Allen, Sophie. A Critical Introduction to Properties (Bloomsbury Critical Introductions to Contemporary Metaphysics)
2016, Bloomsbury
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Naomi Osorio-KupferblumPublisher's Note: What do blue things have in common? Or electrons? Or planets? Distinct things appear to share properties; but what are properties and what is the best philosophical account of them? A Critical Introduction to Properties introduces different ontological accounts of properties, exploring how their formulation is shaped by the explanatory demands placed upon them. This accessible introduction begins with a discussion of universals, tropes, sets and resemblance classes, the major objections to them and their responses, providing readers with a firm grasp on the competing ontological accounts of what (if anything) grounds similarity and difference. It then explores issues concerning the formulation and justification of property theories such as: how many properties are there? Should we accept a sparse ontology of properties, or an abundant one? Can we make a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties? Do properties have their causal roles necessarily? What is the relationship between properties and other metaphysical phenomena such as causality, laws and modality? These questions get to the heart of why a coherent theory of properties is so important to metaphysics, and to philosophy more generally. By concluding with the question of the ontological status of properties, the reader is introduced to some Carnapian and contemporary themes about the content and methodology of metaphysics. For students looking for an accessible resource and a more comprehensive understanding of contemporary metaphysics, A Critical Introduction to Properties is a valuable starting point.Comment: This is an excellent introduction to an important topic in metaphysics. Each chapter is dedicated to a key aspect of properties, e.g., universals, tropes, grounded/ungrounded, intrinsic/extrinsic, categorical/dispositional properties, etc., each of which Allen describes with great clarity. The book clearly presents arguments and counter-arguments for various claims in the metaphysics of properties and contains many references for further reading. An excellent book for any undergraduate course on the metaphysics of properties, or metaphysics generally. Individual chapters would work well as introductory readings for the relevant position in a graduate course on metaphysics or the metaphysics of properties.
Allori, Valia. On the metaphysics of quantum mechanics
2013, In Soazig Lebihan (ed.), Precis de la Philosophie de la Physique, Vuibert.
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Added by: Laura JimenezAbstract: Many solutions have been proposed for solving the problem of macroscopic superpositions of wave function ontology. A possible solution is to assume that, while the wave function provides the complete description of the system, its temporal evolution is not given by the Schroedinger equation. The usual Schroedinger evolution is interrupted by random and sudden "collapses". The most promising theory of this kind is the GRW theory, named after the scientists that developed it: Gian Carlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini and Tullio Weber. It seems tempting to think that in GRW we can take the wave function ontologically seriously and avoid the problem of macroscopic superpositions just allowing for quantum jumps. In this paper it is argued that such "bare" wave function ontology is not possible, neither for GRW nor for any other quantum theory: quantum mechanics cannot be about the wave function simpliciter. All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.Comment: This is a very interesting article on the metaphysics and ontology of quantum mechanics. It is recommended for advanced courses (i.e., final year undergraduate courses or taught masters courses) in Philosophy of Science, especially for modules in the Philosophy of physics. Previous knowledge of Bohmian mechanics and the Many Words Interpretation is necessary. Recommended for postgraduate students.
Alvarez, Maria. Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action
2010, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Jie GaoPublisher's Note: Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions and motives, and of how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. In Kinds of Reasons, Maria Alvarez offers a fresh and incisive treatment of these issues, focusing in particular on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. Her account builds on some important recent work in the area; but she takes her main inspiration from the tradition that receives its seminal contemporary expression in the writings of G.E.M. Anscombe, a tradition that runs counter to the broadly Humean orthodoxy that has dominated the theory of action for the past forty years. Alvarez's conclusions are therefore likely to be controversial; and her bold and painstaking arguments will be found provocative by participants on every side of the debates with which she engages. Clear and directly written, Kinds of Reasons aims to stake out a distinctive position within one of the most hotly contested areas of contemporary philosophy.Comment: This book is on the ontological nature of reasons for which we act carries on. The first two chapters are very good introductory readings on reasons broadly. Chapters 3 to 5 explore the connection between reasons and motivation. Topics include what motivates actions, whether desires are motivating reasons, and whether motivating reasons are belief. They are proper introductory reading material for courses on ethics, reasons and philosophy of action.
