Topic: Epistemology -> Social Epistemology
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Grasswick, Heidi. Feminist Social Epistemology
2013, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: Survey article on feminist epistemology and its intersection with social epistemology. Includes discussion on topics such as the historical development of feminist epistemology as well as on epistemic injustice and the epistemology of ignorance.
Comment: It can be used as introductory/overview reading for a course on feminism, as well as social epistemology.
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Haraway, Donna. Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective
1988, Feminist Studies 14(3), pp. 575-599
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Added by: Olivia Maegaard Nielsen
Abstract:

Academic and activist feminist inquiry has repeatedly tried to come to terms with the question of what we might mean by the curious and inescapable term "objectivity." We have used a lot of toxic ink and trees processed into paper decrying what they have meant and how it hurts us. The imagined "they" constitute a kind of invisible conspiracy of masculinist scientists and philosophers replete with grants and laboratories. The imagined "we" are the embodied others, who are not allowed not to have a body, a finite point of view, and so an inevitably disqualifying and polluting bias in any discussion of consequence outside our own little circles, where a "mass"-subscription journal might reach a few thousand
readers composed mostly of science haters.

Comment: A classic in feminist, postmodernist, and social epistemologies. In this text, Haraway introduces the concept 'situated knowledge', which plays a big role in many philosophical subfields, especially in standpoint epistemologies. It would be a great introductory text in seminars on feminist epistemology or as a complimentary critique in introductory epistemology courses.
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Harding, Sandra. The science question in feminism
1986, Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press
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Added by: Björn Freter

Publisher's Note: Can science, steeped in Western, masculine, bourgeois endeavors, nevertheless be used for emancipatory ends? In this major contribution to the debate over the role gender plays in the scientific enterprise, Sandra Harding pursues that question, challenging the intellectual and social foundations of scientific thought. Harding provides the first comprehensive and critical survey of the feminist science critiques, and examines inquiries into the androcentricism that has endured since the birth of modern science. Harding critiques three epistemological approaches: feminist empiricism, which identifies only bad science as the problem; the feminist standpoint, which holds that women's social experience provides a unique starting point for discovering masculine bias in science; and feminist postmodernism, which disputes the most basic scientific assumptions. She points out the tensions among these stances and the inadequate concepts that inform their analyses, yet maintains that the critical discourse they foster is vital to the quest for a science informed by emancipatory morals and politics.

Comment: Core text in feminist philosophy of science.
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Harding, Sandra. Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?
1991, Ithaca: Cornell University Press
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Added by: Björn Freter

Publisher's Note: Sandra Harding here develops further the themes first addressed in her widely influential book, The Science Question in Feminism, and conducts a compelling analysis of feminist theories on the philosophical problem of how we know what we know. Following a strong narrative line, Harding sets out her arguments in highly readable prose. In Part 1, she discusses issues that will interest anyone concerned with the social bases of scientific knowledge. In Part 2, she modifies some of her views and then pursues the many issues raised by the feminist position which holds that women's social experience provides a unique vantage point for discovering masculine bias and and questioning conventional claims about nature and social life. In Part 3, Harding looks at the insights that people of color, male feminists, lesbians, and others can bring to these controversies, and concludes by outlining a feminist approach to science in which these insights are central. "Women and men cannot understand or explain the world we live in or the real choices we have," she writes, "as long as the sciences describe and explain the world primarily from the perspectives of the lives of the dominant groups." Harding's is a richly informed, radical voice that boldly confronts issues of crucial importance to the future of many academic disciplines. Her book will amply reward readers looking to achieve a more fruitful understanding of the relations between feminism, science, and social life.

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Harding, Sandra. Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is “Strong Objectivity”?
1993, In Alcoff, L. & Potter, E. (eds.), Feminist Epistemologies, New York: Routledge, pp. 49-82.
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Added by: Olivia Maegaard Nielsen
Abstract:

In this paper, Harding demonstrates how starting inquiry from the lives of the marginalized is a prerequisite to what she calls "Strong objectivity". She outlines the central arguments for feminist standpoint theories and contrasts them with the objectivist ideals of traditional science, who, she argues, are only able to achieve weak objectivity.

