Ivanova, Milena, Paternotte, Cedric. Theory Choice, Good Sense and Social Consensus
2013, Erkenntnis 78 (5):1109-1132.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Milena IvanovaAbstract: There has been a significant interest in the recent literature in developing a solution to the problem of theory choice which is both normative and descriptive, but agent-based rather than rule-based, originating from Pierre Duhem's notion of 'good sense'. In this paper we present the properties Duhem attributes to good sense in different contexts, before examining its current reconstructions advanced in the literature and their limitations. We propose an alternative account of good sense, seen as promoting social consensus in science, and show that it is superior to its rivals in two respects: it is more faithful to Duhemian good sense, and it cashes out the effect that virtues have on scientific progress. We then defend the social consensus account against objections that highlight the positive role of diversity and division of labour in scienceComment:Grasswick, Heidi. Feminist Social Epistemology2013, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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Added by: Giada FratantonioSummary: Survey article on feminist epistemology and its intersection with social epistemology. Includes discussion on topics such as the historical development of feminist epistemology as well as on epistemic injustice and the epistemology of ignorance.Comment: It can be used as introductory/overview reading for a course on feminism, as well as social epistemology.Spaulding, Shannon. Mind Misreading2016, Philosophical Issues 26 (1): 422-440.
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Added by: Andrea BlomqvistAbstract: Most people think of themselves as pretty good at understanding others' beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions. Accurate mindreading is an impressive cognitive feat, and for this reason the philosophical literature on mindreading has focused exclusively on explaining such successes. However, as it turns out, we regularly make mindreading mistakes. Understanding when and how mind misreading occurs is crucial for a complete account of mindreading. In this paper, I examine the conditions under which mind misreading occurs. I argue that these patterns of mind misreading shed light on the limits of mindreading, reveal new perspectives on how mindreading works, and have implications for social epistemology.Comment: Unlike most papers in the mindreading debate, this paper focuses on the cases in which we fail to mindread. It relates these cases to self-awareness, and suggests how this could be explored to shed light on peer disagreement and epistemic injustice. This paper would fit in well in a social cognition syllabus.Mills, Charles W.. White Ignorance2007, In Suvllian, Shannon & Tuana, Nancy (eds). Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. State University of New York Press, Albany.
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Added by: Helen Morley, Contributed by: Kei Hiruta
<strong>Abstract:</strong> The development of social epistemology in recent decades is a welcome turn away from Cartesian individualism. But the centrality of oppression to societies in general is still insufficiently recognized in this literature. This chapter looks at “white ignorance†as an example of a particular kind of systemic group-based miscognition that has been hugely influential over the past few hundred years. After a ten-point clarification of the concept, it turns to an examination of white ignorance as it plays itself out in the complex interaction of Eurocentric perception and categorization, white normativity, social memory and social amnesia, the derogation of non-white testimony, racial group interests, and motivated irrationality.
Comment: Argues that "color blindness" contributes to perpetuating racial injustice. Good introductory text to issues of justice in a race context.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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