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Jackson Balcerak, Magdalena. Justification by Imagination
2018, In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory. Oxford University Press. pp. 209-226

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: The author argues that experience constraints the nature of imagination in such a way that this results having a justificatory role.
Comment: Good to use as further reading in a course on the topic of the epistemology of imagination.
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Hoagland, Sarah Lucia. Denying Relationality: Epistemology and Ethics and Ignorance
2007,

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In this chapter, the author argues that epistemological and ethical practices of ignorance are strategic and involve a strategic denial of relationality, namely, of the way in which subjects are formed through relation with each other.
Comment: Good as a further reading for a course on epistemology of ignorance.
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Jacskon Balcerak, Magdalena. On the Epistemic Value of Imagining, Supposing and Conceiving
2016, In Amy Kind & Peter Kun (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2016)

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Abstract:
Abstract. Philosophers frequently invoke our ability to imagine, conceive or suppose various thing in order to explain how we achieve our cognitive goals when we make decisions about future actions, when we perform thought experiments, and when we engage in games of pretense. But what is the relationship between imaginings, conceivings, and supposings? And what exactly are the epistemic roles they play in the cognitive projects in which they are involved? This chapter provides answers to these questions by first bringing out a contrast between what we do when we imagine and what we do when we suppose, and then by showing how to fit conceivings into the emerging systematic picture of the ways we use different forms of hypothetical thinking to acquire knowledge.
Comment: Good resource as further reading in an undergraduate course on epistemology of imagination, or as core reading in a graduate class on a similar topic.
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Grasswick, Heidi. Feminist Social Epistemology
2013, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: Survey article on feminist epistemology and its intersection with social epistemology. Includes discussion on topics such as the historical development of feminist epistemology as well as on epistemic injustice and the epistemology of ignorance.
Comment: It can be used as introductory/overview reading for a course on feminism, as well as social epistemology.
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Haack, Susan. A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification
2008, in Sosa, Ernest, Jaegwon, Kim, Fant, Jeremy, and McGrath Matthew (eds.), Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd Edition

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In the debate over the structure of epistemic justification, epistemologists have opposed foundationalism to coherentism. In this paper, the author argues for "Foundherentism".
Comment: Great as a further reading in an undergraduate epistemology course on the topic of the structure of the epistemic justification.
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Foot, Philippa. Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
1972, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 81, No. 3. (Jul., 1972), pp. 305-316

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In this well known paper, the author argues that there are no categorical imperatives. In a nutshell, the author's logical outline runs - schematically - as follows: i) imperatives can be either categorical or imperative ii) moral imperatives are not categorical, iii) Therefore, there are hypotetical.
Comment: This can be used as main text in an introductory undergraduate course on ethics or meta-ethics.
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Elgin, Z. Catherine. Scepticism Aside
2010, in Joseph Keim Campell, Michael O'Rourke and Harry (eds.), Knowledge and Scepticism Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010, 309-324. ed. Silverstein

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: The author presents an argument for disregarding scepticism. Although she does not commit herself to saying that scepticism is false, she argues that it is, not only practicaly, yet epistemologically responsible to assume scepticism to be false.
Comment: This can be used as further reading for problematization of skepticism; it focusses on the epistemological problems of scepticism and discusses their practical implications.
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Elgin, Z. Catherine. Take it from me – the epistemological status of testimony
2002, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV (2002), 291-308.

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In this paper, the author addresses the problem of to what provides epistemic justification for taking someone's testimony as true. That is, to what extent testimony provides conveys warrant? More precisely, the author argues, contra C. J. A. Coady, that testimony does not easily provide warrant in most of the cases, yet the whether a testimony conveys warrant is context-sensitive: different levels of warrant are transmitted in different contexts.
Comment: This could work as secondary reading for a postgraduate course in epistemology, focusin on the epistemology of testimony.
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Elgin, Z. Catherine. Non-foundationalist epistemology: Holism, coherence, and tenability
2005, in Steup, Matthias and Sosa, Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Boston: Blackwell, 2005, pp. 156-167

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In this paper, the author argues that epistemic justification is explained out by coherentism. Although coherence is not the ground of truth, it is the source of epistemic justification.
Comment: This can be used as secondary/further reading for a postgraduate course in epistemology, focusing on the foundationalism/coherentism debate on epistemic justification.
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Nzegwu, Nkiru. African Art in Deep Time: De‐race‐ing Aesthetics and De‐racializing Visual Art
2019, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 77 (4): 367-378.
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Added by: Simon Fokt

Abstract: In two essays in the ART/Artifact(1988) exhibition catalog, white American museum curator Susan Vogel and white American philosopher Arthur Danto pronounce that Africans do not distinguish between art and nonart. Although seemingly objective empirical statements, their assertions about Africa and its art are racially based ruminations of a white supremacist worldview. I argue that in theorizing within the category of race they produced racialized aesthetics that commit the Eurocentric fallacy of upholding systemic racist objectives. I argue that (1) their assertions fail to be about African art, but about hegemony and power; (2) as the longest enduring artistic activity of humanity, African art is an important check to racialized aesthetics; (3) art is produced outside the category of race and from a critically conscious awareness of the world; and (4) art bespeaks creativity and presupposes the artistic and moral values of a culture in the manipulation and transformation of physical reality.

Comment: Written in an engaging way, this paper invites the reader to re-evaluate some common assumptions about art from different cultures. Exposing the prevalent Western approach to African art as racialised, it can be a great tool in making students understand both the structural-societal, as well as own biases in approaching other cultures. Ngzewu defends a powerful thesis: that ‘the West’s conception of art and creativity presupposes white racial hegemony.’ She exposes the way in which Western art is tacitly assumed to be a yardstick against which all is measured, and the Westerners have become the ‘purveyors of knowledge’ who apply this yardstick to decide whether works of other cultures are art, all without any need to consult the creators of those works, or to revise own concept of art. As such, the paper can be very empowering to some students, while also being very uncomfortable to others – teaching it might require some skill in leading the discussion in a constructive way. The import of Ngzewu’s argumentis that while racism and white domination rest on the assumption of cognitive and moral superiority of white people, the approach to African art she criticises serves to reinforce this assumption. This can inspire further class discussion on the importance and value of aesthetics. Best used before assigning other texts on non-Western art, which should all be read in light of Ngzewu’s criticism. Written in an engaging way, this paper invites the reader to re-evaluate some common assumptions about art from different cultures. Exposing the prevalent Western approach to African art as racialised, it can be a great tool in making students understand both the structural-societal, as well as own biases in approaching other cultures. Ngzewu defends a powerful thesis: that ‘the West’s conception of art and creativity presupposes white racial hegemony.’ She exposes the way in which Western art is tacitly assumed to be a yardstick against which all is measured, and the Westerners have become the ‘purveyors of knowledge’ who apply this yardstick to decide whether works of other cultures are art, all without any need to consult the creators of those works, or to revise own concept of art. As such, the paper can be very empowering to some students, while also being very uncomfortable to others – teaching it might require some skill in leading the discussion in a constructive way. The import of Ngzewu’s argumentis that while racism and white domination rest on the assumption of cognitive and moral superiority of white people, the approach to African art she criticises serves to reinforce this assumption. This can inspire further class discussion on the importance and value of aesthetics. Best used before assigning other texts on non-Western art, which should all be read in light of Ngzewu’s criticism.