McKenna, Erin. Living with Animals: Rights, Responsibilities, and Respect
2020, Rowman and Littlefield
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Added by: Björn FreterPublisher’s Note:
Living with Animals brings a pragmatist ecofeminist perspective to discussions around animal rights, animal welfare, and animal ethics to move the conversation beyond simple use or non-use decisions. Erin McKenna uses a case study approach with select species to question how humans should live and interact with various animal beings through specific instances of such relationships. Addressing standard topics such as the use of animals for food, use for biomedical research, use in entertainment, use as companions, use as captive specimens in zoos, and use in hunting and ecotourism through a revolutionary pluralist and experimental approach, McKenna provides an uncommonly nuanced accounts for complex relationships and changing circumstances. Rather than seek absolute moral stands regarding human relationships with other animal beings, and rather than trying to end such relationships altogether, the books urges us to make existing relations better.Comment (from this Blueprint): This chapter provides philosophical arguments for a better understanding of the complexity of human relationships with other animal beings through a pragmatist and ecofeminist lens.McKenzie, Kerry. Ontic Structural Realism2017, Philosophy Compass 12(4).-
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Abstract: Ontic structural realism is at its core the view that 'structure is ontologically fundamental.' Informed from its inception by the scientific revolutions that punctuated the 20th century, its advocates often present the position as the perspective on ontology best befitting of modern physics. But the idea that structure is fundamental has proved difficult to articulate adequately, and what OSR's claimed naturalistic credentials consist in is hard to precisify as well. Nor is it clear that the position is actually supported by our most fundamental physical theories. What is clear, however, is that structuralists have revealed a seam of material at the core of modern physics that is replete with implications for metaphysics. This article surveys some positions subsumed under the rubric of OSR, considering both their warrant and the interconnections that exist between them. The author argues that the fundamental kind properties pose a challenge to ontic structuralism, because it seems that these properties do not supervene upon the relevant structures. The development of structuralist metaphysics will require both an engagement with the details of modern physical theories and the deployment of tools more typically developed in a priori metaphysics. As such, it seems armchair metaphysicians have not just a stake in whether OSR's claims may ultimately be shown to stand up, but a crucial role to play in getting them to the point where they can be subjected to scrutiny in the first place.Comment : This paper offers a good overview of Ontic Structural Realism and its two distinct doctrines: eliminative structuralism and priority-based structuralism. It could serve as a specialized reading for postgraduate courses in philosophy of science. Before reading this paper, students should first acquire some knowledge on the basic features of structural realism.McKinnon, Rachel, Conrad, Aryn. Including Trans Women in Sport: Analyzing Principles and Policies of Fairness in Competition2020, In: Philosophical Topics: Gendered Oppression and Its Intersections (Ed. Bianka Takaoka and Kate Manne)-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Lizzy Ventham
Abstract: In this paper, we examine the scientific, legal, and ethical foundations for inclusion of transgender women athletes in competitive sport, drawing on IOC principles and relevant Court of Arbitration for Sport decisions. We argue that the inclusion of transathletes in competition commensurate with their legal gender is the most consistent position with these principles of fair and equitable sport. Biological restrictions, such as endogenous testosterone limits, are not consistent with IOC and CAS principles. We explore the implications for recognizing that endogenous testosterone values are a natural physical trait and that excluding legally recognized women for high endogenous testosterone values constitutes discrimination on the basis of a natural physical trait. We suggest that the justificatory burden for such prima facie discrimination is unlikely to be met. Thus, in place of a limit on endogenous testosterone for women (whether cisgender, transgender, or intersex), we argue that legally recognized gender is most fully in line with IOC and CAS principles.Comment : I would use this paper primarily as a key piece of reading in an applied ethics class. It's detailed, topical, and can be a great way to start discussions on trans* issues, gender, sport, and fairness. It makes some good use of science and statistics, but in a way that's accessible, and it offers original arguments. It would also be useful in classes on feminism or the philosophy of sport.McLean, Sheila. A Patient’s Right to Know: Information Disclosure, the Doctor and the Law1995, Aldershot: Dartmouth.-
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Added by: Simon FoktPublisher’s Note:
Comment : This volume addresses issues concerning the rights of patients. Particular issues examined include the patient's right to consent to or refuse treatment, and issues related to valid consent and its dependence on information, including full details regarding the risks associated with a particular course of treatment. Useful as further reading in applied ethics classes, or in any moral or political philosophy teaching related to consent. Additionally, can be useful in discussions on the differences and similarities between the moral and legal approaches to the issue of consent.McLeod, Alexus. Philosophy of the Ancient Maya: Lords of Time2018, Lexington Books-
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Added by: M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández VillarrealPublisher’s Note:
This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the î and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.
