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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
Logical nihilism can be understood as the view that there are no laws of logic. This paper presents both a counterexample-based argument in favor of logical nihilism, and a way to resist it by using Lakatos' method of lemma incorporation. The price to pay is the loss of absolute generality.
Saint-Croix, Catharine. Privilege and Position: Formal Tools for Standpoint Epistemology2020, Res Philosophica, 97(4), 489-524-
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
How does being a woman affect one’s epistemic life? What about being black? Or queer? Standpoint theorists argue that such social positions can give rise to otherwise unavailable epistemic privilege. “Epistemic privilege” is a murky concept, however. Critics of standpoint theory argue that the view is offered without a clear explanation of how standpoints confer their benefits, what those benefits are, or why social positions are particularly apt to produce them. But this need not be so. This article articulates a minimal version of standpoint epistemology that avoids these criticisms and supports the normative goals of its feminist forerunners. With this foundation, we develop a formal model in which to explore standpoint epistemology using neighborhood semantics for modal logic.
Comment (from this Blueprint): The paper contains a very extensive introduction to standpoint theory and its history, making it well suited for a course on modal logic (showcasing an application) or on formal epistemology. Formal elements are introduced with a lot of examples and informal discussion, so the paper might also be used in a course focusing on standpoint theory, although familiarity with (some) formal semantics is still a prerequisite.
Plumwood, Val. The Politics of Reason: Towards a Feminist Logic1993, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71(4): 436-462-
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
The author argues that there is a strong connection between the dualisms that have strengthened and naturalized systematic oppression across history (man/woman, reason/emotion, etc.), and "classical" logic. It is suggested that feminism's response should not be to abandon logic altogether, but rather to focus on the development of alternative, less oppressive forms of rationality, of which relevant logics provide an example.
Comment (from this Blueprint): This is a seminal text of feminist logic, and thus a natural pick for any course wanting to discuss the topic. It could however also be assigned in a course on relevant logics interested in discussing particular applications, especially if such a course has previously spent time on the arguments in Plumwood's "False laws of logic" (or more generally, in Sylvan&co's "Relevant logics and their rivals"). Eckert and Donahue's "Towards a Feminist Logic" is a useful reading companion.
Eichler, Lauren. Sacred Truths, Fables, and Falsehoods: Intersections between Feminist and Native American Logics2018, APA Newsletter on Native American and Indigenous Philosophy, 18(1).-
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
From the newsletter's introduction: "Lauren Eichler [...] examines the resonances between feminist and Native American analyses of classical logic. After considering the range of responses, from overly monolithic rejection to more nuanced appreciation, Eichler argues for a careful, pluralist understanding of logic as she articulates her suggestion that feminists and Native American philosophers could build fruitful alliances around this topic."
Comment:
available in this Blueprint
Scott, Patricia Bell. Debunking Sapphire: Toward a Non-Racist and Non-Sexist Social Science1977, The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, 4 (6)-
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Added by: Tomasz Zyglewicz, Shannon Brick, Michael GreerAbstract:
The term "Sapphire" is frequently used to describe an age-old image of Black women. The caricature of the dominating, emasculating Black woman is one which historically has saturated both the popular and scholarly literature. The purpose of this paper is debunk the "Sapphire" caricature as it has been projected in American social science. By exposing the racist and sexist underpinnings of this stereotype, it is hoped that more students and scholars might be sensitized and encouraged to contribute to the development of a nonracist and non-sexist social science.Comment (from this Blueprint): In this 1977 article, Patricia Bell Scott explains how social sciences had theretofore been racist, sexist, and classist in their research of Black women. She identifies concrete failings and biases in the approach of socials sciences towards Black women, and suggests concrete agendas for research institutions, moving forward.
Gruen, Lori. Animals1991, In Peter Singer (ed.) A Companion to Ethics, Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, Malden, 343-353-
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Added by: Björn FreterAbstract:
While there are different philosophical principles that may help in deciding how we ought to treat animals, one strand runs through all those that withstand critical scrutiny: we ought not to treat animals the way we, as a society, are treating them now. We are very rarely faced with lifeboat decisions: our moral choices are not usually ones that exist in extremes. It simply isn’t the case that I will suffer great harm without a fur coat or a leg of lamb. The choice between our baby and our dog is one that virtually none of us will be forced to make. The hypothetical realm is one where we can clarify and refine our moral intuitions and principles, but our choices and the suffering of billions of animals are not hypothetical. However the lines are drawn, there are no defensible grounds for treating animals in any way other than as beings worthy of moral consideration.Comment (from this Blueprint): Introduction into basic questions of (non-human) animal ethics.
