Topic: Social Philosophy -> Gender Sex and Sexuality
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Adams, Laurie. Art on Trial: From Whistler to Rothko
1976, New York: Walker & Co

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Christy Mag Uidhir
Publisher's Note: This book examines six modern art trials covering a wide range of legal and artistic considerations ... the first in-depth examination of the art trial from every intriguing point of view.
Comment: Of particular interest is chapter 4: Traitor or forger? - Van Meegeren vs. Vermeer, dealing with issues of authenticity, forgery, and art ontology
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Akiode, Olajumoke. African Philosophy, its Questions, the Place and the Role of Women and its Disconnect with its World
2018, in Chimakonam, J. and du Toit, L. (eds.), African Philosophy and the Epistemic Marginalization of Women. London, New York: Routledge

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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc Gwodog
Abstract:
An African philosophy that excludes women despite its African cultural origin and DNA of complementarity, inclusion, interrelatedness, and interconnectedness, as highlighted by concepts like ‘Ubuntu’, is indeed an aberration. The excuse that the process of forging the African identity in an era of exclusion from rationality called for a blanket or block procedure that could not accommodate demographic disaggregation is untenable. Also, the assumption of gender neutrality is a farce. This African philosophical enterprise is essentially an exhibition of a colonized mentality. The hermeneutic analysis of the pre-colonial Yoruba African world-view, its concept of existence, being/self, governance, and eldership, has offered proof that ideas of interconnectedness, interrelatedness, being-with-others, inclusion, and complementarity are entrenched and inseparable from the African world-view. In conclusion, it is therefore a valid argument and conclusion that if African philosophy is based on African world-views of complementarity, inclusion, and being-with-others, then external (colonial) influence on thought and the socialization process is responsible for the contemporary marginalization of women. When a correct diagnosis has been made, a prescription can be made accurately, and the cure is at hand.
Comment (from this Blueprint): Examines the intersections of African philosophy, gender, and colonialism and thus provides a good introduction to these issues. This is a rather easily accessible text to learn about a contemporary position on issues of African women philosophers.
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Alcoff, Linda. Is the Feminist Critique of Reason Rational?
1995, Philosophical Topics, 23 (2): 1-26

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Added by: Franci Mangraviti and Viviane Fairbank
Abstract:
Recent criticism of feminist philosophy poses a dilemma. Feminism is taken to be a substantive set of empirical claims and political commitments, whereas philosophy is taken to be a discipline of thought organized by the pursuit of truth, but uncommitted to any particular truth. This paper responds to this dilemma, and defends the project of feminist philosophy.The first task toward understanding the feminist critique of reason, Alcoff argues, is to historically situate it within the rather long tradition of critiquing reason that has existed within the mainstream of philosophy itself.
Comment: available in this Blueprint
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Alcoff, Linda Martin. On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?
2000, In Naomi Zack (ed.), Women of Color and Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 235-262.

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa
Abstract: In assessing the likely credibility of a claim or judgment, is it ever relevant to take into account the social identity of the person who has made the claim? There are strong reasons, political and otherwise, to argue against the epistemic relevance of social identity. However, there are instances where social identity might be deemed relevant, such as in determinations of criminal culpability where a relatively small amount of evidence is the only basis for the decision and where social prejudices can play a role in inductive reasoning. This paper explores these issues.
Comment: This is a stub entry. Please add your comments below to help us expand it
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Alcoff, Linda Martin. Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self
2006, Oxford University Press.

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa
Publisher's Note: Visible Identities critiques the critiques of identity and of identity politics and argues that identities are real but not necessarily a political problem. Moreover, the book explores the material infrastructure of gendered identity, the experimental aspects of racial subjectivity for both whites and non-whites, and in several chapters looks specifically at Latio identity.
Comment: This is a stub entry. Please add your comments below to help us expand it
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Alexander, Larry, Hurd, Heidi, Westen, Peter. Consent Does Not Require Communication: A Reply to Dougherty
2016, Law and Philosophy. 35: 655-660.

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Added by: Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-Moore
Abstract:
Tom Dougherty argues that consenting, like promising, requires both an appropriate mental attitude and a communication of that attitude. Thus, just as a promise is not a promise unless it is communicated to the promisee, consent is not consent unless it is communicated to the relevant party or parties. And those like us, who believe consent is just the attitude, and that it can exist without its being communicated, are in error. Or so Dougherty argues. We, however, are unpersuaded. We believe Dougherty is right about promises, but wrong about consent. Although each of us gives a slightly different account of the attitude that constitutes consent, we all agree that consent is constituted by that attitude and need not be communicated in order to alter the morality of another’s conduct.
Comment (from this Blueprint): The authors argue that consent is an attitude, rather than an act of communication. They give two examples to support this view where the communication of consent doesn’t occur or goes wrong somehow, but nonetheless (they claim) it is intuitively a consensual interaction.
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Allen, Anita. 22 Atmospherics: Abortion Law and Philosophy
2004, In Francis J. Mootz (ed.), On Philosophy in American Law. Cambridge University Press 184

