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Added by: Christopher James MastermanAbstract:
Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta have recently proposed a new form of actualism. I characterize the general form of their view and the motivations behind it. I argue that it is not quite new – it bears interesting similarities to Alvin Plantinga’s view – and that it definitely isn’t actualist.
Comment: This article presupposes knowledge of actualism vs. possibilism debate, as well as some familiarity with quantified modal logic. It would be best to incorporate this text alongside Linsky and Zalta's 'In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic' (1994). It is a perfect text for a more advanced undergraduate course on modal metaphysics or a masters course, particularly if you were wanting to spend more than a single week on actualism vs. possibilism.Einheuser, Iris. Inner and Outer Truth2012, The Philosophers' Imprint, Vol. 12, pp. 1-22-
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Added by: Christopher James MastermanAbstract:
Kit Fine and Robert Adams have independently introduced a distinction between two ways in which a proposition might be true with respect to a world. A proposition is true at a world if it correctly represents the world. A proposition is true in a world, if it exists in that world and correctly represents it. In this paper, I clarify this distinction between outer and inner truth, defend it against recent charges of unintelligibly and argue that outer truth tracks counterfactual possibility while inner truth tracks counter-actual possibility. This connection allows us to clarify the relationship between possibility, possible actuality and the thesis of serious actualism, which is the thesis that nothing could have had a property without existing. I show that this undermines serious actualists' scruples against reading sentences like `Even if Socrates had not existed, he might have' as expressing true and genuinely de re propositions about Socrates. More generally, the connection I draw provides the serious actualist with a justification for treating actually existing but contingent objects differently from how he treats merely possible objects
Comment: This text would be perfect for an advanced undergraduate or masters course on modal metaphysics and/or modal logic. It requires previous knowledge of actualism vs. possibilism debate, the literature on singular propositions, and possible worlds, as well as a familiarity with quantified modal logic. It works as a good replacement for Adams's Actualism and Thisness (1981), covering many of issues Adams covers often more accessibly.Fairchild, Maegan. Symmetry and Hybrid Contingentism, Fairchild, Maegan (forthcoming). Symmetry and Hybrid Contingentism. In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones (eds.), Higher-order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Christopher MastermanAbstract:
This paper outlines a defense of hybrid contingentism: that it is contingent which individuals there are, but not contingent what properties there are. Critics pursue two main lines of complaint. First, that the hybrid contingentist’s treatment of haecceitistic properties is metaphysically mysterious, and second, that hybrid contingentism involves an unjustified asymmetry in the associated modal logic. I suggest that these complaints may be too quick, at least in the setting of higher-order metaphysics. It is not at all obvious whether and to what extent we should expect particular "symmetries" across the orders, and so whether (as Williamson (2013) argues) “the default preference is for a uniform metaphysics, on which being is contingent at all orders or none.”
Comment: This article is perfect for any advanced course (masters or higher) on modal logic and metaphysics, particularly if the course covers issues in contingentism vs. necessitism debate, or issues higher-order metaphysics more broadly. This article is a good replacement for Lukas Skiba's article "In Defence of Hybrid Contingentism".Fisher, Jennifer. On the Philosophy of Logic2007, Cengage Learning.-
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Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Matt ClemensPublisher's Note: Jennifer Fisher's On the Philosophy of Logic explores questions about logic often overlooked by philosophers. Which of the many different logics available to us is right? How would we know? What makes a logic right in the first place? Is logic really a good guide to human reasoning? An ideal companion text for any course in symbolic logic, this lively and accessible book explains important logical concepts, introduces classical logic and its problems and alternatives, and reveals the rich and interesting philosophical issues that arise in exploring the fundamentals of logic.Comment: This book provides an introduction to some traditional questions within philosophy of logic. Moreover, it presents some non-classical logics. It includes an introduction to formal classical logic, so no previous technical knowledge is required. Adequate for a first course on philosophy of logic, either as main or further reading.Janssen-Lauret, Frederique. Ruth Barcan Marcus and quantified modal logic2022, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 30 (2):353-383.
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Added by: Christopher MastermanAbstract:
Analytic philosophy in the mid-twentieth century underwent a major change of direction when a prior consensus in favour of extensionalism and descriptivism made way for approaches using direct reference, the necessity of identity, and modal logic. All three were first defended, in the analytic tradition, by one woman, Ruth Barcan Marcus. But analytic philosophers now tend to credit them to Kripke, or Kripke and Carnap. I argue that seeing Barcan Marcus in her historical context – one dominated by extensionalism and descriptivism – allows us to see how revolutionary she was, in her work and influence on others. I focus on her debate with Quine, who found himself retreating to softened, and more viable, versions of his anti-modal arguments as a result. I make the case that Barcan's formal logic was philosophically well-motivated, connected to her views on reference, and well-matched to her overall views on ontology. Her nominalism led her to reject posits which could not be directly observed and named, such as possibilia. She conceived of modal calculi as facilitating counterfactual discourse about actual existents. I conclude that her contributions ought to be recognized as the first of their kind. Barcan Marcus must be awarded a central place in the canon of analytic philosophy.
Comment: This would be excellent supplementary reading for a course in modal logic or metaphysics which incorporated the work of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Clearly discusses her contribution to modal logic and metaphysics and discusses the history of this period of philosophy in depth.Sullivan, Meghan. Modal Logic as Methodology2014, Sullivan, Meghan (2014). Modal Logic as Methodology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):734-743.-
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Added by: Christopher MastermanAbstract:Comment: This article would work well in any masters course, or advanced undergraduate course, covering the metaphysics of logic of modality, particularly Williamson's views on these topics. This is a good replacement for Philip Bricker's article "The Methodology of Modal Logic as Metaphysics" which covers the same topic.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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Bennett, Karen. Proxy ”Actualism”
2006, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 129, No. 2, pp. 263-294.