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Fisher, Jennifer. On the Philosophy of Logic
2007, Cengage Learning.

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Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Matt Clemens

Publisher's Note: Jennifer Fisher's On the Philosophy of Logic explores questions about logic often overlooked by philosophers. Which of the many different logics available to us is right? How would we know? What makes a logic right in the first place? Is logic really a good guide to human reasoning? An ideal companion text for any course in symbolic logic, this lively and accessible book explains important logical concepts, introduces classical logic and its problems and alternatives, and reveals the rich and interesting philosophical issues that arise in exploring the fundamentals of logic.

Comment: This book provides an introduction to some traditional questions within philosophy of logic. Moreover, it presents some non-classical logics. It includes an introduction to formal classical logic, so no previous technical knowledge is required. Adequate for a first course on philosophy of logic, either as main or further reading.

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Fourcade, Marion, Ollion, Etienne, Algan, Yann. The Superiority of Economics
2015, Journal of economic perspectives 29.1, 89-114

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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Anna Alexandrova

Abstract: In this essay, we investigate the dominant position of economics within the network of the social sciences in the United States. We begin by documenting the relative insularity of economics, using bibliometric data. Next, we analyze the tight management of the field from the top down, which gives economics its characteristic hierarchical structure. Economists also distinguish themselves from other social scientists through their much better material situation (many teach in business schools, have external consulting activities), their more individualist worldviews, and in the confidence, they have in their discipline’s ability to fix the world’s problems. Taken together, these traits constitute what we call the superiority of economists, where economists’ objective supremacy is intimately linked with their subjective sense of authority and entitlement. While this superiority has certainly fueled economists’ practical involvement and their considerable influence over the economy, it has also exposed them more to conflicts of interests, political critique, even derision.

Comment: Good overview of the sociology of contemporary economics, how much prestige and hierarchy matter to them, and how poorly they view other social scientists.

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Francois, Karen, Vandendriessche, Eric. Reassembling Mathematical Practices: a Philosophical-Anthropological Approach
2016, Revista Latinoamericana de Etnomatemática Perspectivas Socioculturales de la Educación Matemática, 9(2): 144-167.

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Added by: Fenner Stanley Tanswell
Abstract:
In this paper we first explore how Wittgenstein’s philosophy provides a conceptual tools to discuss the possibility of the simultaneous existence of culturally different mathematical practices. We will argue that Wittgenstein’s later work will be a fruitful framework to serve as a philosophical background to investigate ethnomathematics (Wittgenstein 1973). We will give an overview of Wittgenstein’s later work which is referred to by many researchers in the field of ethnomathematics. The central philosophical investigation concerns Wittgenstein’s shift to abandoning the essentialist concept of language and therefore denying the existence of a universal language. Languages—or ‘language games’ as Wittgenstein calls them—are immersed in a form of life, in a cultural or social formation and are embedded in the totality of communal activities. This gives rise to the idea of rationality as an invention or as a construct that emerges in specific local contexts. In the second part of the paper we introduce, analyse and compare the mathematical aspects of two activities known as string figure-making and sand drawing, to illustrate Wittgenstein’s ideas. Based on an ethnomathematical comparative analysis, we will argue that there is evidence of invariant and distinguishing features of a mathematical rationality, as expressed in both string figure-making and sand drawing practices, from one society to another. Finally, we suggest that a philosophical-anthropological approach to mathematical practices may allow us to better understand the interrelations between mathematics and cultures. Philosophical investigations may help the reflection on the possibility of culturally determined ethnomathematics, while an anthropological approach, using ethnographical methods, may afford new materials for the analysis of ethnomathematics and its links to the cultural context. This combined approach will help us to better characterize mathematical practices in both sociological and epistemological terms.

Comment (from this Blueprint): Francois and Vandendriessche here present a later Wittgensteinian approach to “ethnomathematics”: mathematics practiced outside of mainstream Western contexts, often focused on indigenous or tribal groups. They focus on two case studies, string-figure making and sand-drawing, in different geographic and cultural contexts, looking at how these practices are mathematical.

