowledge. But these properties, once generalised, help characterise other epistemic phenomena, including warranted inference, legal verdicts, scientific claims, reaching conclusions, addressing questions, warranted assertion, and the epistemic force of corroborating evidence. We introduce and explain Mayo’s severe testing account of statistical inference. A hypothesis is severely tested to the extent it passes tests that probably would have found errors, were they present. We argue Mayo’s account is fruitfully understood using the resulting relevant alternatives framework. Recasting Mayo’s condition using the conceptual framework of contemporary epistemology helps forge fruitful connections between two research areas—philosophy of statistics and the analysis of knowledge—not currently in sufficient dialogue. The resulting union benefits both research areas.Comment: This essay can be paired with Deborah Mayo, to explain her view. It can also be used at the end of a "safety versus sensitivity" modue or a module on rival theories of knowledge, to suggest how the views can be compatible. The math can be skipped over. Gardiner has a "cheat sheet" on her website for this essay.
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