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Alcoff, Linda Martín. On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?
1999, Philosophic Exchange 29(1), pp. 73-93.

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Olivia Maegaard Nielsen
Abstract: In assessing the likely credibility of a claim or judgment, is it ever relevant to take into account the social identity of the person who has made the claim? There are strong reasons, political and otherwise, to argue against the epistemic relevance of social identity. However, there are instances where social identity might be deemed relevant, such as in determinations of criminal culpability where a relatively small amount of evidence is the only basis for the decision and where social prejudices can play a role in inductive reasoning. This paper explores these issues.
Comment: This essay asks the question of whether and how the identity of a knower should be taken into account when judging their epistemic credibility. It explores different ways in which such a relationship might be understood and concludes that it is not irrational to take the identity of the knower into account. While her starting point is in the legal context of jury selection, the question applies much more broadly to (social) epistemological questions. It also shows why it is helpful to take social relations into account in epistemological inquiries. The text would therefore be suitable to read in many different contexts, but for example, in seminars on social epistemology, on identity, or on metaphilosophical questions.
Alcoff, Linda Martín. The Problem of Speaking for Others
1991, Cultural Critique 20, pp. 5-32.
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Added by: Olivia Maegaard Nielsen
Abstract:

As philosophers and social theorists we are authorized by virtue of our academic positions to develop theories that express and encompass the ideas, needs, and goals of others. However, we must begin to ask ourselves whether this is a legitimate authority. Is the discursive practice of speaking for others ever a valid practice, and, if so, what are the criteria for validity? In particular, is it ever valid to speak for others who are unlike me or who are less privileged than me?

Comment: This is a classic all the while being very timely and concerning a topic that will still engage today's students. The text postulates the dilemma of whether and under what conditions it is legitimate to speak for those in less privileged positions than oneself. While not providing one final answer, Alcoff delineates and evaluates different possible approaches and offers four different interrogatory practices for evaluating instances of speaking for others. She illustrates the dillemma by drawing on real life examples. This is a dillemma that concerns many people interested in philosophy and beyond and it can help students reflect on their own philosophical practice in a constructive way. The text would be suitable to read in seminars concerning social (in)justice, feminist philosophy, and social epistemology.
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Arcila-Valenzuela, Migdalia, Páez, Andrés. Testimonial Injustice: The Facts of the Matter
2022, Review of Philosophy and Psychology

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Added by: Tomasz Zyglewicz, Shannon Brick, Michael Greer
Abstract:
To verify the occurrence of a singular instance of testimonial injustice three facts must be established. The first is whether the hearer in fact has an identity prejudice of which she may or may not be aware; the second is whether that prejudice was in fact the cause of the unjustified credibility deficit; and the third is whether there was in fact a credibility deficit in the testimonial exchange. These three elements constitute the facts of the matter of testimonial injustice. In this essay we argue that none of these facts can be established with any degree of confidence, and therefore that testimonial injustice is an undetectable phenomenon in singular instances. Our intention is not to undermine the idea of testimonial injustice, but rather to set limits to what can be justifiably asserted about it. According to our argument, although there are insufficient reasons to identify individual acts of testimonial injustice, it is possible to recognize recurrent patterns of epistemic responses to speakers who belong to specific social groups. General testimonial injustice can thus be characterized as a behavioral tendency of a prejudiced hearer.
Comment (from this Blueprint): Migdalia Arcila-Valenzuela and Andrés Páez argue that it is impossible to detect an individual instance of epistemic injustice. Their case relies on a review and analysis of the recent research on implicit bias. The key theoretical premise of their argument is that it is impossible to establish, for any individual situation, what is the minimum degree of credibility that the speaker is entitled to. However, they still think we can measure general testimonial injustice, which they construe as “a behavioral tendency of a prejudiced hearer.”
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Bailey, Alison. Strategic Ignorance
2007, In Sullivan, Shanon and Tuana, Nancy (eds.): Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, Albany: State University of New York Press.
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Added by: Olivia Maegaard Nielsen
Abstract:

I want to explore strategic expressions of ignorance against the background of Charles W. Mills's account of epistemologies of ignorance in The Racial Contract (1997). My project has two interrelated goals. I want to show how Mills's discussion is restricted by his decision to frame ignorance within the language and logic of social contract theory. And, I want to explain why Maria Lugones's work on purity is useful in reframing ignorance in ways that both expand our understandings of ignorance and reveal its strategic uses. I begin with Mills's account of the Racial Contract, and explain how it prescribes for its signatories an epistemology of ignorance, which Mills characterizes as an inverted epistemology. I briefly outline his program for undoing white ignorance and indicate that retooling white ignorance is more complex than his characterization suggests. Making this argument requires an abrupt shift from the white-created frameworks of social contract theory to Lugones's system of thinking rooted in the lives of people of color. So, the next section outlines Lugones's distinction between the logic of purity and the logic of curdling and explains its usefulness in addressing ignorance. With both accounts firmly in place the third section demonstrates how the Racial Contract produces at least two expressions of ignorance and explains how the logic of purity underlying the Contract shapes each expression in ways that limit possibilities for resistance. I don't mean to suggest that the social contract theory's love of purity invalidates Mills's work, only that this framework limits prospects for long-term change by neglecting the relationship between white ignorance and non-white resistance. The final sections explain how people of color use ignorance strategically to their advantage , and argue that examining ignorance through a curdled lens not only makes strategic ignorance visible, but also points to alternatives for retooling white ignorance.

