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Added by: Simon Fokt
Introduction: Dworkin puts forth two main arguments to justify adhering to the wishes the patient expressed before becoming demented. As he sees it, this course of action both promotes the patient’s well-being and is required in order to respect the patient’s autonomy. In each argument, while I consider most of the ideas well-founded, I challenge the crucial premise. In the argument focused on the patient’s well-being, I dispute the claim that demented patients are no longer capable of generating what Dworkin calls “critical interests.” In the argument concerning autonomy, I question the premise that demented patients no longer possess the “capacity for autonomy.”7 In each case, I will trace how the problematic premise arises within Dworkin’s argument and then develop an alternative account of the relevant capacity.Jeffers, Chike. The Ethics and Politics of Cultural Preservation2015, Journal of Value Inquiry 49(1-2): 205-220.-
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Added by: Erich Hatala Matthes
Summary: Jeffers offers an account of the moral permissibility, and moreover, praiseworthiness of cultural preservation for the sake of the continued existence of cultural groups. He defends this argument against challenges about inauthenticity and incoherence leveled by Jeremy Waldron and Sam Scheffler. In a political context, Jeffers argues that cultural preservation can be obligatory as a component of resistance against colonialism and racism.Comment: This text is readily applicable to a variety of cultural practices that constitute part of a cultural heritage or practice. It offers thoughtful considerations for discussion concerning the reasons one might have to engage (or not) in a particular cultural artistic practice.
Jenkins Ichikawa, Jonathan. Presupposition and Consent2020, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly. 6(4).-
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Added by: Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-MooreAbstract:
I argue that “consent” language presupposes that the contemplated action is or would be at someone else’s behest. When one does something for another reason—for example, when one elects independently to do something, or when one accepts an invitation to do something—it is linguistically inappropriate to describe the actor as “consenting” to it; but it is also inappropriate to describe them as “not consenting” to it. A consequence of this idea is that “consent” is poorly suited to play its canonical central role in contemporary sexual ethics. But this does not mean that nonconsensual sex can be morally permissible. Consent language, I’ll suggest, carries the conventional presupposition that that which is or might be consented to is at someone else’s behest. One implication will be a new kind of support for feminist critiques of consent theory in sexual ethics.Comment (from this Blueprint): Here Ichikawa argues that the language of "consent" to sex presupposes that there is a 'requester' who asks for sex and a 'consenter' who then replies yes or no. Ichikawa argues that this reinforces sexist norms of how sex works.
Jenkins, Carrie. Entitlement and rationality2007, Synthese 157 (1): 25-45.-
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Added by: Jie Gao
Abstract: This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright's notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should characterize epistemic rationality.Comment: This paper critically examines Wright's notion of entitlement, therefore it is natural to use it as a further disucssion material on Wright's paper (On epistemic entitlement: Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free?), 2004). Suitable for a senior undergraduate course on epistemology for topics on entitlement and epistemic rationality.
Jenkins, Carrie. What can we know a priori?2014, Neta, Ram (ed.), Current Controversies in Epistemology. London: Routledge. 11-22.-
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Added by: Jie Gao
Abstract: Michael Devitt has been developing an influential two-pronged attack on the a priori for over thirteen years. This attack does not attempt to undermine the coherence or significance of the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori, but rather to answer the question: 'What Can We Know A Priori?' with: 'Nothing'. In this paper I explain why I am dissatisfied with key extant responses to Devitt's attack, and then take my own steps towards resisting the attack as it appears in two recent incarnations. Devitt aims firstly to undermine the motivation for believing in any a priori knowledge, and secondly to provide reasons directly against believing in any. I argue that he misidentifies the motivations available to the a priorist, and that his reasons against believing in the a priori do not take account of all the options. I also argue that his attempt to combine the two prongs of the attack into an abductive argument for his anti-a priorist position does not succeed.Comment: Suitable for an upper-level undergraduate courses or master courses on epistemology. It is good for teachings on topics of a priori knowledge.
Jenkins, Carrie. What Is Love? An Incomplete Map of the Metaphysics2015, Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1(2): 349-364.-
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Added by: Rie Iizuka
Abstract: The paper begins by surveying a range of possible views on the metaphysics of romantic love, organizing them as responses to a single question. It then outlines a position, constructionist functionalism, according to which romantic love is characterized by a functional role that is at least partly constituted by social matters (social institutions, traditions, and practices), although this role may be realized by states that are not socially constructed.Comment: This paper is a good and clear introduction to metaphysics of love. The author offers a map of the options for a metaphysician of love, and she proposes her own view called constructionist functionalism on love.
Jenkins, David, Kimberley Brownlee. What a Home Does2022, Law and Philosophy 41 (4):441-468-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
Analytic philosophy has largely neglected the topic of homelessness.
