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Kongzi (Confucius). Analects (Selections)
2005, In: Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (Second Edition). Edited by Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden. Hackett.
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Added by: Chris Blake-TurnerSummary: Selections from the Analects of Kongzi (Confucius), a foundational text in Chinese philosophy. It is split into twenty books recounting things that the Master (Kongzi) and his disciples said and did. Much of the rest of Chinese philosophy owes a debt, more or less explicit, to this work. Kongzi seeks the cultivation of virtue through ritual, so that worthy persons will occupy positions of power and influence. Society will thereby return to some of the splendor of the bygone ages of the legendary Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors, as well as the more recent Xia, Shang, and Western Zhou dynasties.Comment: The selections are best read in their entirety, as the work is holistic and difficult to interpret piecemeal. (So reading the whole text is better still!) It's helpful to stress Kongzi's particularism, as this makes sense of seemingly contradictory pronouncements he makes in different contexts. But if you're looking to incorporate some Classical Chinese philosophy in a course without space for the whole thing, the selections from Book One include many key Confucian themes: ritual, the ideal of a junzi or gentleman, virtue, filial piety, and the appeal to tradition. Either way, it's probably wise to give students some historical context to help understand the appeal of harking back to older traditions.
Manne, Kate. Internalism about Reasons, Sad but True?
2014, Philosophical Studies 167(1): 89-117.
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Lizzy VenthamAbstract: Internalists about reasons following Bernard Williams claim that an agent's normative reasons for action are constrained in some interesting way by her desires or motivations. In this paper, I offer a new argument for such a position - although one that resonates, I believe, with certain key elements of Williams' original view. I initially draw on P.F. Strawson's famous distinction between the interpersonal and the objective stances that we can take to other people, from the second-person point of view. I suggest that we should accept Strawson's contention that the activity of reasoning with someone about what she ought to do naturally belongs to the interpersonal mode of interaction. I also suggest that reasons for an agent to perform some action are considerations which would be apt to be cited in favor of that action, within an idealized version of this advisory social practice. I then go on to argue that one would take leave of the interpersonal stance towards someone - thus crossing the line, so to speak - in suggesting that she do something one knows she wouldn't want to do, even following an exhaustive attempt to hash it out with her. An internalist necessity constraint on reasons is defended on this basis.Comment: I use this as one of the key pieces of reading whenever I discuss reasons internalism (alongside Williams' original 'Internal and External Reasons'). Gives a good overview and a good original argument.
Manne, Kate. Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny
2017, Oxford University Press
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Lizzy VenthamPublisher's Note: Down Girl is a broad, original, and far ranging analysis of what misogyny really is, how it works, its purpose, and how to fight it. The philosopher Kate Manne argues that modern society's failure to recognize women's full humanity and autonomy is not actually the problem. She argues instead that it is women's manifestations of human capacities - autonomy, agency, political engagement - is what engenders misogynist hostility.Comment: This book offers a convincing argument against the idea that misogyny is explicit hatred of women. It would be great to teach in its own right, but the author also gives several case studies and helpful summaries, many of which can be used in a variety of ethics classes (eg. on abortion or online bullying).
Pérez, Diana. Why should our mind-reading abilities be involved in the explanation of phenomenal consciousness?
2008, Análisis filosófico 28(1)
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Juan R. LoaizaAbstract: In this paper I consider recent discussions within the representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness, in particular, the discussions between first order representationalism (FOR) and higher order representationalism (HOR). I aim to show that either there is only a terminological dispute between them or, if the discussion is not simply terminological, then HOR is based on a misunderstanding of the phenomena that a theory of phenomenal consciousness should explain. First, I argue that we can defend first order representationalism from Carruthers' attacks and ignore higher order thoughts in our account of phenomenal consciousness. Then I offer a diagnostic of Carruthers' misunderstanding. In the last section I consider further reasons to include mindreading abilities in an explanation of phenomenal consciousness.Comment: This text connects three topics in philosophy of mind in a clear way: representationalism (especially Fodor's LOT), consciousness, and mind-reading. It serves as an example of how to integrate different problems while proposing a provocative claim about them.
Galavotti, Maria Carla. The notion of subjective probability in the works of Ramsey and de Finetti
1991, Theoria 57 (3): 239-259.
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Added by: Sara PeppeIntroduction: The decade from the mid-twenties to the mid-thirties was undoubtedly the most crucial for the twentieth Century notion of subjective probability. It was in 1926 that Frank Ramsey wrote his essay 'Truth and probability', presented at the Moral Science Club in Cambridge and published posthumously in 1931. There he put forward for the first time a definition of probability as degree of belief, that had been anticipated only by E. Borel in 1924, in a review of J. M. Keynes' Treatise on Ten years after Ramsey's paper, namely in 1935, Bruno de Finetti gave a series of lectures at the Institut Poincare in Paris, published in 1937 under the title 'La prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives'. In this paper subjective probability, defined in a way analogous to that adopted by Ramsey, was implemented with the notion of exchangeability, that de Finetti had already worked out in 1928- 1930. Exchangeability confers applicability to the notion of subjective probability, and fills the gap between frequency and probability as degree of belief. It was only when these two were tied together that subjectivism could become a full-fledged interpretation of probability and gain credibility among probabilists and statisticians. One can then say that with the publication of 'La prévision' the formation process of a subjective notion of probability was completed.Comment: This article is focused on subjective probability in the works of Ramsey and de Finetti even if the main part of the work is devoted to Ramsey. This text is crucial in order to understand the subjectivist line of thinking.
