Jackson, Jennifer C.. Toleration in the Abortion Debate
1992, In: Bromham D.R., Dalton M.E., Jackson J.C., Millican P.J.R. (eds) Ethics in Reproductive Medicine. Springer, London pp 189-200
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Barbara Cohn, Contributed by: Simon FoktAbstract: What methods, what strategies, is it defensible for us to employ when campaigning on a contentious moral issue? What kinds of intolerance may we legitimately manifest towards the opposition in our endeavour to win converts and influence opinion? Could we be justified in refusing on principle even to engage with the opposition in public debate? And what of the legitimacy of 'playing' on people's emotions, or of not correcting misinformation put about by some of our supporters which helps our cause? Or, in making use of premises in argument that our opponents accept but we do not or, of appealing to arguments that we know to be invalid but by which the opposition may be taken in?Comment: This is a stub entry. Please add your comments below to help us expand it
Jacskon Balcerak, Magdalena. On the Epistemic Value of Imagining, Supposing and Conceiving
2016, In Amy Kind & Peter Kun (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2016)
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Giada FratantonioAbstract:
Abstract. Philosophers frequently invoke our ability to imagine, conceive or suppose various thing in order to explain how we achieve our cognitive goals when we make decisions about future actions, when we perform thought experiments, and when we engage in games of pretense. But what is the relationship between imaginings, conceivings, and supposings? And what exactly are the epistemic roles they play in the cognitive projects in which they are involved? This chapter provides answers to these questions by first bringing out a contrast between what we do when we imagine and what we do when we suppose, and then by showing how to fit conceivings into the emerging systematic picture of the ways we use different forms of hypothetical thinking to acquire knowledge.Comment: Good resource as further reading in an undergraduate course on epistemology of imagination, or as core reading in a graduate class on a similar topic.
Jacskon Balcerak, Magdalena, Brendan Balcerak Jackson. Understanding and Philosophical Methodology
2012,
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Giada FratantonioAbstract: According to Conceptualism, philosophy is an independent discipline that can be pursued from the armchair because philosophy seeks truths that can be discovered purely on the basis of our understanding of expressions and the concepts they express. In his recent book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson argues that while philosophy can indeed be pursued from the armchair, we should reject any form of Conceptualism. In this paper, we show that Williamson's arguments against Conceptualism are not successful, and we sketch a way to understand understanding that shows that there is a clear sense in which we can indeed come to know the answers to (many) philosophical questions purely on the basis of understanding.Comment: The author argues, contra Williamson, for the role of understanding as a way of gaining knowledge and providing answer to lots of philosophical questions. Good to use as a further reading for postgraduate courses in epistemology of understanding, as well as philosophical methodology.
Jaeger,Lydia. Against Physicalism-plus-God
2012, Faith and Philosophy , 29, 295-312
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Laura JimenezAbstract: It is often assumed that contemporary physics is more hospitable to divine action (and human freedom) than classical mechanics. The article criticizes this assumption on the grounds of both physics and theology. Most currently discussed models of divine action do not challenge the physicalist assumption that physics provides a true and complete description of nature's causal web. Thus they resemble physicalism-plus-God. Taking up suggestions from Herman Dooyeweerd and Henri Blocher, I propose an alternative framework for divine action in the world. It takes creation as the starting-point to understand the world and leads to a non-reductionist, multidimensional picture of realityComment: Good article for undergraduate students. It is valuable for studying the relation between science and divinity.
Jaggar, Alison. What is Terrorism, Why is it Wrong, and Could it Ever Be Morally Justified?
2005, Journal of Social Philosophy 36(2): 202-217.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Carl FoxContent: Starts with a nice historical discussion of the emergence of the term 'terrorism' and some of the ways that it changed before and after the 9/11 attacks. Jaggar offers a specification of the concept and then her own conception, which can be practiced by governments and international bodies, and then discusses several kinds of conflict in which it may be deployed as a tactic. Here is her definition: "Terrorism is the use of extreme threats or violence designed to intimidate or subjugate governments, groups, or individuals. It is a tactic of coercion intended to promote further ends that in themselves may be good, bad or indifferent. Terrorism may be practiced by governments or international bodies or forces, sub-state groups or even individuals. Its threats or violence are aimed directly or immediately at the bodies or belongings of innocent civilians but these are typically terrorists’ secondary targets; the primary targets of terrorists are the governments, groups or individuals that they wish to intimidate" (2005: 209).Comment: Would make good required reading on the subject of terrorism.
Jaggar, Alison. Reasoning About Well-Being: Nussbaum’s Methods of Justifying the Capabilities.
