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Eaton, Marcia Muelder. A Sustainable Definition of “Art”
2000, in Theories of Art Today, ed. by Noel Carroll (London: The University of Wisconsin Press)
Topics: Culture; Metaphysics of Aesthetics
Keywords: art classification; bias; cultural differences; sustainability
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Simon Fokt
Content: Eaton begins with some remarks on the practical need for classification of art and proceeds to present and improve her definition. Her focus is not on specific properties of artworks, but on the fact that they possess properties which within a given culture are considered worth attending to. The modifications made to the theory follow a realisation of Western-centric bias embedded in the original formulation, and the discussion explicitly aims to work towards a definition which acknowledges the cultural differences in art production and appreciation. Eaton moves on to discuss Danto’s and Cohen’s claims that art cannot be defined and points out some Western-centric aspects of their arguments. The paper ends with an overview of what it is for art and its definition to be sustainable.
Comment: Western-centric bias in art classification is explicitly addressed in the article and efforts are made to account for the cultural variations in attitudes to and classification of art. This can offer a powerful motivation for the students to seek similar biases in other definitions and ask whether they entail a preferential treatment of Western art.
Difficulty: Easy, Intermediate
Recommended use: Further, Specialised

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Eaton, Marcia Muelder. Art, Artifacts, and Intentions
1969, American Philosophical Quarterly 6(2): 165 - 169
Topics: Culture; Metaphysics of Aesthetics
Keywords: art classification; artefact; found art; intention; literature
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Simon Fokt
Content: The paper is written in support of the claim that artworks have to be artefacts. In a series of thought experiments involving driftwood and poems typed by monkeys, Eaton argues that linguistic objects such as warnings or poems have to result from intentional actions. She supports this argument by distinguishing linguistic objects from linguistic actions. To understand an utterance, it is necessary to not only explicate the meaning of the words used, but also to interpret the linguistic action which resulted in it. Literary works require interpretation, and interpretation requires reference to the linguistic actions of the work’s creator – their intentions. So literary works need to result from intentional actions, i.e. be artefacts. Similarly, artworks are objects of interpretation and thus must be artefacts.
Comment: The artefactuality requirement is involved in various definitions of art and thus Eaton’s paper can be used in many contexts. With its narrow topic and a lack of introduction to any particular definitions, in the context of undergraduate teaching it remains a rather specialised reading. It is best used as a further reading, or as a required reading in higher level modules which already introduced more general works on art classification.
Difficulty: Intermediate
Recommended use: Specialised

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Eaton, Marcia Muelder. A strange kind of sadness
1982, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 41 (1):51-63.
Topics: Aesthetic Experience and Judgement; Aesthetic Normativity and Value; Individual Arts and Crafts; Mental States and Processes; Metaphysics of Aesthetics
Keywords: Emotions
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag Uidhir
Abstract: HERE IS a Steve McQueen, Jackie Gleason, Tuesday Weld movie called Soldier in the Rain that I watch whenever it comes on the TV late show. I have seen it at least half a dozen times. The first time I saw it, I cried at the end. The next time I saw it I began crying just before the end. Now I choke up when it starts and cry more or less steadily through the whole thing. My husband and son find this exasperating. "Why are you going to watch that if it is just going to make you unhappy?" they ask. What they do not understand is that very few things bring me greater pleasure than watching this movie, crying all the way through. Or perhaps my son does understand when he disdainfully concludes, "You're crazy".
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Eaton, Marcia Muelder. Kantian and contextual beauty
1999, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 57 (1):11-15.
Topics: Aesthetic Experience and Judgement; Aesthetic Normativity and Value; Individual Arts and Crafts; Mental States and Processes; Metaphysics of Aesthetics
Keywords: aesthetic judgment
Traditions: Analytic; Historical; North American
Languages: English