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Added by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: In 1934, Karl N. Llewellyn published a lively essay trumpeting the dawn of legal realism, "On Philosophy in American Law." The charm of his defective little piece is its style and audacity. A philosopher might be seduced into reading Llewellyn’s essay by its title; but one soon learns that by "philosophy" Llewellyn only meant "atmosphere". His concerns were the "general approaches" taken by practitioners, who may not even be aware of having general approaches. Llewellyn paired an anemic concept of philosophy with a pumped-up conception of law. Llewellyn’s "law" included anything that reflects the "ways of the law guild at large" - judges, legislators, regulators, and enforcers. Llewellyn argued that the legal philosophies implicit in American legal practice had been natural law, positivism and realism, each adopted in response to felt needs of a time. We must reckon with many other implicit "philosophies" to understand the workings of the law guild, not the least of which has been racism. Others, maternalism and paternalism, my foci here, persist in American law, despite women’s progress toward equality. Both maternalism and paternalism were strikingly present in a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Gonzales v. Carhart, upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.
Comment: This article offers a good way to relate practical legal problems with philosophical issues, giving the students a very direct way to see the relevance of ethics. It can inspire discussions on paternalism and its relations with global justice. Note that the article does not define the following terms which are important to understand the material: Natural law, Positivism, Realism, Atmosphere/atmospherics, Paternalism, Maternalism. Due to its focus on legal issues, the text can be better suited as further reading, or as a core reading in classes focused on applied ethics and law (following Diversifying Syllabi).
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Alstott, Anne. Good for Women
2001, In Phillipe Van Parijs, Joel Rogers, & Joshua Cohen (eds.), What's Wrong With a Free Lunch? Beacon Press, Boston.
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Added by: Deryn Mair Thomas
Abstract:

A Universal Basic Income (UBI) has much to offer, particularly to women. A UBI could help fill the gaps in U.S. social programs that leave women economically vulnerable. And the tax increase needed to fund the program poses no serious threat to the economy. The libertarian right will surely howl that “high taxes” dramatically reduce work and savings. But economic research challenges that prediction. Raising the right taxes, to fund the right programs, can render freedom and equality compatible with economic growth. Refreshingly, Van Parijs argues the case for the UBI in terms of freedom – a value too seldom invoked in American social welfare policy. For similar reasons, Bruce Ackerman and I have proposed stakeholding – a one-time, unconditional grant to young citizens. Although stakeholding and the UBI differ in important ways, I want to focus on their shared strengths: both proposals could enhance women’s freedom and economic security by breaking the link between social welfare benefits and paid work.

Comment: This text discusses contemporary literature on basic income and argues that UBI and related policies increase economic security and freedom for women. In doing so, it merges contemporary feminist thought with the debates on universal basic income and similar schemes, like participatory income, guaranteed income, stakeholder grants, etc. It discuses the particular economic risks faced by women, as distinct from men, and argues that a basic income mitigates these risks by giving women the agency to decide how they use state-sponsored assistance. The article is also very brief, as it was originally part of a series in the Boston Review, then published as an edited compilation, aimed at stimulating public non-academic engagement in the topic. As such, it might be useful if explored in tandem with some of the other arguments from the series (see Van Parijs, What's Wrong With a Free Lunch?), or as an introductory text to stimulate discussion in a reading group or fundamental-level undergraduate course. Due to its interdisciplinary approach, it would be appropriate for a variety of contexts exploring many contemporary philosophical topic areas in political and social philosophy, including feminist thought, economics, ethics and politics.
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Amadiume, Ifi. Gender and the Economy
1987, in Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society. London/New Jersey: Zed Books

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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc Gwodog
Abstract:
In 1987, more than a decade before the dawn of queer theory, Ifi Amadiume published the groundbreaking 'Male Daughters, Female Husbands' to critical acclaim. This compelling, enduring, and highly original book argues that gender, as constructed in Western feminist discourse, did not exist in Africa before the colonial imposition of a dichotomous understanding of sexual difference. Amadiume examines the African societal structures that enabled people to achieve power within fluid masculine and feminine roles. At a time when gender and queer theory is viewed by many as overly focused on identity politics, this apt text not only warns against the danger of projecting Western notions of difference onto other cultures, but also questions the very concept of gender itself.
Comment (from this Blueprint): Amadiume explains the institutional and ideological power of women in the pre-colonial 19th century, the downfall of this power during colonialism, and the continuation of women's marginalization in society. This study allows to develop an understanding of the highly complex sex/gender understanding in African (here: Igbo) societies. It will show that the Western understanding of sex and gender might be fruitfully applicable for certain (Western) societies, but is only of limited (if not detrimental) use within African spaces. The book is thus not only a lesson in African philosophy, African feminism, or Igbo thought, it also teaches an important caveat with regard to the cultural relativity of concepts (like sex and gender).
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Amadiume, Ifi. Women, Wealth, Titles and Power
1987, in Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society. London/New Jersey: Zed Books

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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc Gwodog
Abstract:
In 1987, more than a decade before the dawn of queer theory, Ifi Amadiume published the groundbreaking 'Male Daughters, Female Husbands' to critical acclaim. This compelling, enduring, and highly original book argues that gender, as constructed in Western feminist discourse, did not exist in Africa before the colonial imposition of a dichotomous understanding of sexual difference. Amadiume examines the African societal structures that enabled people to achieve power within fluid masculine and feminine roles. At a time when gender and queer theory is viewed by many as overly focused on identity politics, this apt text not only warns against the danger of projecting Western notions of difference onto other cultures, but also questions the very concept of gender itself.
Comment (from this Blueprint): Amadiume explains the institutional and ideological power of women in the pre-colonial 19th century, the downfall of this power during colonialism, and the continuation of women's marginalization in society. This study allows to develop an understanding of the highly complex sex/gender understanding in African (here: Igbo) societies. It will show that the Western understanding of sex and gender might be fruitfully applicable for certain (Western) societies, but is only of limited (if not detrimental) use within African spaces. The book is thus not only a lesson in African philosophy, African feminism, or Igbo thought, it also teaches an important caveat with regard to the cultural relativity of concepts (like sex and gender).
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