Bobzien, Susanne. Stoic Syllogistic
1996, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 14: 133-92.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Giada FratantonioAbstract: For the Stoics, a syllogism is a formally valid argument; the primary function of their syllogistic is to establish such formal validity. Stoic syllogistic is a system of formal logic that relies on two types of argumental rules: (i) 5 rules (the accounts of the indemonstrables) which determine whether any given argument is an indemonstrable argument, i.e. an elementary syllogism the validity of which is not in need of further demonstration; (ii) one unary and three binary argumental rules which establish the formal validity of non-indemonstrable arguments by analysing them in one or more steps into one or more indemonstrable arguments (cut type rules and antilogism). The function of these rules is to reduce given non-indemonstrable arguments to indemonstrable syllogisms. Moreover, the Stoic method of deduction differs from standard modern ones in that the direction is reversed (similar to tableau methods). The Stoic system may hence be called an argumental reductive system of deduction. In this paper, a reconstruction of this system of logic is presented, and similarities to relevance logic are pointed out.Comment: This paper can be used as specialised/further reading for an advanced undergrad or postgraduate course on ancient logic or as a primary reading in an advanced undergrad or postgraduate course on Stoic logic. Alternatively, given that the text argues that there are important parallels between Stoic logic and Relevance logic, it could be used in a course on Relevance logic as well. It requires prior knowledge of logic (in particular, proof theory).
Boden, Margaret. Escaping from the Chinese Room
1988, reprinted in Mind Design III, John Haugeland, Carl Craver, and Colin Klein (eds), The MIT Press
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Alnica VisserAbstract:
John Searle, in his paper on 'Minds, Brains, and Programs' (1980), argues that computational theories in psychology are essentially worthless. He makes two main claims: that computational theories, being purely formal in nature, cannot possibly help us to understand mental processes; and that computer hardware-unlike neuroprotein-obviously lacks the right causal powers to generate mental processes. I shall argue that both these claims are mistaken.
Comment: Excellent summary of the Chinese Room argument along with some interesting objections. Can be used as a follow-up reading to Searle, but also in place of it.
Boden, Margaret A.. Intentionality and physical systems
1970, Philosophy of Science 32 (June):200-214.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktAbstract: Intentionality is characteristic of many psychological phenomena. It is commonly held by philosophers that intentionality cannot be ascribed to purely physical systems. This view does not merely deny that psychological language can be reduced to physiological language. It also claims that the appropriateness of some psychological explanation excludes the possibility of any underlying physiological or causal account adequate to explain intentional behavior. This is a thesis which I do not accept. I shall argue that physical systems of a specific sort will show the characteristic features of intentionality. Psychological subjects are, under an alternative description, purely physical systems of a certain sort. The intentional description and the physical description are logically distinct, and are not intertranslatable. Nevertheless, the features of intentionality may be explained by a purely causal account, in the sense that they may be shown to be totally dependent upon physical processes.
Bodunrin, Peter Oluwambe. The Question of African Philosophy
1981, Philosophy. 56 (216): 161-179.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Sara Peppe and Björn FreterAbstract:
Philosophy in Africa has for more than a decade now been dominated by the discussion of one compound question, namely, is there an African philosophy, and if there is, what is it? The first part of the question has generally been unhesitatingly answered in the affirmative. Dispute has been primarily over the second part of the question as various specimens of African philosophy presented do not seem to pass muster. Those of us who refuse to accept certain specimens as philosophy have generally been rather illogically said also to deny an affirmative answer to the first part of the question. In a paper presented at the International Symposium in Memory of Dr William Amo, the Ghanaian philosopher who taught in German universities in the early part of the eighteenth century, Professor Odera Oruka identified four trends, perhaps more appropriately approaches, in current African philosophyComment (from this Blueprint): The article is focused on the theme of African philosophy giving a clear picture of the difficulties in defining what is African philosophy. This paper does not treat the theme of African philosophy and African language, but it provides a base for the above-mentioned debate giving an account picture of African philosophy. The paper indicates that the philosopher Oruka found four trends in African philosophy: Ethno-philosophy, Philosophy sagacity, Nationalist-ideological philosophy and Professional philosophy. The author highlights that the nature of African philosophy is understood differently by the various contemporary African thinkers. And, the article deeply considers the effects of contact with Western populations. Thus, the article links the philosophical problem of defining philosophy in Africa with colonialism. Moreover, Bodunrin examines the four categories of African philosophy proposed by Oruka in the light of the four challenges Africa faces after entering in contact with Western countries.
