Allen, Anita. 22 Atmospherics: Abortion Law and Philosophy
2004, In Francis J. Mootz (ed.), On Philosophy in American Law. Cambridge University Press 184
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Added by: Simon FoktAbstract: In 1934, Karl N. Llewellyn published a lively essay trumpeting the dawn of legal realism, "On Philosophy in American Law." The charm of his defective little piece is its style and audacity. A philosopher might be seduced into reading Llewellyn’s essay by its title; but one soon learns that by "philosophy" Llewellyn only meant "atmosphere". His concerns were the "general approaches" taken by practitioners, who may not even be aware of having general approaches. Llewellyn paired an anemic concept of philosophy with a pumped-up conception of law. Llewellyn’s "law" included anything that reflects the "ways of the law guild at large" - judges, legislators, regulators, and enforcers. Llewellyn argued that the legal philosophies implicit in American legal practice had been natural law, positivism and realism, each adopted in response to felt needs of a time. We must reckon with many other implicit "philosophies" to understand the workings of the law guild, not the least of which has been racism. Others, maternalism and paternalism, my foci here, persist in American law, despite women’s progress toward equality. Both maternalism and paternalism were strikingly present in a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Gonzales v. Carhart, upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.Comment: This article offers a good way to relate practical legal problems with philosophical issues, giving the students a very direct way to see the relevance of ethics. It can inspire discussions on paternalism and its relations with global justice. Note that the article does not define the following terms which are important to understand the material: Natural law, Positivism, Realism, Atmosphere/atmospherics, Paternalism, Maternalism. Due to its focus on legal issues, the text can be better suited as further reading, or as a core reading in classes focused on applied ethics and law (following Diversifying Syllabi).
Allen, Anita L.. Mental Disorders and the “System of Judgmental Responsibility”
2010, Boston University Law Review 90: 621-640.
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Added by: Simon FoktDiversifying Syllabi: Thesis: Those affected by mental disorders whose actions are episodically influenced by their disorder are often overlooked by philosophers of moral and ethical responsibility. Allen gives us reasons for thinking it is inappropriate to either: a) “summarily exclude people with mental problems out of the universe of moral agents, reducing them to the status of rocks, trees, animals, and infants” b) “include the group on the false assumption that their moral lives are precisely like the paradigmatic moral lives of the epistemically-sound and well-regulated people never personally touched by a mental condition” We must explore a revised approach to moral and ethical responsibility and obligation for this group.Comment: This text is useful in teaching in two main contexts: (1) in discussing ethical issues related to mental disorders; and (2) to provide a challenging case in classes on blame and responsibility. The text can be also used in the context of the free will and determinism debate, and as a further reading in classes on moral agency.
Allen, Sophie. A Critical Introduction to Properties (Bloomsbury Critical Introductions to Contemporary Metaphysics)
2016, Bloomsbury
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Naomi Osorio-KupferblumPublisher's Note: What do blue things have in common? Or electrons? Or planets? Distinct things appear to share properties; but what are properties and what is the best philosophical account of them? A Critical Introduction to Properties introduces different ontological accounts of properties, exploring how their formulation is shaped by the explanatory demands placed upon them. This accessible introduction begins with a discussion of universals, tropes, sets and resemblance classes, the major objections to them and their responses, providing readers with a firm grasp on the competing ontological accounts of what (if anything) grounds similarity and difference. It then explores issues concerning the formulation and justification of property theories such as: how many properties are there? Should we accept a sparse ontology of properties, or an abundant one? Can we make a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties? Do properties have their causal roles necessarily? What is the relationship between properties and other metaphysical phenomena such as causality, laws and modality? These questions get to the heart of why a coherent theory of properties is so important to metaphysics, and to philosophy more generally. By concluding with the question of the ontological status of properties, the reader is introduced to some Carnapian and contemporary themes about the content and methodology of metaphysics. For students looking for an accessible resource and a more comprehensive understanding of contemporary metaphysics, A Critical Introduction to Properties is a valuable starting point.Comment: This is an excellent introduction to an important topic in metaphysics. Each chapter is dedicated to a key aspect of properties, e.g., universals, tropes, grounded/ungrounded, intrinsic/extrinsic, categorical/dispositional properties, etc., each of which Allen describes with great clarity. The book clearly presents arguments and counter-arguments for various claims in the metaphysics of properties and contains many references for further reading. An excellent book for any undergraduate course on the metaphysics of properties, or metaphysics generally. Individual chapters would work well as introductory readings for the relevant position in a graduate course on metaphysics or the metaphysics of properties.
Allori, Valia. On the metaphysics of quantum mechanics
2013, In Soazig Lebihan (ed.), Precis de la Philosophie de la Physique, Vuibert.
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Added by: Laura JimenezAbstract: Many solutions have been proposed for solving the problem of macroscopic superpositions of wave function ontology. A possible solution is to assume that, while the wave function provides the complete description of the system, its temporal evolution is not given by the Schroedinger equation. The usual Schroedinger evolution is interrupted by random and sudden "collapses". The most promising theory of this kind is the GRW theory, named after the scientists that developed it: Gian Carlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini and Tullio Weber. It seems tempting to think that in GRW we can take the wave function ontologically seriously and avoid the problem of macroscopic superpositions just allowing for quantum jumps. In this paper it is argued that such "bare" wave function ontology is not possible, neither for GRW nor for any other quantum theory: quantum mechanics cannot be about the wave function simpliciter. All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.Comment: This is a very interesting article on the metaphysics and ontology of quantum mechanics. It is recommended for advanced courses (i.e., final year undergraduate courses or taught masters courses) in Philosophy of Science, especially for modules in the Philosophy of physics. Previous knowledge of Bohmian mechanics and the Many Words Interpretation is necessary. Recommended for postgraduate students.