Olberding, Amy. Confucius’ Complaints and the Analects’ Account of the Good Life
2013, Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 12 (4):417-440.
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Ian James KiddAbstract: The Analects appears to offer two bodies of testimony regarding the felt, experiential qualities of leading a life of virtue. In its ostensible record of Confucius' more abstract and reflective claims, the text appears to suggest that virtue has considerable power to afford joy and insulate from sorrow. In the text's inclusion of Confucius' less studied and apparently more spontaneous remarks, however, he appears sometimes to complain of the life he leads, to feel its sorrows, and to possess some despair. Where we attend to both of these elements of the text, a tension emerges. In this essay, I consider how Confucius' complaints appear to complicate any clean conclusion that Confucius wins a good life, particularly where we attend to important pre-theoretical sensibilities regarding what a 'good life' ought to include and how it ought to feel for the one who leads it.Comment: A rich text that explains the role of complaints - and, more broadly, disappointment, regret, and sadness - in the moral life. Especially good for challenging the idea that the moral life will insulate a person from such negative affects. Also points out the tendency of some moral philosophers to downplay certain aspects of human beings when constructing their ideals.
Churchland, Patricia S.. Brain-Wise
2002, MIT Press.
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Added by: Sara PeppePublisher's Note: Progress in the neurosciences is profoundly changing our conception of ourselves. Contrary to time-honored intuition, the mind turns out to be a complex of brain functions. And contrary to the wishful thinking of some philosophers, there is no stemming the revolutionary impact that brain research will have on our understanding of how the mind works. Brain-Wise is the sequel to Patricia Smith Churchland's Neurophilosophy, the book that launched a subfield. In a clear, conversational manner, this book examines old questions about the nature of the mind within the new framework of the brain sciences. What, it asks, is the neurobiological basis of consciousness, the self, and free choice? How does the brain learn about the external world and about its own introspective world? What can neurophilosophy tell us about the basis and significance of religious and moral experiences? Drawing on results from research at the neuronal, neurochemical, system, and whole-brain levels, the book gives an up-to-date perspective on the state of neurophilosophy - what we know, what we do not know, and where things may go from here.Comment: This book is a very deep and clear work about mind. This latter one is examined considering brain sciences. This book is a good way to familiarise whit the mind-related philosophical debate.
Wee, Cecilia. Xin, Trust, and Confucius’ Ethics
2011, Philosophy East and West, 61 (3): 516-533.
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Ian James KiddAbstract: Confucius frequently employs the term xin 信 in the Analects. The frequency of his usage suggests that xin has a significant place within his ethics. The main aim of this article is to offer an account of the roles played by xin within Confucius' ethics. To have a clear understanding of these roles, however, one needs first to understand what Confucius encompasses within his notion of xin. The article begins by delineating the Confucian conception of xin, as presented in the Analects. The notion of xin is often taken to be isomorphic with the notion of trust. I argue that Confucius' notion of xin does not quite map onto the notion of trust as usually understood in contemporary Western contexts. To understand better what Confucian xin amounts to, I compare and contrast the Confucian conception of xin with contemporary Western accounts of trust by Baier, McLeod, and Mullin. This comparison helps elucidate what xin is as well as how xin relates to morality. With this in hand, the roles that Confucius ascribes to xin in social and political contexts are then delineated.Comment: Clear discussion of Confucian conceptions of trustworthiness and trust and their roles in the moral life. Useful for those who want to do comparative work with Chinese philosophy.
Sarkar, Sahotra. Environmental Philosophy: From Theory to Practice
2012, Wiley-Blackwell.
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Rose Trappes
Publisher's Note: The first comprehensive treatment of environmental philosophy, going beyond ethics to address the philosophical concepts that underlie environmental thinking and policy-making today
- Encompasses all of environmental philosophy, including conservation biology, restoration ecology, sustainability, environmental justice, and more
- Offers the first treatment of decision theory in an environmental philosophy text
- Explores the conceptions of nature and ethical presuppositions that underlie contemporary environmental debates, and, moving from theory to practice, shows how decision theory translates to public policy
- Addresses both hot-button issues, including population and immigration reform, and such ongoing issues as historical legacies and nations' responsibility and obligation for environmental problems
- Anchors philosophical concepts to their practical applications, establishing the priority of the discipline's real-world importance
Comment: This book provides a clear and comprehensive introduction to major philosophical issues in environmental science, ethics and policy. There are handy 'boxes' with examples to illustrate the text. Chapters are fairly short and can be a bit dense, but they are good as overviews of the major issues when paired with related but more specific texts. It's also sensitive to indigenous and racial issues when it comes to conservation.
Massimi, Michaela. Why There are No Ready-Made Phenomena: What Philosophers of Science Should Learn From Kant
2008, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 63:1-35.
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Added by: Sara PeppeAbstract: The debate on scientific realism has raged among philosophers of science for decades. The scientific realist's claim that science aims to give us a literally true description of the way things are, has come under severe scrutiny and attack by Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. All science aims at is to save the observable phenomena, according to van Fraassen. Scientific realists have faced since a main sceptical challenge: the burden is on them to prove that the entities postulated by our scientific theories are real and that science is still in the 'truth' business.Comment: This article provides a very clear explanation of the scientific realism/Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism debate highlighting scientific realists' main difficulty, i.e find a proof that entities posited by science are real. Presupposes some background on the above mentioned themes.