Alvarez, Maria. How many kinds of reasons?
2009, Philosophical Explorations: 12 (2): 181-193.
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Added by: Jie GaoAbstract: Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate and guide us in our actions (and omissions), in the sense that we often act in the light of reasons. And reasons can be grounds for beliefs, desires and emotions and can be used to evaluate, and sometimes to justify, all these. In addition, reasons are used in explanations: both in explanations of human actions, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., and in explanations of a wide range of phenomena involving all sorts of animate and inanimate substances. This diversity has encouraged the thought that the term 'reason' is ambiguous or has different senses in different contexts. Moreover, this view often goes hand in hand with the claim that reasons of these different kinds belong to different ontological categories: to facts (or something similar) in the case of normative/justifying reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating/explanatory reasons. In this paper I shall explore some of the main roles that reasons play and, on that basis, I shall offer a classification of kinds of reasons. As will become clear, my classification of reasons is at odds with much of the literature in several respects: first, because of my views about how we should understand the claim that reasons are classified into different kinds; second, because of the kinds into which I think reasons should be classified; and, finally, because of the consequences I think this view has for the ontology of reasons.Comment: This paper discusses roles of reasons that they can play and whether different kinds of reasons are also ontologically different. It is a very good introductory paper on reasons, suitable for an introductory course on ethics or philosophy of action.
Ambroce, Alice. Wittgenstein on Mathematical Proof
1982, Mind, 91(362): 264–272
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, and elsewhere, Wittgenstein made some general statements about mathematical proof which can only be described as paradoxical. What he says is directed to proofs for which there is no general method of solution such as there is for statements of the form a x b = c where a simple calculation is sufficient. His concern is with propositions for which one cannot in advance of proof describe any procedure which will demonstrate them... In an earlier study,' 'Proof and the Theorem Proved', I singled out a group of propositions for which his account of proof seemed correct, and not paradoxical.... But I did not succeed in making his account of deductions of connections between established concepts paradox-free. I should like to return to his account as applied to such demonstrations, with the aim of explaining what justification there is for it, and what his account comes to.
Comment: This paper is a follow-up to Ambrose's earlier "Proof and the Theorem Proved" (which is also listed in the DRL).
Ambrose, Alice, Lazerowitz, Morris. Fundamentals of Symbolic Logic
1948, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
This book is intended for the newcomer to formal logic and is designed to provide an introduction for the intelligent general reader as well as for the student in the classroom. Its primary purpose is to present in a clear, natural, and orderly fashion the fundamentals of a subject that has now acquired the status of an exact science... Chapters I through VII are devoted to the exposition of material necessary to the construction of the deductive system of truth-functions... Thanks to the special notation that has come to be characteristic of symbolic logic, it is possible to express the logical material with clarity and exactness and to organize it, as in Chapter VIII, into a deductive system. Chapters IX through XI are given over to the study of general propositions and of forms of inference involving them... Care has been taken to show how Aristotelian logic is accommodated within the framework of the extended, present-day subject: by introducing the reader to quantification theory and to the current notation for expressing forms of general propositions, and finally, by presenting, in Chapter XII, the calculus of classes.Comment: This introductory textbook to formal logic was widely used in America in the mid-20th Century. Although some of the methods and notations are now outdated, it still provides a useful introduction to central ideas in formal and informal logic, and could be used as a reference for those preparing an introductory logic course (or for those interested in the history of logic education).