Comment: A key read in standpoint epistemologies, explaining how starting from marginalized lives can create what Harding calls 'Strong Objectivity'. The arguments are fairly accessible and at the same time, there is plenty of potential for discussion.
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Harman, Elizabeth. Does moral ignorance exculpate?
2011, Ratio 24 (4):443-468.

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Corbin Covington
Abstract: Non-moral ignorance can exculpate: if Anne spoons cyanide into Bill's coffee, but thinks she is spooning sugar, then Anne may be blameless for poisoning Bill. Gideon Rosen argues that moral ignorance can also exculpate: if one does not believe that one's action is wrong, and one has not mismanaged one's beliefs, then one is blameless for acting wrongly. On his view, many apparently blameworthy actions are blameless. I discuss several objections to Rosen. I then propose an alternative view on which many agents who act wrongly are blameworthy despite believing they are acting morally permissibly, and despite not having mismanaged their moral beliefs.1
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Harp, Randall, Kareem Khalifa. Why Pursue Unification? A Social-Epistemological Puzzle
2015, Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30(3): 431-447.

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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Many have argued that unified theories ought to be pursued wherever possible. We deny this on the basis of social-epistemological and game-theoretic considerations. Consequently, those seeking a more ubiquitous role for unification must either attend to the scientific community's social structure in greater detail than has been the case, and/or radically revise their conception of unification.
Comment: An interesting argument about how scientific practice influences the rationality of theory choice. Would be suited to any course where these issues are discussed.
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Haslanger, Sally. Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?
2000, Nous 34(1): 31-55.

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Added by: Carl Fox
Abstract: This paper proposes social constructionist accounts of gender and race. The focus of the inquiry--inquiry aiming to provide resources for feminist and antiracist projects--are the social positions of those marked for privilege or subordination by observed or imagined features assumed to be relevant to reproductive function, or geographical origins. I develop these ideas and propose that other gendered and racialized phenomena are usefully demarcated and explained by reference to these social positions. In doing so, I address the concern that attempts to define race or gender are misguided because they either assume a false commonality or marginalize some members of the group in question.
Comment: Seminal reading for modules on gender or race.
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Hill Collins, Patricia. Black Feminist Thought
2000, 2nd Edition. Routledge

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Added by: Anne-Marie McCallion
Publisher’s Note:

In spite of the double burden of racial and gender discrimination, African-American women have developed a rich intellectual tradition that is not widely known. In Black Feminist Thought, originally published in 1990, Patricia Hill Collins set out to explore the words and ideas of Black feminist intellectuals and writers, both within the academy and without. Here Collins provides an interpretive framework for the work of such prominent Black feminist thinkers as Angela Davis, bell hooks, Alice Walker, and Audre Lorde. Drawing from fiction, poetry, music and oral history, the result is a book that provided the first synthetic overview of Black feminist thought and its canon.

Comment: Patricia Hill Collins is an American academic specializing in race, class, and gender. She is a Distinguished University Professor of Sociology Emerita at the University of Maryland. She was the 100th president of the ASA and the first African-American woman to hold this position. Collins's work primarily concerns issues involving race, gender, and social inequality within the African-American community. In Black Feminist Thought, Collins sets out to explore the words and ideas of Black feminist intellectuals and writers, both within the academy and without. Here Collins provides an interpretive framework for the work of such prominent Black feminist thinkers as Angela Davis, bell hooks, Alice Walker, and Audre Lorde. In this chapter, Collins outlines and illuminates the framework for a black feminist epistemology by juxtaposing it against Western epistemologies that have dominated and hindered thought. In doing so, Collins also underlines the necessity of alternative epistemologies to render the lives of black women intelligible.
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Hoagland, Sarah Lucia. Denying Relationality: Epistemology and Ethics and Ignorance
2007, In Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana (eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. SUNY Press.

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In this chapter, the author argues that epistemological and ethical practices of ignorance are strategic and involve a strategic denial of relationality, namely, of the way in which subjects are formed through relation with each other.
Comment: Good as a further reading for a course on epistemology of ignorance.
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