-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Jamie Collin
Publisher's Note: Cheryl Misak presents a history of the great American philosophical tradition of pragmatism, from its inception in the Metaphysical Club of the 1870s to the present day. She identifies two dominant lines of thought in the tradition: the first begins with Charles S. Peirce and Chauncey Wright and continues through to Lewis, Quine, and Sellars; the other begins with William James and continues through to Dewey and Rorty. This ambitious new account identifies the connections between traditional American pragmatism and twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy, and links pragmatism to major positions in the recent history of philosophy, such as logical empiricism. Misak argues that the most defensible version of pragmatism must be seen and recovered as an important part of the analytic tradition.Misak, Cheryl. Pragmatism and Deflationism2007, in New Pragmatists, ed. C.Misak. Oxford: Oxford University Press.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Jamie Collin
Summary: A contemporary defense of a pragmatist account of truth, which contrasts the view with various versions of deflationism. Misak defends the claim that to grasp the concept of truth by exploring its connections with practices we engage in - including assertion, believing, reason-giving, and inquiry. The pragmatist conception of truth, it is argued, helps to elucidate realism/anti-realism: inquiry is truth-apt when it aims at establishing propositions that are indefeasible.Comment: A clear and contemporary reading on pragmatist appraoches to truth in a course on theories of truth. Useful for both advanced undergraduate and postgraduate courses.
Misak, Cheryl. Truth and the End of Inquiry: A Peircean Account of Truth2004, Oxford University Press-
Expand entry
-
, Contributed by: Quentin PharrPublisher’s Note:
C.S. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, argued that truth is what we would agree upon, were inquiry to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. In this book, Misak argues for and elucidates the pragmatic account of truth, paying attention both to Peirce's texts and to the requirements of a suitable account of truth. An important argument of the book is that we must be sensitive to the difference between offering a definition of truth and engaging in a distinctively pragmatic project. The pragmatic project spells out the relationship between truth and inquiry; it articulates the consequences of a statement's being true. The existence of a distinct pragmatic enterprise has implications for the status of the pragmatic account of truth and for the way in which philosophy should be conducted.Comment: For students wanting to know more about Peirce's conception of truth, as it relates to the end of inquiry, Misak's book is an excellent first book to study. It is highly readable and authoritative. It is also a great book for understanding some of the major differences between Peirce and James, as early proponents of pragmatism who disagreed on the nature of truth. Prior readings of Peirce's philosophy will help - but, by and large, Misak provides everything that is needed for a first appreciation of the substance of his views. It is also a helpful guide for students to gather a sense of how pragmatists who are not necessarily Jamesians believe we should philosophize and inquire.
Mitchell, Sandra. Dimensions of Scientific Law2000, Philosophy of Science 67(2): 242-265.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Laura Jimenez
Abstract: Biological knowledge does not fit the image of science that philosophers have developed. Many argue that biology has no laws. Here I criticize standard normative accounts of law and defend an alternative, pragmatic approach. I argue that a multidimensional conceptual framework should replace the standard dichotomous law/ accident distinction in order to display important differences in the kinds of causal structure found in nature and the corresponding scientific representations of those structures. To this end I explore the dimensions of stability, strength, and degree of abstraction that characterize the variety of scientific knowledge claims found in biology and other sciences.Comment: Really interesting paper that examines the nature of scientific laws by focusing on the case of laws in biology. It would be recommendable to read Carnap's analysis of the acceptance of different linguistic forms within science before reading this article. Could be used as a paper for a senior undergraduate course or for postgraduate courses in Philosophy of Science.
Mitchell, Sandra. Complexity and explanation in the social sciences2009, Mitchell, Sandra. "Complexity and explanation in the social sciences." Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (Hg.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice, Cambridge (2009): 130-145.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Patricia Rich
Abstract: To answer Condorcet, in this chapter I will investigate what it is about the social world that makes the universal, exceptionless generalizations that are heralded as the foundation of knowledge of the physical world so elusive. I am not going to rehearse all the arguments for and against the possibility of laws in the social realm. What I aim to do is not to take either side of the debate, that is, not to say - "YES! Social science does have laws just like physics (or close enough any-way)" or "NO! Social science can never have laws like those of physics; knowledge of the social has a wholly different character." Rather I will suggest replacing the standard conception of laws that structure the debate with a more spacious conceptual framework that not only illuminates what it is about knowledge of the social that is similar to knowledge of the physical, but also explains what is so different in the two scientific endeavors.Comment: When studying the philosophy of the social sciences, the nature of explanation and the role of laws in explanation are important issues. This text provides a valuable argument on this topic, provides an example of how philosophy of biology is relevant to the social sciences, and brings in some other useful philosophical concepts.