Figures: Immanuel Kant

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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag Uidhir
Introduction: Two conflicting but strongly entrenched intu itions about beauty hold sway in the hearts and minds of many. On the one hand, many people believe that attributions of beauty to objects or events are unmediated-that all that matters is one's direct, personal response. If something is beautiful, one just sees it; cognitive or ethical concerns matter little. On the other hand, many people are drawn to the view that the beautiful is not independent of other human values and atti tudes-that our attributions of beauty are related to beliefs or moral judgments. At the end of the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant represented the former view with such cleverness that his ar guments continue to disturb even those who re main unconvinced by them. At the end of the nineteenth century, partly as a result of the influ ence of Kant's theory of beauty, Leo Tolstoy felt forced to downplay the importance of beauty's role in explaining the value of art-a trend that continued for several decades. At the end of the twentieth century, increasing numbers of aes thetic theorists and practitioners are persuaded that beauty does matter in art, and although many, including me, believe that beauty is a con textual property deeply connected to factual be liefs and moral attitudes, the tug of Kant's arguments remains strong.
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Eaton, Marcia Muelder. Merit, Aesthetic and Ethical
2001, Oxford University Press.
Topics: Aesthetic Normativity and Value; Metaethics
Keywords: aesthetic concepts; merit; value
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag Uidhir
Publisher's Note: To "look good" and to "be good" have traditionally been considered two very different notions. Indeed, philosophers have seen aesthetic and ethical values as fundamentally separate. Now, at the crossroads of a new wave of aesthetic theory, Marcia Muelder Eaton introduces this groundbreaking work, in which a bold new concept of merit where being good and looking good are integrated into one.
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Edgington, Dorothy. On Conditionals
1995, Mind 104(414): 235-329.
Topics: Grammar and Meaning; Logic and Mathematics
Keywords: conditionals; truth conditions
Traditions: Analytic; European
Languages: English

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Added by: Emily Paul, Contributed by: Helen De Cruz
Summary: Examines the theory of conditionals and whether it's possible to have a unified theory of them.
Comment: Great core text as there are many important discussion points here, and Edginton uses lots of helpful examples. Could set students the task of coming up with their own conditionals, and analysing these in the would/will sense. This definitely requires a background in beginner's logic.
Difficulty: Advanced, Intermediate
Recommended use: Specialised

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Edgington, Dorothy. Indicative Conditionals
2001, In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
Topics: Logic and Mathematics Keywords: conditional belief; conditional probability; indicative conditionals; truth conditions
Traditions: Analytic; European; Formal Languages: English
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Abstract:

The chapter is an introduction to logical treatments of indicative conditionals, comparing truth-functional, non-truth-functional, and suppositional approaches. Some of the topics discussed are truth conditions, conditional belief, assertability, and issues with compounds of conditionals.

Comment: This page can be used in a course focused on the philosophy of conditionals, as an introduction/overview of the basic logical issues; or in any logic course wishing to spend more time on this particular notion.
Difficulty: Intermediate
Recommended use: Introductory, Overview
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Egan, Frances. Representationalism
2012, In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, OUP, 250-272.
Topics: Cognitive Science; Intentionality; Mental States and Processes
Keywords: cognitive science; information; representationalism
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Representationalism, in its most widely accepted form, is the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are to be understood as representational capacities. This chapter distinguishes several distinct theses that go by the name "representationalism," focusing on the view that is most prevalent in cogntive science. It also discusses some objections to the view and attempts to clarify the role that representational content plays in cognitive models that make use of the notion of representation.
Comment: A very good overview of representationalism. Suitable for a preliminary introduction to the topic.
Difficulty: Easy
Recommended use: Introductory

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Egan, Frances. Computational models: a modest role for content
2010, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41(3): 253-259.
Topics: Cognitive Science; Intentionality; Mental States and Processes
Keywords: cognitive capacities; computation; explanation; representational content
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.
Comment: Good paper about the relation of representation and content to computation. Best suited to higher-level courses on the subject.
Difficulty: Advanced
Recommended use: Specialised

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Egan, Frances. Folk psychology and cognitive architecture
1995, Philosophy of Science 62(2): 179-96.
Topics: Cognitive Science; Psychology
Keywords: cognitive science; research; science
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science.
Comment: A good defense of folk psychology. Would be a good inclusion in a course on philosophy of mind/philosophy of cognitive science to show that scepticism need not be taken to extremes.
Difficulty: Intermediate
Recommended use: Specialised

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