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Franklin, L. R.. Exploratory Experiments
2005, Philosophy of Science 72(5): 888-899.

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Added by: Nick Novelli

Abstract: Philosophers of experiment have acknowledged that experiments are often more than mere hypothesis-tests, once thought to be an experiment's exclusive calling. Drawing on examples from contemporary biology, I make an additional amendment to our understanding of experiment by examining the way that `wide' instrumentation can, for reasons of efficiency, lead scientists away from traditional hypothesis-directed methods of experimentation and towards exploratory methods.

Comment: Good exploration of the role of experiments, challenging the idea that they are solely useful for testing clearly defined hypotheses. Uses many practical examples, but is very concise and clear. Suitable for undergraduate teaching in an examination of scientific methods in a philosophy of science course.

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Freidel, David, Schele, Linda, Parker, Joy. Maya Cosmos: Three Thousand Years on the Shaman’s Path
1995, William Morrow

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Added by: M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández Villarreal
Publisher’s Note:

The ancient Maya, through their shamans, kings, warriors, and scribes, created a legacy of power and enduring beauty. The landmark publication of A Forest of Kings presented the first accessible, dramatic history of this great civilization, written by experts in the translation of glyphs. Now, in Maya Cosmos, Freidel, Schele, and Parker examine Maya mythology and religion, unraveling the question of how these extraordinary people, five million strong, have managed to preserve their most sacred beliefs into modern times. In Maya Cosmos, the authors draw upon translations of sacred texts and histories spanning thousands of years to tell us a story of the Maya, not in our words but in theirs.

Comment (from this Blueprint): The book contextualises the Mayan Popol Vuh. Chapter 2 contextualizes the creation of human beings in the wider context of the Quiché creation myth. Chapter 4 introduces the Mayan notions of k’ul (ch’ul), essence or vital force, used to denote a sacred aspect of human that is not identical with their bodies but is inserted into them; chanul (also kanul) which is a supernatural guardian that accompanies a person and shares with them their vital force; and the ‘white flower’ and the idea that the soul is created and abandons the body in the moment of death.

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Friend, Michele. Introducing Philosophy of Mathematics
2007, Acumen; reprinted by Routledge (2014).

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Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Matt Clemens

Publisher's Note: What is mathematics about? Does the subject-matter of mathematics exist independently of the mind or are they mental constructions? How do we know mathematics? Is mathematical knowledge logical knowledge? And how is mathematics applied to the material world? In this introduction to the philosophy of mathematics, Michele Friend examines these and other ontological and epistemological problems raised by the content and practice of mathematics. Aimed at a readership with limited proficiency in mathematics but with some experience of formal logic it seeks to strike a balance between conceptual accessibility and correct representation of the issues. Friend examines the standard theories of mathematics - Platonism, realism, logicism, formalism, constructivism and structuralism - as well as some less standard theories such as psychologism, fictionalism and Meinongian philosophy of mathematics. In each case Friend explains what characterises the position and where the divisions between them lie, including some of the arguments in favour and against each. This book also explores particular questions that occupy present-day philosophers and mathematicians such as the problem of infinity, mathematical intuition and the relationship, if any, between the philosophy of mathematics and the practice of mathematics. Taking in the canonical ideas of Aristotle, Kant, Frege and Whitehead and Russell as well as the challenging and innovative work of recent philosophers like Benacerraf, Hellman, Maddy and Shapiro, Friend provides a balanced and accessible introduction suitable for upper-level undergraduate courses and the non-specialist.

Comment: This book provides an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics. No previous mathematical skills/knowledge required. Suitable for undergraduate courses on philosophy of mathematics.

