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Eckert, Maureen, Donahue, Charlie. Towards a Feminist Logic: Val Plumwood’s Legacy and Beyond
2020, In Dominic Hyde (ed.), Noneist Explorations II: The Sylvan Jungle - Volume 3 (Synthese Library, 432). Dordrecht: pp. 424-448
Topics: Gender Sex and Sexuality; Logic and Mathematics Keywords: classical negation; feminist logic; relevant negation; val plumwood
Traditions: Critical; Formal; North American Languages: English
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Abstract:

Val Plumwood’s 1993 paper, “The politics of reason: towards a feminist logic” (hence- forth POR) attempted to set the stage for what she hoped would begin serious feminist exploration into formal logic – not merely its historical abuses, but, more importantly, its potential uses. This work offers us: (1) a case for there being feminist logic; and (2) a sketch of what it should resemble. The former goal of Plumwood’s paper encourages feminist theorists to reject anti-logic feminist views. The paper’s latter aim is even more challenging. Plumwood’s critique of classical negation (and classical logic) as a logic of domination asks us to recognize that particular logical systems are weapons of oppression. Against anti-logic feminist theorists, Plumwood argues that there are other logics besides classical logic, such as relevant logics, which are suited for feminist theorizing. Some logics may oppress while others may liberate. We provide details about the sources and context for her rejection of classical logic and motivation for promoting relevant logics as feminist.

Comment (from this Blueprint): This is an ideal companion piece to Plumwood's paper: it provides an accessible summary, and discusses both objections to the paper and possible responses.
Difficulty: Easy
Recommended use: Further
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Eckert, Maureen. De-centering and Genderqueering Val Plumwood’s Feminist Logic
2024, In R. Cook and A. Yap (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic. University of Minnesota Press
Topics: Logic and Mathematics
Keywords: centering; feminist logic; gender identity; genderqueer
Traditions: Critical; Formal; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Franci Mangraviti and Viviane Fairbank
Abstract:
The strongest and, until recently, least-explored approach to feminist logic holds that some formal logics have structural features that perpetuate sexism and oppression, whereas other logics are helpful for resisting and opposing these social phenomena. Our choice of logics may not be purely formal on this view: for example, some logics are preferrable to others on the grounds of feminist commitments. This strong account of feminist logic was first articulated by Val Plumwood. We will critically engage salient features of her view, especially her critique of classical logic and the centering and dominating functions she believes classical negation has. We will see that her understanding of classical negation captures neither the development of Intersectional Feminism, nor the position the concept of centering holds in transformative justice. However, Plumwood's critique of classical negation does lead us to a deeper insight regarding which logics to apply in social justice contexts. Robin Dembroff's analysis of genderqueer as a critical gender kind helps us delineate a non-classical context in which a four-valued logic, such as FDE, can structurally account for the critical feature of this gender kind in a way classical logic cannot. We will also observe how four-valued logics precisely capture the destabilization of, and resistance to, the exclusive and exhaustive gender binary categories Dembroff describes.
Comment: available in this Blueprint
Difficulty: Easy, Intermediate
Recommended use: Specialised

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Edgington, Dorothy. On Conditionals
1995, Mind 104(414): 235-329.
Topics: Grammar and Meaning; Logic and Mathematics
Keywords: conditionals; truth conditions
Traditions: Analytic; European
Languages: English

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Added by: Emily Paul, Contributed by: Helen De Cruz
Summary: Examines the theory of conditionals and whether it's possible to have a unified theory of them.
Comment: Great core text as there are many important discussion points here, and Edginton uses lots of helpful examples. Could set students the task of coming up with their own conditionals, and analysing these in the would/will sense. This definitely requires a background in beginner's logic.
Difficulty: Advanced, Intermediate
Recommended use: Specialised

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Edgington, Dorothy. Indicative Conditionals
2001, In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
Topics: Logic and Mathematics Keywords: conditional belief; conditional probability; indicative conditionals; truth conditions
Traditions: Analytic; European; Formal Languages: English
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Abstract:

The chapter is an introduction to logical treatments of indicative conditionals, comparing truth-functional, non-truth-functional, and suppositional approaches. Some of the topics discussed are truth conditions, conditional belief, assertability, and issues with compounds of conditionals.

Comment: This page can be used in a course focused on the philosophy of conditionals, as an introduction/overview of the basic logical issues; or in any logic course wishing to spend more time on this particular notion.
Difficulty: Intermediate
Recommended use: Introductory, Overview
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Egan, Frances. Representationalism
2012, In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, OUP, 250-272.
Topics: Cognitive Science; Intentionality; Mental States and Processes
Keywords: cognitive science; information; representationalism
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Representationalism, in its most widely accepted form, is the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are to be understood as representational capacities. This chapter distinguishes several distinct theses that go by the name "representationalism," focusing on the view that is most prevalent in cogntive science. It also discusses some objections to the view and attempts to clarify the role that representational content plays in cognitive models that make use of the notion of representation.
Comment: A very good overview of representationalism. Suitable for a preliminary introduction to the topic.
Difficulty: Easy
Recommended use: Introductory