Comment (from this Blueprint): In the preface and conclusion, McLeod introduces some relevant methodological aspects that must be considered in order to understand Mayan philosophy. The first one, is that of the nature of the sources from which we can reconstruct Mayan philosophical thought that are available to use. Unlike the source of Ancient Mexica intellectual culture which are relatively abundant, the availability of Mayan sources is more limited. The second one, is about the nature of Mayan language: written Maya consists of pictograms which represent both ideograms or glyphs and syllabic sounds. The author also discusses the fact that some forms of Mayan languages and Mayan peoples are alive. Finally, this section of McLeod’s book also discusses the philosophical concepts of truth and personhood.McLeod, Alexus. Philosophy of the Ancient Maya: Lords of Time2018, Lexington Books-
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Added by: M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández Villarreal
Publisher’s note: This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the Popol Vuh and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.
Comment (from this Blueprint): McLeod begins by asking whether, for ancient Mayans, the name of rulers or gods is a case of proper names or of function names, i.e. a description of a role. He is interested in a Mayan view discussed in previous chapters according to which the attributes of e.g. an exemplary ruler are attached to the role they fulfilled. For McLeod, the Mayan view is partly supported by their metaphysical views on the self. As preamble to his discussion of the Mayan notion of personhood, McLeod provides some comparison between the Mayan view of the self to that of other traditions. He refers, too, to the sacrality of objects discussed in the previous session. McLeod, then, moves on to discuss the ideas that Mayan personhood can be collective and that someone’s essence can extend to material artifacts. The text also includes a discussion of the Mayan notion of substitution (k’ex), the act in which someone took the essence of a god.McLeod, Alexus. Philosophy of the Ancient Maya. Lords of Time2018, Lexington Books-
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Added by: M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández Villarreal
Publisher’s note: This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the Popol Vuh and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.
Comment : available in this BlueprintMcPherson, Lionel K.. Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?2007, Ethics 117(3): 524-546.-
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Added by: Helen Morley
Introduction: Many people, including philosophers, believe that terrorism is necessarily and egregiously wrong. I will call this “the dominant view.” The dominant view maintains that terrorism is akin to murder. This forecloses the possibility that terrorism, under any circumstances, could be morally permissible—murder, by definition, is wrongful killing. The unqualified wrongness of terrorism is thus part of this understanding of terrorism. I will criticize the dominant view. Some philosophers have argued that terrorism might not be impermissible on either a rights‐based or a consequentialist analysis. But I will not pursue the question of whether terrorism could ever be justifiable. Rather, I will argue that the dominant view’s condemnatory attitude toward terrorism as compared to conventional war cannot be fully sustained. I propose that a version of the argument that terrorists do not have adequate authority to undertake political violence—and not the prominent argument that noncombatants should be immune from deliberate use of force against them—is the most plausible basis for finding terrorism objectionable.Comment : McPherson challenges the view that there is something distinctively wrong about terrorism as compared to conventional warfare. In addition to a discussion on terrorism it presents challenges to traditional interpretations of just war theory.McShane, Katie. Neosentimentalism and Environmental Ethics2011, Environmental Ethics, 33 (1): 5-23.-
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Added by: Rochelle DuFord
Abstract: Neosentimentalism provides environmental ethics with a theory of value that might be particularly useful for solving many of the problems that have plagued the field since its early days. In particular, a neosentimentalist understanding of value offers us hope for making sense of (1) what intrinsic value might be and how we could know whether parts of the natural world have it; (2) the extent to which value is an essentially anthropocentric concept; and (3) how our understanding of value could be compatible with both a respectable naturalism and a robust normativity.Comment : This reading is could be used well as a response to Rolston or Callicott's versions of environmental value. The article also covers a number of problems endemic to formal value theory (especially a neosentimentalist theory of the nature of value). It would work best in an upper level undergraduate course on value theory or environmental ethics.McSweeney, Michaela Markham. Logical Realism and the Metaphysics of Logic2019, Philosophy Compass. 14:e12563.-
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
‘Logical Realism’ is taken to mean many different things. I argue that if reality has a privileged structure, then a view I call metaphysical logical realism is true. The view says that, first, there is ‘ One True Logic ’ ; second, that the One True Logic is made true by the mind ‐ and ‐ language ‐ independent world; and third, that the mind ‐ and ‐ language ‐ independent world makes it the case that the One True Logic is better than any other logic at capturing the structure of reality. Along the way, I discuss a few alternatives, and clarify two distinct kinds of metaphysical logical realism.
Comment : The paper provides a simple, lucid argument for why many metaphysical views are committed to what the author calls metaphysical logical realism. For the purpose of discussion, it may be paired with an attempt to resist the commitment. More generally, it might be helpful as a survey of logical commitments of metaphysical views.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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