Alvarez, Maria. Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action
2010, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Jie GaoPublisher's Note: Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions and motives, and of how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. In Kinds of Reasons, Maria Alvarez offers a fresh and incisive treatment of these issues, focusing in particular on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. Her account builds on some important recent work in the area; but she takes her main inspiration from the tradition that receives its seminal contemporary expression in the writings of G.E.M. Anscombe, a tradition that runs counter to the broadly Humean orthodoxy that has dominated the theory of action for the past forty years. Alvarez's conclusions are therefore likely to be controversial; and her bold and painstaking arguments will be found provocative by participants on every side of the debates with which she engages. Clear and directly written, Kinds of Reasons aims to stake out a distinctive position within one of the most hotly contested areas of contemporary philosophy.Comment: This book is on the ontological nature of reasons for which we act carries on. The first two chapters are very good introductory readings on reasons broadly. Chapters 3 to 5 explore the connection between reasons and motivation. Topics include what motivates actions, whether desires are motivating reasons, and whether motivating reasons are belief. They are proper introductory reading material for courses on ethics, reasons and philosophy of action.
Alvarez, Maria. How many kinds of reasons?
2009, Philosophical Explorations: 12 (2): 181-193.
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Added by: Jie GaoAbstract: Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate and guide us in our actions (and omissions), in the sense that we often act in the light of reasons. And reasons can be grounds for beliefs, desires and emotions and can be used to evaluate, and sometimes to justify, all these. In addition, reasons are used in explanations: both in explanations of human actions, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., and in explanations of a wide range of phenomena involving all sorts of animate and inanimate substances. This diversity has encouraged the thought that the term 'reason' is ambiguous or has different senses in different contexts. Moreover, this view often goes hand in hand with the claim that reasons of these different kinds belong to different ontological categories: to facts (or something similar) in the case of normative/justifying reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating/explanatory reasons. In this paper I shall explore some of the main roles that reasons play and, on that basis, I shall offer a classification of kinds of reasons. As will become clear, my classification of reasons is at odds with much of the literature in several respects: first, because of my views about how we should understand the claim that reasons are classified into different kinds; second, because of the kinds into which I think reasons should be classified; and, finally, because of the consequences I think this view has for the ontology of reasons.Comment: This paper discusses roles of reasons that they can play and whether different kinds of reasons are also ontologically different. It is a very good introductory paper on reasons, suitable for an introductory course on ethics or philosophy of action.
Ambrose, Alice, Lazerowitz, Morris. Fundamentals of Symbolic Logic
1948, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
This book is intended for the newcomer to formal logic and is designed to provide an introduction for the intelligent general reader as well as for the student in the classroom. Its primary purpose is to present in a clear, natural, and orderly fashion the fundamentals of a subject that has now acquired the status of an exact science... Chapters I through VII are devoted to the exposition of material necessary to the construction of the deductive system of truth-functions... Thanks to the special notation that has come to be characteristic of symbolic logic, it is possible to express the logical material with clarity and exactness and to organize it, as in Chapter VIII, into a deductive system. Chapters IX through XI are given over to the study of general propositions and of forms of inference involving them... Care has been taken to show how Aristotelian logic is accommodated within the framework of the extended, present-day subject: by introducing the reader to quantification theory and to the current notation for expressing forms of general propositions, and finally, by presenting, in Chapter XII, the calculus of classes.Comment: This introductory textbook to formal logic was widely used in America in the mid-20th Century. Although some of the methods and notations are now outdated, it still provides a useful introduction to central ideas in formal and informal logic, and could be used as a reference for those preparing an introductory logic course (or for those interested in the history of logic education).
Ambrose, Alice. Proof and the Theorem Proved
1959, Mind, 68(272): 435–445
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
There is something curiously opaque about Wittgenstein's assertions concerning the connection between proof of a proposition p, sense of the sentence " p ", and understanding " p ". The difficulties inherent in his account are apparent, and he has
himself mentioned them, while leaving their resolution obscure. I shall now detail them, so that it will be clear what difficulties must be got round and what clarification is required.Comment: This is a useful work of Wittgenstein exegesis by one of his students and collaborators, concerning his views on mathematical proof with discussion of several examples. It could be used in an intermediate/advanced course on the philosophy of mathematics or on Wittgenstein's philosophy more generally.
Ambrose, Alice. Wittgenstein on Mathematical Proof
1982, Mind, 91(362): 264–272
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, and elsewhere, Wittgenstein made some general statements about mathematical proof which can only be described as paradoxical. What he says is directed to proofs for which there is no general method of solution such as there is for statements of the form a x b = c where a simple calculation is sufficient. His concern is with propositions for which one cannot in advance of proof describe any procedure which will demonstrate them... In an earlier study,' 'Proof and the Theorem Proved', I singled out a group of propositions for which his account of proof seemed correct, and not paradoxical.... But I did not succeed in making his account of deductions of connections between established concepts paradox-free. I should like to return to his account as applied to such demonstrations, with the aim of explaining what justification there is for it, and what his account comes to.
Comment: This paper is a follow-up to Ambrose's earlier "Proof and the Theorem Proved" (which is also listed in the DRL).
Amijee, Fatema. The Role of Attention in Russell’s Theory of Knowledge
2013, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6):1175-1193.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Dominic Alford-DuguidAbstract: In his Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell distinguished knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. This paper argues for a new interpretation of the relationship between these two species of knowledge. I argue that knowledge by acquaintance of an object neither suffices for knowledge that one is acquainted with the object, nor puts a subject in a position to know that she is acquainted with the object. These conclusions emerge from a thorough examination of the central role played by attention in Russell's theory of knowledge. Attention bridges the gap between knowledge by acquaintance and our capacity to form judgements about the objects of acquaintance.
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