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Frowe, Helen. The Duty to Remove Statues of Wrongdoers
2019, Journal of Practical Ethics 7(3):1-31

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Added by: Ten-Herng Lai
Abstract:
This paper argues that public statues of persons typically express a positive evaluative attitude towards the subject. It also argues that states have duties to repudiate their own historical wrongdoing, and to condemn other people’s serious wrongdoing. Both duties are incompatible with retaining public statues of people who perpetrated serious rights violations. Hence, a person’s being a serious rights violator is a sufficient condition for a state’s having a duty to remove a public statue of that person. I argue that this applies no less in the case of the ‘morally ambiguous’ wrongdoer, who both accomplishes significant goods and perpetrates serious rights violations. The duty to remove a statue is a defeasible duty: like most duties, it can be defeated by lesser-evil considerations. If removing a statue would, for example, spark a violent riot that would risk unjust harm to lots of people, the duty to remove could be outweighed by the duty not to foreseeably cause unjust harm. This would provide a lesser-evil justification for keeping the statue. But it matters that the duty to remove is outweighed, rather than negated, by these consequences. Unlike when a duty is negated, one still owes something in cases of outweighing. And it especially matters that it is outweighed by the predicted consequences of wrongful behaviour by others.

Comment (from this Blueprint): This paper highlights several important things. First, statues are blunt tools and express pro-attitudes to the persons they represent as a whole. Second, it sets out a clear standard for removal, and defends the conclusion that we should remove many or even most existing statues. Third, to the question “what if removal incites violence?” this paper provides a good answer. Fourth, a legitimate question is what we should do about statues of wrongdoers of the distant past? The discussion on this here is insightful.

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Galavotti, Maria Carla. A Philosophical Introduction to Probability
2005, CSLI Publications

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Added by: Sara Peppe

Publisher's Note: Not limited to merely mathematics, probability has a rich and controversial philosophical aspect. 'A Philosophical Introduction to Probability' showcases lesser-known philosophical notions of probability and explores the debate over their interpretations. Galavotti traces the history of probability and its mathematical properties and then discusses various philosophical positions on probability, from the Pierre Simon de Laplace's 'classical' interpretation of probability to the logical interpretation proposed by John Maynard Keynes. This book is a valuable resource for students in philosophy and mathematics and all readers interested in notions of probability

Comment: Very good article for philosophy of science and philosophy of probability courses. It works perfectly to build basic knowledge on the theme of probability.

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Galavotti, Maria Carla. The notion of subjective probability in the works of Ramsey and de Finetti
1991, Theoria 57 (3): 239-259.

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Added by: Sara Peppe

Introduction: The decade from the mid-twenties to the mid-thirties was undoubtedly the most crucial for the twentieth Century notion of subjective probability. It was in 1926 that Frank Ramsey wrote his essay 'Truth and probability', presented at the Moral Science Club in Cambridge and published posthumously in 1931. There he put forward for the first time a definition of probability as degree of belief, that had been anticipated only by E. Borel in 1924, in a review of J. M. Keynes' Treatise on Ten years after Ramsey's paper, namely in 1935, Bruno de Finetti gave a series of lectures at the Institut Poincare in Paris, published in 1937 under the title 'La prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives'. In this paper subjective probability, defined in a way analogous to that adopted by Ramsey, was implemented with the notion of exchangeability, that de Finetti had already worked out in 1928- 1930. Exchangeability confers applicability to the notion of subjective probability, and fills the gap between frequency and probability as degree of belief. It was only when these two were tied together that subjectivism could become a full-fledged interpretation of probability and gain credibility among probabilists and statisticians. One can then say that with the publication of 'La prévision' the formation process of a subjective notion of probability was completed.

Comment: This article is focused on subjective probability in the works of Ramsey and de Finetti even if the main part of the work is devoted to Ramsey. This text is crucial in order to understand the subjectivist line of thinking.

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Galgut, Elisa. Raising the Bar in the Justification of Animal Research
2015, Journal of Animal Ethics 5 (1):5-19

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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Anonymous
Abstract:
Animal ethics committees (AECs) appeal to utilitarian principles in their justification of animal experiments. Although AECs do not grant rights to animals, they do accept that animals have moral standing and should not be unnecessarily harmed. Although many appeal to utilitarian arguments in the justification of animal experiments, I argue that AECs routinely fall short of the requirements needed for such justification in a variety of ways. I argue that taking the moral status of animals seriously—even if this falls short of granting rights to animals—should lead to a thorough revision or complete elimination of many of the current practices in animal experimentation.

Comment: This paper can be used in a course on animal research ethics.

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