Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: The paper discusses the utility of the notion of consciousness for the behavioural and brain sciences. It describes four distinctively different senses of ‘conscious’, and argues that to cope with the heterogeneous phenomena loosely indicated thereby, these sciences not only do not but should not discuss them in terms of ‘consciousness’. It is thus suggested that ‘the problem’ allegedly posed to scientists by consciousness is unreal; one need neither adopt a realist stance with respect to it, nor include the term and its cognates in the sciences’ conceptual apparatus. The paper briefly examines Nagel’s  article, since this presents the strongest counter to the thesis proposedExport citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Wilkes, Kathleen Vaughan. Is consciousness important?
1984, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (September):223-43.
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