The few notable exceptions, including work by Jeremy Waldron and Christopher
Essert, focus on our interests in shelter, housing, and property rights, but ignore the
key social functions that a home performs as a place in which we are welcomed,
accepted, and respected. This paper identifies a ladder of home-related concepts
which begins with the minimal notion of temporary shelter, then moves to persistent
shelter and housing, and finally to the rich notion of a home which focuses on meeting
our social needs including, specifically, our needs to belong and to have meaningful
control over our social environment. This concept-ladder enables us to distinguish
the shelterless from the sheltered; the unhoused from the housed; and the unhomed
from the homed. It also enables us to decouple the concept of a home from property
rights, which reveals potential complications in people’s living arrangements. For
instance, a person could be sheltered but unhoused, housed but homeless, or, indeed,
unhoused but homed. We show that we should reserve the concept of home to
capture the rich idea of a place of belonging in which our core social needs are met.Comment: This paper provides an in-depth exploration of existing analytic literature on the concept of home and the topic of homelessness, and provides a novel account of both. As such, it would be a useful addition to any syllabus interested in social ethics, social rights, and social needs. It could be used as a specialised reading for courses interested in questions of justice regarding access to a home or exploring the sorts of needs which constitute social needs. It is also written in a clear, straightforward style, and is therefore accessible to a wide range of experience levels, so it would be possible to use in a more introductory or general context as well. For an intro-level social or political philosohpy, for example, it could be used to introduce or supplement discussions on social welfare or duties of the state.
Jenkins, Katharine. Amelioration and Includion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman2016, Ethics 126(2): 394-421.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: Feminist analyses of gender concepts must avoid the inclusion problem, the fault of marginalizing or excluding some prima facie women. Sally Haslanger's 'ameliorative' analysis of gender concepts seeks to do so by defining woman by reference to subordination. I argue that Haslanger's analysis problematically marginalizes trans women, thereby failing to avoid the inclusion problem. I propose an improved ameliorative analysis that ensures the inclusion of trans women. This analysis yields 'twin' target concepts of woman, one concerning gender as class and the other concerning gender as identity, both of which I hold to be equally necessary for feminist aims.Comment: In my view this paper is a 'must include' in any feminist philosophy course with a unit on the metaphysics of gender - or on a social ontology course. Especially useful in conjunction with Haslanger's 'Gender and Race: (What) are they? (What) do we want them to be?'
Jenkins-Ichikawa, Carrie. Knowledge of Arithmetic2005, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56: 727-747.-
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Added by: Jamie Collin
Abstract: The goal of the research programme I describe in this article is a realist epistemology for arithmetic which respects arithmetic's special epistemic status (the status usually described as a prioricity) yet accommodates naturalistic concerns by remaining funda- mentally empiricist. I argue that the central claims which would allow us to develop such an epistemology are (i) that arithmetical truths are known through an examination of our arithmetical concepts; (ii) that (at least our basic) arithmetical concepts are accurate mental representations of elements of the arithmetical structure of the inde- pendent world; (iii) that (ii) obtains in virtue of the normal functioning of our sensory apparatus. The first of these claims protects arithmetic's special epistemic status relative, for example, to the laws of physics, the second preserves the independence of arithmetical truth, and the third ensures that we remain empiricists.Comment: Useful as a primary or secondary reading in an advanced undergraduate course epistemology (in a section on a priori knowledge) or an advanced undergraduate course on philosophy of mathematics. This is not an easy paper, but it is clear. It is also useful within a teaching context, as it provides a summary of the influential neo-Fregean approach to mathematical knowledge.
Jeshion, Robin. Frege’s Notions of Self-Evidence2001, Mind 110 (440):937-976-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Alexander Yates
Abstract: Controversy remains over exactly why Frege aimed to estabish logicism. In this essay, I argue that the most influential interpretations of Frege's motivations fall short because they misunderstand or neglect Frege's claims that axioms must be self-evident. I offer an interpretation of his appeals to self-evidence and attempt to show that they reveal a previously overlooked motivation for establishing logicism, one which has roots in the Euclidean rationalist tradition. More specifically, my view is that Frege had two notions of self-evidence. One notion is that of a truth being foundationally secure, yet not grounded on any other truth. The second notion is that of a truth that requires only clearly grasping its content for rational, a priori justified recognition of its truth. The overarching thesis I develop is that Frege required that axioms be self-evident in both senses, and he relied on judging propositions to be self-evident as part of his fallibilist method for identifying a foundation of arithmetic. Consequently, we must recognize both notions in order to understand how Frege construes ultimate foundational proofs, his methodology for discovering and identifying such proofs, and why he thought the propositions of arithmetic required proof.Comment: A nice discussion of what sort of epistemic status Frege thought axioms needed to have. A nice historical example of foundationalist epistemology - good for a course on Frege or analytic philosophy more generally, or as further reading in a course on epistemology, to give students a historical example of certain epistemological subtleties.
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Jaworska, Agnieszka. Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the Capacity to Value
1999, Philosophy and Public Affairs 28(2): 105–138.
Comment: Jaworska asks: 'Should we, in our efforts to best respect a patient with dementia, give priority to the preferences and attitudes this person held before becoming demented, or should we follow the person’s present preferences?' (p. 108). The article offers a useful critical overview of the views expressed by Rebecca Dresser and Ronald Dworkin. It is best used as a primary reading in ethics classes focusing directly on medical ethics or autonomy, or as further reading in general ethics teaching on autonomy.