Comment: This rather advanced paper is an interesting addition to discussions of ignorance that involve Mills's concept of white ignorance. It engages with and criticizes his approach to ignorance in The Racial Contract. Having read either that or his essay White Ignorance would be helpful. Having read both Mills and Bailey would provide a good foundation for an interesting discussion among students about the complexity of white ignorance.
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Cardona, Carlos Alberto. Kepler: Analogies in the search for the law of refraction
2016, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:22-35.

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Juan R. Loaiza
Publisher's Note: This paper examines the methodology used by Kepler to discover a quantitative law of refraction. The aim is to argue that this methodology follows a heuristic method based on the following two Pythagorean principles: (1) sameness is made known by sameness, and (2) harmony arises from establishing a limit to what is unlimited. We will analyse some of the author's proposed analogies to find the aforementioned law and argue that the investigation's heuristic pursues such principles.
Comment: This is a stub entry. Please add your comments below to help us expand it
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Clerbout, Nicolas, McConaughey, Zoe. Dialogical Logic
2022, "Dialogical Logic", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.)
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Abstract:

This entry presents the framework of « dialogical logic » in the initial Lorenzen and Lorenz tradition. The rules for the game and for building strategies are provided with step by step examples, helping the reader understand how the dialogue tables reflect a dynamic process of interaction between the players. Various logics are presented within this pluralistic framework: intuitionist logic, classical logic, and modal logics, with references to various other logics. In a second part of the entry, objections against the framework are considered, together with answers provided by the « Immanent Reasoning » variant, which stays within the Lorenzen and Lorenz tradition, and by the « Built-In Opponent » variant first developed by Catarina Dutilh Novaes, which develops a different dialogical tradition.

Comment: Obvious overview choice for any course involving dialogical logic. Familiarity with first-order languages is a prerequisite.
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Erickson, Evelyn. More Limits of Abductivism About Logic
2025, Studia Logica, 113: 503–322.

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Added by: Viviane Fairbank
Abstract:
Logical abductivism is the method which purports to use Inference to the Best Explantion (IBE) to determine the best logical theory. The present essay argues that this is not the case, since the method fails to meet the criteria requisite for the fruitful application of IBE. This occurs due to an intrinsic difficulty in choosing the appropriate evidence and theoretical virtues which guide theory revision in logic: one’s previous conception of logic influences both these choices. Logical abductivism fails, moreover, to select the best logical theory, exactly because a lack of agreement on theory and virtues for Logic. Rather than direct comparison between two options, a more suitable approach to theory revision in logic is piecemeal, because this method neither assumes nor needs a neutral ground from which to start revising theories.
Comment: This is an accessible introduction to the contemporary debate regarding "abductivism about logic" (not to be confused with "abductive logic"). It might be included in any course on the epistemology of logic, particularly for anyone interested in so-called anti-exceptionalism about logic.
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Ferracioli, Luara. The Appeal and Danger of a New Refugee Convention
2014, Social Theory and Practice, 40 (1): 123-144.

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Added by: Rochelle DuFord
Abstract: It is widely held that the current refugee Convention is inadequate with respect to its specification of who counts as a refugee and in its assignment of responsibility concerning refugees to states. At the same time, there is substantial agreement among scholars that the negotiation of a new Convention would lead states to extricate themselves from previously assumed responsibilities rather than sign on to a set of more desirable legal norms. In this paper, I argue that states should ultimately negotiate a new Convention, but that first they must alleviate the institutional and motivational constraints that make progress currently unattainable.
Comment: This text provides a clear introduction to the philosophical treatment of the 1951 Refugee Convention. It criticises contemporary international law concerning refugees and asylum, and discusses the constraints to feasability for a new legal regime. This text would work well as an introduction to the philosophical issues involved in granting refugee status, or within a specialized context concerning the right to immigrate/migrate. It would also have a place in a class on human rights that covered greivous human rights violations and their remedy.
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Kempadoo, Kamala. Sexing the Caribbean: Gender, Race and Sexual Labour
2004, Routledge

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Added by: Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-Moore
Publisher’s Note:
This unprecedented work provides both the history of sex work in this region as well as an examination of current-day sex tourism. Based on interviews with sex workers, brothel owners, local residents and tourists, Kamala Kempadoo offers a vivid account of what life is like in the world of sex tourism as well as its entrenched roots in colonialism and slavery in the Caribbean.
Comment (from this Blueprint): Chapter 3 is about the perceptions of sex as transactional in the Caribbean and how the definition of "prostitution" has shifted over time. It details how sex work is organised, both in brothels and in other establishments, such as hotels, nightclubs, etc. It explores the experiences and feelings of women who have experiences of various kinds of transactional sex. This chapter can be used as a case study which allows the reader to explore sex work through a variety of lenses: its interaction with broader social issues like racism and poverty; the place of transactions and intimacy in sex and sex work; sexual norms and the social meanings of sexual relationships; and freedom and choice when engaging in sex and sex work.
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Lugones, María. Playfulness, “World”-Travelling, and Loving Perception
1987, Hypatia 2(2): 3-19

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Added by: Jimena Clavel
Abstract:
A paper about cross-cultural and cross-racial loving that emphasizes the need to understand and affirm the plurality in and among women as central to feminist ontology and epistemology. Love is seen not as fusion and erasure of difference but as incompatible with them. Love reveals plurality. Unity  -not to be confused with solidarity - is understood as conceptually tied to domination.
Comment: This paper discusses the epistemic position of marginalized identities. It can be discussed in a course on feminist philosophy or on social epistemology. It can also be helpful to connect discussions between feminist philosophy and empathy.
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