2006, Journal of Political Philosophy 14(3): 301-322.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Carl FoxContent: Discusses Nussbaum's methodology and the question of whether she covertly relies on assumptions about her own moral authority.Comment: Most useful as further reading on political liberalism or the capability approach.
James, Susan. Feminism in philosophy of mind: The question of personal identity
2022, in McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 156-172
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Adriana Alcaraz Sanchez and Jodie RussellAbstract:
In this essay, James challenges current psychological theories on personal identity - theories arguing that psychological continuity is a criterion for personal identity. James offers a feminist examination of popular thought experiments aimed at showing that one's person's character and memories could be transplanted into someone's else body, thus, preserving a person's survival. According to James, those thought experiments don't take into account the role of the body in constructing one's identity and character, as well as influencing one's memories.Comment (from this Blueprint): In this article, James argues for a deeply embodied account of personal identity. James claims that current psychological theories on personal identity, tend to overlook the role of the body in maintaining psychological continuity. Mainstream thought experiments used by those theories, for instance, examples of body swap, undermine the extent to which psychological traits of a person depend on a body. James claims that the body is constitutive for developing one's identity and character. Additionally, she offers an analysis of the role of gender on personal identity by examining how patriarchal structures promote the idea that the mind can be independent of the body.
Janssen-Lauret, Frederique. Ruth Barcan Marcus and quantified modal logic
2022, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 30 (2):353-383.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Christopher MastermanAbstract:
Analytic philosophy in the mid-twentieth century underwent a major change of direction when a prior consensus in favour of extensionalism and descriptivism made way for approaches using direct reference, the necessity of identity, and modal logic. All three were first defended, in the analytic tradition, by one woman, Ruth Barcan Marcus. But analytic philosophers now tend to credit them to Kripke, or Kripke and Carnap. I argue that seeing Barcan Marcus in her historical context – one dominated by extensionalism and descriptivism – allows us to see how revolutionary she was, in her work and influence on others. I focus on her debate with Quine, who found himself retreating to softened, and more viable, versions of his anti-modal arguments as a result. I make the case that Barcan's formal logic was philosophically well-motivated, connected to her views on reference, and well-matched to her overall views on ontology. Her nominalism led her to reject posits which could not be directly observed and named, such as possibilia. She conceived of modal calculi as facilitating counterfactual discourse about actual existents. I conclude that her contributions ought to be recognized as the first of their kind. Barcan Marcus must be awarded a central place in the canon of analytic philosophy.
Comment: This would be excellent supplementary reading for a course in modal logic or metaphysics which incorporated the work of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Clearly discusses her contribution to modal logic and metaphysics and discusses the history of this period of philosophy in depth.
Jaworska, Agnieszka. Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the Capacity to Value
1999, Philosophy and Public Affairs 28(2): 105–138.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Simon FoktIntroduction: Dworkin puts forth two main arguments to justify adhering to the wishes the patient expressed before becoming demented. As he sees it, this course of action both promotes the patient’s well-being and is required in order to respect the patient’s autonomy. In each argument, while I consider most of the ideas well-founded, I challenge the crucial premise. In the argument focused on the patient’s well-being, I dispute the claim that demented patients are no longer capable of generating what Dworkin calls “critical interests.” In the argument concerning autonomy, I question the premise that demented patients no longer possess the “capacity for autonomy.”7 In each case, I will trace how the problematic premise arises within Dworkin’s argument and then develop an alternative account of the relevant capacity.Comment: Jaworska asks: 'Should we, in our efforts to best respect a patient with dementia, give priority to the preferences and attitudes this person held before becoming demented, or should we follow the person’s present preferences?' (p. 108). The article offers a useful critical overview of the views expressed by Rebecca Dresser and Ronald Dworkin. It is best used as a primary reading in ethics classes focusing directly on medical ethics or autonomy, or as further reading in general ethics teaching on autonomy.
Jenkins, Katharine. Amelioration and Includion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman
2016, Ethics 126(2): 394-421.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Emily PaulAbstract: Feminist analyses of gender concepts must avoid the inclusion problem, the fault of marginalizing or excluding some prima facie women. Sally Haslanger's 'ameliorative' analysis of gender concepts seeks to do so by defining woman by reference to subordination. I argue that Haslanger's analysis problematically marginalizes trans women, thereby failing to avoid the inclusion problem. I propose an improved ameliorative analysis that ensures the inclusion of trans women. This analysis yields 'twin' target concepts of woman, one concerning gender as class and the other concerning gender as identity, both of which I hold to be equally necessary for feminist aims.Comment: In my view this paper is a 'must include' in any feminist philosophy course with a unit on the metaphysics of gender - or on a social ontology course. Especially useful in conjunction with Haslanger's 'Gender and Race: (What) are they? (What) do we want them to be?'
Can’t find it?
Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!