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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Simon Prosser
Abstract: I argue that we should reject the sparse view that there are or could be only a small number of rather distinct senses. When one appreciates this then one can see that there is no need to choose between the standard criteria that have been proposed as ways of individuating the senses—representation, phenomenal character, proximal stimulus and sense organ—or any other criteria that one may deem important. Rather, one can use these criteria in conjunction to form a fine-grained taxonomy of the senses. We can think of these criteria as defining a multidimensional space within which we can locate each of the senses that we are familiar with and which also defines the space of possible senses there could be.
Maddy, Penelope. Naturalism in Mathematics1997, Oxford: Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Jamie Collin
Publisher's Note: Our much-valued mathematical knowledge rests on two supports: the logic of proof and the axioms from which those proofs begin. Naturalism in Mathematics investigates the status of the latter, the fundamental assumptions of mathematics. These were once held to be self-evident, but progress in work on the foundations of mathematics, especially in set theory, has rendered that comforting notion obsolete. Given that candidates for axiomatic status cannot be proved, what sorts of considerations can be offered for or against them? That is the central question addressed in this book. One answer is that mathematics aims to describe an objective world of mathematical objects, and that axiom candidates should be judged by their truth or falsity in that world. This promising view - realism - is assessed and finally rejected in favour of another - naturalism - which attends less to metaphysical considerations of objective truth and falsity, and more to practical considerations drawn from within mathematics itself. Penelope Maddy defines this naturalism, explains the motivation for it, and shows how it can be helpfully applied in the assessment of candidates for axiomatic status in set theory. Maddy's clear, original treatment of this fundamental issue is informed by current work in both philosophy and mathematics, and will be accessible and enlightening to readers from both disciplines.Comment: Good further reading in advanced undergraduate or postgraduate courses on metaphysics, naturalism or philosophy of mathematics. Sections from the book - for instance, the chapters in Part II on indispensability considerations in scientific and mathematical practice - could be profitably read on their own. These sections may also be of interest in philosophy of science courses, as they provide a careful analysis of scientific practice (as it relates to what scientists take themselves to be ontologically committed to).
Maddy, Penelope. Three Forms of Naturalism2005, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, (ed.) S. Shapiro. New York: Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Jamie Collin
Summary: A clear introduction to mathematical naturalism and its Quinean roots; developing and defending Maddy's own naturalist philosophy of mathematics. Maddy claims that the Quinian ignores some nuances of scientific practice that have a bearing on what the naturalist should take to be the real scientific standards of evidence. Historical studies show that scientists sometimes do not take themselves to be committed to entities that are indispensably quantified over in their best scientific theories, hence the Quinian position that naturalism dictates that we are committed to entities that are indispensably quantified over in our best scientific theories is incorrect.Comment: Good primary reading in advanced undergraduate or postgraduate courses on metaphysics, naturalism or philosophy of mathematics. This would serve well both as a clear and fairly concise introduction to Quinean naturalism and to the indispensability argument in the philosophy of mathematics.
Magidor, Ofra, Stephen Kearns. Epistemicism about vagueness and meta-linguistic safety2008, Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1): 277-304.-
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Added by: Berta Grimau
Abstract: The paper challenges Williamson's safety based explanation for why we cannot know the cut-off point of vague expressions. We assume throughout (most of) the paper that Williamson is correct in saying that vague expressions have sharp cut-off points, but we argue that Williamson's explanation for why we do not and cannot know these cut-off points is unsatisfactory. In sect 2 we present Williamson's position in some detail. In particular, we note that Williamson's explanation relies on taking a particular safety principle ('Meta-linguistic belief safety' or 'MBS') as a necessary condition on knowledge. In section 3, we show that even if MBS were a necessary condition on knowledge, that would not be sufficient to show that we cannot know the cut-off points of vague expressions. In section 4, we present our main case against Williamson's explanation: we argue that MBS is not a necessary condition on knowledge, by presenting a series of cases where one's belief violates MBS but nevertheless constitutes knowledge. In section 5, we present and respond to an objection to our view. And in section 6, we briefly discuss the possible directions a theory of vagueness can take, if our objection to Williamson's theory is taken on board.Comment: This paper would work well as a secondary reading in a course on vagueness with a section on epistemicism. For instance, the course could present Williamson's as the main proposal within that tradition and then turn to this paper for criticism and an alternative proposal within the same tradition.
McGowan, M.K. The Metaphysics of Squaring Scientific Realism with Referential Indeterminacy1999, Erkenntnis 50(1): 87-94.-
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Introduction: Scientific realism and the claim that there is radical referential indeterminacy are important and compelling philosophical theses. Each thesis has advocates and for good reason. On cursory examination, however, it seems that these theses are at odds with one another. It seems that one cannot both claim that science seeks to describe an objective reality and yet deny that reality is objectively structured in such a way as to determine the referents of our terms. Since there are compelling reasons in favour of each thesis and since it appears that some philosophers actually advocate both theses (Quine himself may be one such example), finding a way to square the theses would be multiply advantageous. On this paper, the author argues that despite the prima facie tension between them, these theses are indeed cotenable.Comment: Interesting paper that lies on the intersection between philosophy of science and philosophy of language. It could be used as a secondary reading for postgraduate courses in philosophy of science, in particular for lectures on the topic of scientific realism. The level of difficulty is not high, but it is more recommendable for students who have been introduced before to concepts such as realism, subjective supervientism and referential indeterminacy.