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Egan, Frances. Computational models: a modest role for content
2010, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41(3): 253-259.
Topics: Cognitive Science; Intentionality; Mental States and Processes
Keywords: cognitive capacities; computation; explanation; representational content
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.
Comment: Good paper about the relation of representation and content to computation. Best suited to higher-level courses on the subject.
Difficulty: Advanced
Recommended use: Specialised

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Egan, Frances. Folk psychology and cognitive architecture
1995, Philosophy of Science 62(2): 179-96.
Topics: Cognitive Science; Psychology
Keywords: cognitive science; research; science
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science.
Comment: A good defense of folk psychology. Would be a good inclusion in a course on philosophy of mind/philosophy of cognitive science to show that scepticism need not be taken to extremes.
Difficulty: Intermediate
Recommended use: Specialised

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Egan, Frances. Wide Content
2009, In A. Beckerman, B. McLaughlin & S. Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Topics: Intentionality; Language and Mind; Mental States and Processes
Keywords: content externalism
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio, Nick Novelli
Summary: The author presents an overview of the main argument in favour and against content externalism, namely, roughly put, the thesis that the content of our thought is partly individuated by feature of the external environment. After providing a good survey of the debate, the author argues that the content that individuates a subject's thought in the explanation of her behavior is wide.
Comment: The first half of the paper is very useful as an introduction on the topic of semantic and content externalism in the philosophy of mind. The remainder is an interesting and well-presented argument in favour of wide content. The first part could be used on its own for an overview of the debate; the remainder could be used for a more in-depth discussion of the positions and the arguments for them, or could serve as an option for a student essay topic.
Difficulty: Easy, Intermediate
Recommended use: Overview, Specialised

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Egbunu, Fidelis Eleojo. Language Problem in African Philosophy: The Igala Case
2014, Journal of Educational and Social Research. 4 (3): 363-371.
Topics: Communication; Culture; Ethics and Socio-Politics of Language; Grammar and Meaning; Intentionality; Language and Mind; Race
Keywords: African culture; african heritage; igala
Traditions: Comparative/Intercultural; Critical; Cultural; Sub-Saharan African
Languages: English; Igala

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Added by: Sara Peppe and Björn Freter
Abstract:
The Language Question is a very central subject of discourse in African Philosophy. This is consequent upon the fact that the essence of language in philosophy cannot be gainsaid. Language, as it were, is culture bound. As such, to deny a people of their language is to deny them their cultural heritage. While applying the descriptive and analytic method in this work, it is contended that language plays not only a catalyzing role in the art of philosophizing but that it occupies an inalienable place in philosophy. Again, that since philosophy is more or less about resolving “conceptual cramps” or “bottle-necks”, indigenous languages should be given a pride of place over and against their foreign counterparts because of the obvious epistemological advantages embedded therein (especially in mother-tongues). It is submitted here that a lot of homework need to be done in terms of advocacy and development on the low status of such languages so as to meet up with the international standard and nature of the discipline. Meanwhile, the need for using a language that engenders understanding across ethnic barriers alongside the language of the environment is being advocated as a short-term measure. This is not without sounding a caveat that such a transfer of knowledge which is often fraught with some degree of adulteration via the instrument of translation, though practicable, is far from being the ideal. It is on this token the opinions of experts such as Barry Hallen, Quine and a host of others on Methods of Ordinary Language Philosophy and Indeterminacy, respectively are being advanced as plausible means of meeting the challenges before us. In this manner, while using the Igala language of Central Nigeria as a case study, it is finally submitted that it is possible to have what we might term authentic African Philosophy emerging from a systematic analysis of our traditional worldviews.
Comment (from this Blueprint): This paper examines the issue of language in African Philosophy and highlights that language and culture are closely linked. Indeed, in paragraph 2, Egbonu studies the term “language”, underlining that language has to do with people’s identity and culture. Also, the author explains that language has a crucial role in philosophising, with African indigenous languages that should have a major role in African philosophy since it expresses the cultural heritage of African people. Egbunu focuses on the case of Igala people, where the meaning of the words they use is not the same when we translate them. But, Egbunu also underlines that language is not the only way to determine what should be considered authentic African philosophy. Indeed, it is argued that language does not determine whether African philosophy is authentic or not. Instead, authentic African philosophy is the philosophy applied to the conceptual issues of the African experience.
Difficulty: Easy, Intermediate
Recommended use: Overview

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Eichler, Lauren. Sacred Truths, Fables, and Falsehoods: Intersections between Feminist and Native American Logics
2018, APA Newsletter on Native American and Indigenous Philosophy, 18(1).
Topics: Ethics and Socio-Politics of Philosophy; Logic and Mathematics; Philosophical Media and Methodology Keywords: bi-culturalism; feminist logic; native american logic
Traditions: Critical; Formal; North American Languages: English
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Abstract:

From the newsletter's introduction: "Lauren Eichler [...] examines the resonances between feminist and Native American analyses of classical logic. After considering the range of responses, from overly monolithic rejection to more nuanced appreciation, Eichler argues for a careful, pluralist understanding of logic as she articulates her suggestion that feminists and Native American philosophers could build fruitful alliances around this topic."

Comment: available in this Blueprint
Difficulty: Intermediate
Recommended use: Further, Specialised
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