Montague, Michelle. Recent work on intentionality2010, Analysis 70 (4):765 - 782.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: Much recent work on intentionality has been dedicated to exploring the complex relationship between the intentional properties and the phenomenological properties of mental states. A lot of this work has focused on perception, but with the introduction of cognitive phenomenology, conscious thought and the role cognitive-phenomenological properties may play with respect to conscious thought, are likely to receive an increasing amount of attention.Comment:
Montague, Michelle. The Life of the Mind2015, In Paul Coates and Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: What distinguishes a conscious occurrent thought from a non-conscious occurrent thought? I argue that the notion of 'access-consciousness' cannot provide a satisfactory answer and that we must appeal to phenomenological properties. If this is right, a further question arises about what kind of phenomenological features are required. Can we give a satisfactory account of what makes an occurrent thought a conscious thought solely by reference to sensory phenomenology - including both verbal and non-verbal imagery? I argue that we cannot, and that we must appeal to 'cognitive phenomenology' in order to be able to say what distinguishes conscious occurrent thought from non-conscious occurrent thought.
Comment:
Montero, Barbara. The body problem1999,-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: It seems that a solution to the body problem, or at least one that helps us to better understand the mind-body problem, is not forthcoming. And I take it this indicates that, at least for the time being, we should focus on questions other than the question 'Is the mind physical?' To this end, I would like to suggest a question that, I think, highlights some of the central concerns of both physicalists and dualists. And this is the question of whether the mental is fundamentally non-mental. For it seems that physicalism is, at least in part, motivated by the belief that the mental is ultimately non-mental, that is, that mental properties are not fundamental properties, while a central tenet of dualism, precisely, that they are. Of course the notion of the non-mental is also open ended. And, for this reason, it may be just as difficult to see, what sort of considerations are relevant in determining what counts as non-mental as it is to see what sort of considerations could be relevant in determining what counts as physical. But, of course, this is a project for another paper. One advantage, however, is that, arguably, we do have a grasp of one side of the divide - that is, the mental side. So, perhaps, rather than worrying about whether the mind is fundamentally physical, we should be concerned with whether the mind is fundamentally non-mental. And this, I should mention, is a concern that has little to do with what current physics, future physics, or a final physics says about the world.Comment:
Moody-Adams, Michele M.. How to Disagree Without Being Disagreeable2019, Catharsis 23-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Joe Slater
Abstract: It is tempting to assume that disagreements about the principles, policies and institutions that shape contemporary political life - especially the disagreements that emerge during contemporary political contests in the United States - are uniquely uncivil. But for much of human history, disagreement about such matters has often been a rough and tumble affair and the best evidence of this emerges in contests for political power. Unflattering epithets about political opponents can be found in hieroglyphics on the tombs of Egyptian pharaohs, and political insult and invective were common in political competitions in ancient Rome. Moreover, with the rise of the modern political campaign and increased sophistication and complexity in the means for transmitting and targeting campaign messages innuendo, rumor, and even outright character assassination, became familiar fixtures of political life.Comment: Discusses disagreement in politics, and how disagreement can remain respectful. Also considers the decline of civility in discourse in America and why civil disagreement is important.
Morris, Rebecca Lea. Intellectual Generosity and the Reward Structure of Mathematics2021, Synthese, 199(1): 345-367.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Fenner Stanley TanswellAbstract:
Prominent mathematician William Thurston was praised by other mathematicians for his intellectual generosity. But what does it mean to say Thurston was intellectually generous? And is being intellectually generous beneficial? To answer these questions I turn to virtue epistemology and, in particular, Roberts and Wood's (2007) analysis of intellectual generosity. By appealing to Thurston's own writings and interviewing mathematicians who knew and worked with him, I argue that Roberts and Wood's analysis nicely captures the sense in which he was intellectually generous. I then argue that intellectual generosity is beneficial because it counteracts negative effects of the reward structure of mathematics that can stymie mathematical progress.Comment (from this Blueprint): In this paper, Morris looks at ascriptions of intellectual generosity in mathematics, focusing on the mathematician William Thurston. She looks at how generosity should be characterised, and argues that it is beneficial in counteract some of the negative effects of the reward structure of mathematics.
Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
-
-
-
This site is registered on Toolset.com as a development site. -
-
-
-
-
-
Misak, Cheryl. The American Pragmatists (The Oxford History of Philosophy)
2013, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Comment: A good primary reading for courses on pragmatism or the history of American philosophy. Useful for both undergraduate and postgraduate courses.