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Chong, Kim-Chong. The Concept of Zhen 真 in the Zhuangzi
2011, Philosophy East and West 61(2): 324-346.

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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Ian James Kidd

Abstract: The term zhen in the Zhuangzi is commonly associated with the zhen ren or the "true person," who is described, for example, as capable of going through fire and water unharmed. Some scholars take this as typifying a mystical element in the Zhuangzi. This essay investigates the various meanings and uses of zhen in the Zhuangzi and reaches a broader understanding of the zhen ren in various contexts.

Comment: Excellent on the concept of 'zhen' (authenticity, naturalness) in Daoism. Long but clearly written. Very useful for explaining the character of Daoist ethics.

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Clack, Beverley. Feminism and the Problem of Evil
2014, in Justin P. McBrayer & Daniel Howard Snyder (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil (Wiley & Sons): 326-339.

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Added by: Emily Paul

Abstract: Feminists have challenged the claim that gender is irrelevant to the discussion of evil and suffering in the world. This chapter considers a range of approaches offered by feminists to the problem of evil, suggesting something of the innovation that considering gender issues bring to the discussion of evil. In describing a variety of feminist perspectives, I intend to highlight the way in which feminist theories invariably turn to the practical solutions that might be made to evil and suffering in our world.

Comment: Useful for an introduction to philosophy of religion course – especially after looking at traditional theodicies to get students re-thinking the whole framing of the problem of evil.

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Davis, Nancy. Contemporary deontology
1993, In Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. John Wiley & Sons.

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt

Abstract: Many people profess to believe that acting morally, or as we ought to act, involves the self-conscious acceptance of some (quite specific) constraints or rules that place limits both on the pursuit of our own interests and on our pursuit of the general good. Though these people do not regard the furtherance of our own interests or the pursuit of the general good as ignoble ends, or ones that we are morally required to eschew, they believe that neither can be regarded as providing us with morally sufficient reason to take action. Those who hold such a view believe that there are certain sorts of acts that are wrong in themselves, and thus morally unacceptable means to the pursuit of any ends, even ends that are morally admirable, or morally obligatory. (How strong the prohibition is against performing such acts is a matter that will be taken up later.) Philosophers call such ethical views 'deontological' (from the Greek deon , 'duty'), and contrast them to views that are 'teleological' in structure (from telos , Greek for 'goal'). Those who hold teleological views reject the view that there are special kinds of acts that are right or wrong in themselves. For teleologists, the rightness or wrongness of our acts is determined by a comparative assessment of their consequences. [...] The focus of this essay is on deontological theories.

Comment:

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Deane-Drummond, Celia. Gaia as Science Made Myth: Implications for Environmental Ethics
1996, Studies in Christian Ethics 9(2): 1-5.

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Added by: Simon Fokt

Content: Offers a critical discussion of the Gaia hypothesis in the context of human responsibility for climate change.

Comment: Might be useful for environmental ethics, or as further reading on methodology of science and the dangers of confusing science and myth.

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Deng, Natalja. Religion for Naturalists
2015, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78(2): 195-214.

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Added by: Emily Paul

Abstract: Some naturalists feel an affinity with some religions, or with a particular religion. They may have previously belonged to it, and/or been raised in it, and/or be close to people who belong to it, and/or simply feel attracted to its practices, texts and traditions. This raises the question of whether and to what extent a naturalist can lead the life of a religious believer. The sparse literature on this topic focuses on (a position recognizable as) religious fictionalism. I also frame the debate in these terms. I ask what religious fictionalism might amount to, reject some possible versions of it and endorse a different one. I then examine the existing proposals, by Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Lipton, Andrew Eshleman and Howard Wettstein, and show that even on my version of religious fictionalism, much of what has been described by these authors is still possible.

Comment: Could be very useful for a Philosophy of Religion course where atheism and agnosticism have already been explored, to provide an interesting alternative. I’ve seen religious fictionalism work as a stimulating topic for students, but only if the paper is clear and accessible – like this one.

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Ekstrom, Laura W. Suffering as Religious Experience
2004, in Peter Van Inwagen (ed.) Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Press: 95-110.

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Added by: Emily Paul

Summary: In this paper, Ekstrom argues that some instances of suffering might reasonably be viewed as religious experiences that serve as a means of intimacy with God. Thus, where atheologians typically take suffering as evidence against the existence of God, Ekstrom argues that it might in fact be a route of knowledge to God.

Comment: This chapter would probably be most useful in arguments for/against the existence of God. In particular, it could follow on from a unit on the problem of evil. It is of particular interest because it's commonly argued that suffering is an argument against God's existence, but Ekstrom argues to the contrary.

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Ekstrom, Laura W. Religion on the Cheap
2015, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (Jonathan Kvanvig (ed).) Vol. 6: 87-113

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Added by: Emily Paul

Introduction: The project of this chapter is to address this question: is it sensible to live a life that involves religious practices and experiences and involvement in religious community within a traditional monotheistic religion that affirms the existence of God, without oneself having a commitment to the existence of God---that is, with being a religious agnostic? It is argued that it is not. It is further argued that there are real costs associated with rejecting the claim that the proposition, 'God exists', realistically construed, is true. But one should be prepared to absorb these costs rather than trying to have it both ways - rather than getting religion on the cheap.

Comment: Useful for an introductory philosophy of religion course element on agnosticism and fictionalism, perhaps as a secondary reading in response to a paper that argues for religious fictionalism (e.g. by Natalja Deng - also recommended in the DRL). Alternatively, both of these readings could be set as core readings, and students could be set the task of defending one of them, and giving reasons why they think that particular account is stronger.

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Ellis, Fiona. Atheism and Naturalism
2017, in A. Carroll and R. Norman (eds.) Religion and Atheism: Beyond the Divide. London: Routledge

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Added by: Emily Paul

Summary: Ellis argues that atheism and naturalism don't have to be traditionally-opposed rivals. First of all offers a helpful synopsis of these traditionally-opposed positions, and then argues that there is scope for allowing that nature is God-involving as well as being value-involving, and this move can be defended on (liberal) naturalistic grounds.

Comment: A good paper to use for an atheism and agnosticism unit, especially as many do tend to use naturalism as an argument against the existence of God.

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Garcia, Laura. Ontological Arguments for God’s Existence
2017, in Kelly James Clark (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Reigion - Third Edition. Broadview Press.

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Added by: Emily Paul

Summary: A clear introduction to the Ontological Argument for God's existence, and different versions of it.

Comment: A nice introduction to the Ontological Argument, suitable for an introductory philosophy of religion course. Would work as either a primary or secondary reading, depending on how much attention you want to give to the ontological argument.

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Garcia, Laura. Teleological and Design Arguments
2008, in Charles Taliaferro & Philip Quinn (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, Second Edition. Wiley-Blackwell: 375-384.

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Added by: Emily Paul

Summary: This chapter takes you through the history of teleological arguments and an analysis of them: beginning with traditional teleological arguments and their origins, and moving to discuss modern day 'fine tuning' and 'many worlds' arguments. Along the way, Garcia considers criticisms of these various arguments.

Comment: An excellent and thorough introduction to the Teleological Argument, suitable for an introductory philosophy of religion course as a core reading. It could be good to ask students to compare classical 'design' arguments with 'fine-tuning' arguments, based on their reading of Garcia.

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