Donaldson, Sue, Kymlicka, Will. Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights2011, Oxford University Press-
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Added by: Björn FreterPublisher’s Note:
Zoopolis offers a new agenda for the theory and practice of animal rights. Most animal rights theory focuses on the intrinsic capacities or interests of animals, and the moral status and moral rights that these intrinsic characteristics give rise to. Zoopolis shifts the debate from the realm of moral theory and applied ethics to the realm of political theory, focusing on the relational obligations that arise from the varied ways that animals relate to human societies and institutions. Building on recent developments in the political theory of group-differentiated citizenship, Zoopolis introduces us to the genuine "political animal". It argues that different types of animals stand in different relationships to human political communities. Domesticated animals should be seen as full members of human-animal mixed communities, participating in the cooperative project of shared citizenship. Wilderness animals, by contrast, form their own sovereign communities entitled to protection against colonization, invasion, domination and other threats to self-determination. `Liminal' animals who are wild but live in the midst of human settlement (such as crows or raccoons) should be seen as "denizens", resident of our societies, but not fully included in rights and responsibilities of citizenship. To all of these animals we owe respect for their basic inviolable rights. But we inevitably and appropriately have very different relations with them, with different types of obligations. Humans and animals are inextricably bound in a complex web of relationships, and Zoopolis offers an original and profoundly affirmative vision of how to ground this complex web of relations on principles of justice and compassion.Comment (from this Blueprint): An introduction to the groundbreaking theory of Zoopolis focussing on developing a political vision of human aninmals and non-human animals living together.
McKenna, Erin. Living with Animals: Rights, Responsibilities, and Respect2020, Rowman and Littlefield-
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Added by: Björn FreterPublisher’s Note:
Living with Animals brings a pragmatist ecofeminist perspective to discussions around animal rights, animal welfare, and animal ethics to move the conversation beyond simple use or non-use decisions. Erin McKenna uses a case study approach with select species to question how humans should live and interact with various animal beings through specific instances of such relationships. Addressing standard topics such as the use of animals for food, use for biomedical research, use in entertainment, use as companions, use as captive specimens in zoos, and use in hunting and ecotourism through a revolutionary pluralist and experimental approach, McKenna provides an uncommonly nuanced accounts for complex relationships and changing circumstances. Rather than seek absolute moral stands regarding human relationships with other animal beings, and rather than trying to end such relationships altogether, the books urges us to make existing relations better.Comment (from this Blueprint): This chapter provides philosophical arguments for a better understanding of the complexity of human relationships with other animal beings through a pragmatist and ecofeminist lens.
Joy, Melanie. Why we Love Dogs, Eat Pigs and Wear Cows2009, Red Wheel-
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Added by: Björn FreterPublisher’s Note:
Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows offers an absorbing look at what social psychologist Melanie Joy calls carnism, the belief system that conditions us to eat certain animals when we would never dream of eating others. Carnism causes extensive animal suffering and global injustice, and it drives us to act against our own interests and the interests of others without fully realizing what we are doing. Becoming aware of what carnism is and how it functions is vital to personal empowerment and social transformation, as it enables us to make our food choices more freely—because without awareness, there is no free choice.Comment (from this Blueprint): Introduction to Joy's concept of carnism, the invisible but dominant paradigm used to defend meat consumption; argues against carnism, by showing that there is indeed a problem with eating non-human animals, that meat eating is not necessarily to be understood as normal, that carnism prevents the cognitive dissonance (of caring for animals and at the same time consuming them) by re-defining non-human animals as objects.
Carpenter, Amber. Amber Carpenter on Animals in Indian Philosophy [Podcast]2018, History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps [Blog]-
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Added by: Björn FreterAbstract:
An interview with Amber Carpenter about the status of nonhuman animals in ancient Indian philosophy and literature.Comment (from this Blueprint): An interview about the status of nonhuman animals in ancient Indian philosophy and literature; a very good complement to her paper.
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Russell, Gillian. Logical Nihilism: Could there be no Logic?
2018, Philosophical Issues, 28: 308-324
Comment: The paper is appropriate for any course discussing the monism vs pluralism vs nihilism debate in logic (or maybe even focusing on varieties of logical nihilism). On a technical level it requires no more than an introduction to formal logic; some familiarity with monist and pluralist positions is helpful for context.