McKenzie, Kerry. Ontic Structural Realism2017, Philosophy Compass 12(4).-
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Abstract: Ontic structural realism is at its core the view that 'structure is ontologically fundamental.' Informed from its inception by the scientific revolutions that punctuated the 20th century, its advocates often present the position as the perspective on ontology best befitting of modern physics. But the idea that structure is fundamental has proved difficult to articulate adequately, and what OSR's claimed naturalistic credentials consist in is hard to precisify as well. Nor is it clear that the position is actually supported by our most fundamental physical theories. What is clear, however, is that structuralists have revealed a seam of material at the core of modern physics that is replete with implications for metaphysics. This article surveys some positions subsumed under the rubric of OSR, considering both their warrant and the interconnections that exist between them. The author argues that the fundamental kind properties pose a challenge to ontic structuralism, because it seems that these properties do not supervene upon the relevant structures. The development of structuralist metaphysics will require both an engagement with the details of modern physical theories and the deployment of tools more typically developed in a priori metaphysics. As such, it seems armchair metaphysicians have not just a stake in whether OSR's claims may ultimately be shown to stand up, but a crucial role to play in getting them to the point where they can be subjected to scrutiny in the first place.Comment: This paper offers a good overview of Ontic Structural Realism and its two distinct doctrines: eliminative structuralism and priority-based structuralism. It could serve as a specialized reading for postgraduate courses in philosophy of science. Before reading this paper, students should first acquire some knowledge on the basic features of structural realism.
McWeeny, Jennifer. Which Bodies Have Minds? Feminism, Panpsychism, and the Attribution Question2022, in McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 272-293-
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Abstract:
This article develops a new framework for addressing the attribution question, the question of which bodies have minds, by bringing a feminist perspective to metaphysical considerations about the mind. McWeeny argues that the attribution question, when applied to individuals who have been subject to different sorts of oppression, is not only a question about whose bodies have minds but also a question about the degree of "mentality" attributed to certain individuals and the mental constitution of those individuals.Comment (from this Blueprint): McWeeny provides a novel examination of the attribution question by looking into what might be considered one of the most inclusive theories about the mind: panpsychism. According to Panpsychism, "mentality is ubiquitous in nature". Thus, we should expect panpsychism to hold an equal attribution across all bodies, and assert that all bodies have minds, without discrimination. McWeeny shows us, upon further examination, how mainstream panpsychist views (Russelian or physicalist panpsychism) fail to do so. McWeeny provides a detailed analysis of how Cavendishian Panpsychism is more well-placed to give a feminist perspective on the attribution question.
Megan Wallace. Composition as Identity: Part 12011, Philosophy Compass 6 (11): 804–827-
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Added by: Björn Freter, Contributed by: Eric de Araujo
Abstract: Many of us think that ordinary objects – such as tables and chairs – exist. We also think that ordinary objects have parts: my chair has a seat and some legs as parts, for example. But once we are committed to the thesis that ordinary objects are composed of parts, we then open ourselves up to a whole host of philosophical problems, most of which center on what exactly the composition relation is. Composition as Identity is the view that the composition relation is the identity relation. While such a view has some advantages, there are many arguments against it. In this essay, I will briefly canvass three different varieties of Composition as Identity, and suggest why one of them should be preferred over the others. Then I will outline several versions of the most common objection against CI. I will suggest how a CI theorist can respond to these charges by maintaining that some of the arguments are invalid.
Comment: This introduction to the Composition as Identity debate can either stand alone among a collection of topics in metaphysics, or as an entry into more readings. It presents a range of Composition as Identity positions and helpfully organises objections to the view. Note: there are two parts to this article and this is the first. This introduction to the Composition as Identity debate can either stand alone among a collection of topics in metaphysics, or as an entry into more readings. It presents a range of Composition as Identity positions and helpfully organises objections to the view. Note: there are two parts to this article and this is the first.
Mikkola, Mari. Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender2016, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Introduction: Feminism is the movement to end women's oppression. One possible way to understand 'woman' in this claim is to take it as a sex term: 'woman' picks out human females and being a human female depends on various anatomical features (like genitalia). Historically many feminists have understood 'woman' differently: not as a sex term, but as a gender term that depends on social and cultural factors (like social position). In so doing, they distinguished sex (being female or male) from gender (being a woman or a man), although most ordinary language users appear to treat the two interchangeably. More recently this distinction has come under sustained attack and many view it nowadays with (at least some) suspicion. This entry (around 12 000 words in length) outlines and discusses distinctly feminist debates on sex and gender.Comment: A great first core text for any feminist philosophy, philosophy of sex and gender (or similar) module. Would also be very good to include on a social metaphysics course. Gives a clear and detailed overview of the main rival conceptions of gender, as well as of the relationship between the terms 'sex' and 'gender'.
Mikkola, Mari. Gender Concepts and Intuitions2009, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39(4): 559-583.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: The gender concept woman is central to feminism but has proven to be notoriously difficult to define. Some feminist philosophers, most notably Sally Haslanger, have recently argued for revisionary analyses of the concept where it is defined pragmatically for feminist political purposes. I argue against such analyses: pragmatically revising woman may not best serve feminist goals and doing so is unnecessary. Instead, focusing on certain intuitive uses of the term 'woman' enables feminist philosophers to make sense of it.Comment: In my view this paper is a 'must include' in any feminist philosophy course with a unit on the metaphysics of gender - or on a social ontology course. Especially useful in conjunction with Haslanger's 'Gender and Race: (What) are they? (What) do we want them to be?' - since it provides some really interesting and discussion-provoking responses to this paper.
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Macpherson, Fiona. Taxonomising the Senses
2011, Philosophical Studies, 153 (2011)
Comment: A research paper, but can serve as an introduction to the issue about the individuation of the senses.