Bok, Sissela. Whistleblowing and Professional Responsibility
1980, New York University Education Quarterly, 11(4): 2-10.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Chris HowardAbstract: Individuals who would blow the whistle by making public disclosure of impropriety in their own organizations face choices of public v private good. These dilemmas, along with institutional and professional standards that might ease the way of whistleblowers, are explored.Comment: This is a great piece to pair with popular media covering recent acts of whistleblowing (e.g., by Ed Snowden or Susan Fowler), getting students to analyze real world acts of whistleblowing through the framework Bok sets out. The piece doesn't require any significant background in moral theory, and is sure to spark great discussion, particularly if students are provided with real life examples of whistleblowing that they can consider in conjunction with Bok's discussion.
Bok, Sissela. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life
1978, Vintage Books.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktAbstract: A thoughtful addition to the growing debate over public and private morality. Looks at lying and deception in law, family, medicine, government.
Bok, Sissela. The Limits of Confidentiality
1983, Hastings Center Report 13 (1):24-31.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktIntroduction: Doctors, lawyers, and priests have traditionally recog nized the duty of professional secrecy regarding what individuals confide to them: personal matters such as alcoholism or depression, marital difficulties, corporate or political problems, and indeed most concerns that patients or clients want to share with someone, yet keep from all others.' Accountants, bankers, social workers, and growing numbers of professionals now invoke a similar duty to guard confidences. As codes of ethics take form in old and new professions, the duty of confidentiality serves in part to reinforce their claim to professional status, and in part to strengthen their capacity to offer help to clients.
Bokulich, Alisa. How scientific models can explain
2009, Synthese 180(1): 33-45.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Laura JimenezAbstract: Scientific models invariably involve some degree of idealization, abstraction, or fictionalization of their target system. Nonetheless, I argue that there are circumstances under which such false models can offer genuine scientific explanations. After reviewing three different proposals in the literature for how models can explain, I shall introduce a more general account of what I call model explanations, which specify the conditions under which models can be counted as explanatory. I shall illustrate this new framework by applying it to the case of Bohr's model of the atom, and conclude by drawing some distinctions between phenomenological models, explanatory models, and fictional models.Comment: Interesting paper about scientific modelling. It is easy to read and could serve as an introduction to the topic. The paper explores three approaches to Model Explanations: mechanist model explanations, covering-law model explanations, and causal model explanations. The explanatory function in models is illustrated with the example of Bohr's atom. This article is recommended for undergraduate students.
Bokulich, Alisa. Distinguishing Explanatory from Nonexplanatory Fictions
2012, Philosophy of Science 79(5): 725-737.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Jamie CollinAbstract: There is a growing recognition that fictions have a number of legitimate functions in science, even when it comes to scientific explanation. However, the question then arises, what distinguishes an explanatory fiction from a nonexplanatory one? Here I examine two cases - one in which there is a consensus in the scientific community that the fiction is explanatory and another in which the fiction is not explanatory. I shall show how my account of "model explanations" is able to explain this asymmetry, and argue that realism - of a more subtle form - does have a role in distinguishing explanatory from nonexplanatory fictions.Comment: This would be useful in a course on the philosophy of science or the philosophy of fiction. It is particularly useful for teaching, as it is cutting edge in the philosophy of science but not particularly technical.
Booth, Annie. We are the Land: Native American Views of Nature
2003, in H. Selin (ed.), Nature Across Cultures. Science Across Cultures: The History of Non-Western Science, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Kas BernaysAbstract:
This is how one Native American presents her interpretation of the indigenous understanding of nature. As we will see in this article, many Native Americans present similar understandings. Their reciprocal relationships with nature permeated every aspect of life from spirituality to making a living and led to a different way of seeing the world, what they might call a more “environmental” way of seeing the world. But is this a true picture? Increasingly there has been debate over the nature of the Native American’s relationship to the land, both past and present. This article will examine this debate and the way in which Native Americans view nature.Comment (from this Blueprint): An introduction to the views of nature which proliferate across different Native American philosophies, with a consideration of contemporary discourses about whether environmentalist readings are an accurate or appropriate treatment of Native American traditions of thought.
Can’t find it?
Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!