Jackson Balcerak, Magdalena. Justification by Imagination
2018, In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory. Oxford University Press. pp. 209-226
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Added by: Giada FratantonioSummary: The author argues that experience constraints the nature of imagination in such a way that this results having a justificatory role.
Jacskon Balcerak, Magdalena. On the Epistemic Value of Imagining, Supposing and Conceiving
2016, In Amy Kind & Peter Kun (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2016)
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Added by: Giada FratantonioAbstract: Abstract. Philosophers frequently invoke our ability to imagine, conceive or suppose various thing in order to explain how we achieve our cognitive goals when we make decisions about future actions, when we perform thought experiments, and when we engage in games of pretense. But what is the relationship between imaginings, conceivings, and supposings? And what exactly are the epistemic roles they play in the cognitive projects in which they are involved? This chapter provides answers to these questions by first bringing out a contrast between what we do when we imagine and what we do when we suppose, and then by showing how to fit conceivings into the emerging systematic picture of the ways we use different forms of hypothetical thinking to acquire knowledge.
Comment: Good resource as further reading in an undergraduate course on epistemology of imagination, or as core reading in a graduate class on a similar topic.
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Comment: Good to use as further reading in a course on the topic of the epistemology of imagination.