Ambrose, Alice. Proof and the Theorem Proved
1959, Mind, 68(272): 435–445
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
There is something curiously opaque about Wittgenstein's assertions concerning the connection between proof of a proposition p, sense of the sentence " p ", and understanding " p ". The difficulties inherent in his account are apparent, and he has
himself mentioned them, while leaving their resolution obscure. I shall now detail them, so that it will be clear what difficulties must be got round and what clarification is required.Comment: This is a useful work of Wittgenstein exegesis by one of his students and collaborators, concerning his views on mathematical proof with discussion of several examples. It could be used in an intermediate/advanced course on the philosophy of mathematics or on Wittgenstein's philosophy more generally.
Amijee, Fatema. The Role of Attention in Russell’s Theory of Knowledge
2013, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6):1175-1193.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Dominic Alford-DuguidAbstract: In his Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell distinguished knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. This paper argues for a new interpretation of the relationship between these two species of knowledge. I argue that knowledge by acquaintance of an object neither suffices for knowledge that one is acquainted with the object, nor puts a subject in a position to know that she is acquainted with the object. These conclusions emerge from a thorough examination of the central role played by attention in Russell's theory of knowledge. Attention bridges the gap between knowledge by acquaintance and our capacity to form judgements about the objects of acquaintance.
Andersen, Holly, Rick Grush. A Brief History of Time Consciousness: Historical Precursors to James and Husserl
2009, Journal of the History of Philosophy 47: 277-307.
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Simon Prosser
Abstract: William James’ Principles of Psychology, in which he made famous the ‘specious present’ doctrine of temporal experience, and Edmund Husserl’s Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, were giant strides in the philosophical investigation of the temporality of experience. However, an important set of precursors to these works has not been adequately investigated. In this article, we undertake this investigation. Beginning with Reid’s essay ‘Memory’ in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, we trace out a line of development of ideas about the temporality of experience that runs through Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, William Hamilton, and finally the work of Shadworth Hodgson and Robert Kelly, both of whom were immediate influences on James (though James pseudonymously cites the latter as ‘E.R. Clay’). Furthermore, we argue that Hodgson, especially his Metaphysic of Experience (1898), was a significant influence on Husserl.
Comment: Background reading on temporal perception - a nice historical survey of discussions of the specious present.
Anderson, Elizabeth. What is the Point of Equality?
1999, Ethics 109(2): 287-337.
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Added by: Carl FoxIntroduction: If much recent academic work defending equality had been secretly penned by conservatives, could the results be any more embarrassing for egalitarians? Consider how much of this work leaves itself open to classic and devastating conservative criticisms. Ronald Dworkin defines equality as an "envy-free" distribution of resources.' This feeds the suspicion that the motive behind egalitarian policies is mere envy. Philippe Van Parijs argues that equality in conjunction with liberal neutrality among conceptions of the good requires the state to support lazy, able-bodied surfers who are unwilling to work. This invites the charge that egalitarians support irresponsibility and encourage the slothful to be parasitic on the productive. Richard Arneson claims that equality requires that, under certain conditions, the state subsidize extremely costly religious ceremonies that its citizens feel bound to perform. G. A. Cohen tells us that equality requires that we compensate people for being temperamentally gloomy, or for being so incurably bored by inexpensive hobbies that they can only get fulfilling recreation from expensive diversions. These proposals bolster the objection that egalitarians are oblivious to the proper limits of state power and permit coercion of others for merely private ends. Van Parijs suggests that to fairly implement the equal right to get married, when male partners are scarce, every woman should be given an equal tradable share in the pool of eligible bachelors and have to bid for whole partnership rights, thus implementing a transfer of wealth from successful brides to compensate the losers in love. This supports the objection that egalitarianism, in its determination to correct perceived unfairness everywhere, invades our privacy and burdens the personal ties of love and affection that lie at the core of family life.Comment: This article asks the question: 'What is the point of equality?'. It provides a really clear diagnosis of some of the problems facing luck egalitarianism and goes on to articulate a particular version of the capability approach. Anderson argues that individuals are entitled to whatever they need to escape or overcome oppressive social relationships and to the capabilities necessary to participate as an equal citizen in a democratic state.
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