Dembroff, Robin. What is Sexual Orientation?
2018, Philosophers' Imprint 16.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Andrea Blomqvist, Contributed by: Rory Wilson
Abstract: Ordinary discourse is filled with discussions about ‘sexual orientation’. This discourse might suggest a common understanding of what sexual orientation is. But even a cursory search turns up vastly differing, conflicting, and sometimes ethically troubling characterizations of sexual orientation. The conceptual jumble surrounding sexual orientation suggests that the topic is overripe for philosophical exploration. This paper lays the groundwork for such an exploration. In it, I offer an account of sexual orientation – called ‘Bidimensional Dispositionalism’ – according to which sexual orientation concerns what sex[es] and gender[s] of persons one is disposed to sexually engage, and makes no reference to one’s own sex and genderComment : Dembroff provides an interesting alternative to the Kinsey scale as well as Edward Stein's dispositional account of sexual orientation. Pairs well with Stein's piece of the same name: 'What is Sexual Oreintation' in "The Mismatch of Desire: the science, theory, and ethics of sexual orientation". Can be used for debate on sexual and desire attraction.Diamond, Cora. Eating Meat and Eating People1978, Philosophy, 53 (206): 465.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Rochelle DuFord
Abstract: This paper is a response to a certain sort of argument defending the rights of animals. Part I is a brief explanation of the background and of the sort of argument I want to reject; Part II is an attempt to characterize those arguments: they contain fundamental confusions about moral relations between people and people and between people and animals. And Part III is an indication of what I think can still be said on-as it were-the animals' side.Comment : This text contains a useful overview of both Regan and Singer's classic arguments in favor of vegetarianism. Diamond introduces the concept of 'fellow creatures' as a useful way to discuss membership in the moral community. This text would be useful as a supplement to a unit on vegetarianism, speciesism, or animal rights.Dickie, Bonnie. Hollow Water2000, NFB. 48 min. Canada.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Sonja Dobroski and Quentin PharrAbstract:
This documentary profiles the tiny Ojibway community of Hollow Water on the shores of Lake Winnipeg as they deal with an epidemic of sexual abuse in their midst. The offenders have left a legacy of denial and pain, addiction and suicide. The Manitoba justice system was unsuccessful in ending the cycle of abuse, so the community of Hollow Water took matters into their own hands. The offenders were brought home to face justice in a community healing and sentencing circle. Based on traditional practices, this unique model of justice reunites families and heals both victims and offenders. The film is a powerful tribute to one community's ability to heal and create change.Comment : available in this BlueprintDōgen. Dōgen 道元 (1200–1253)2011, In James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis and John C. Maraldo (eds.) Japanese Philosophy. A Sourcebook. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, pp. 141-162-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Björn FreterAbstract:
In Japanese religious history, Dōgen (1200–1253) is revered as the founder of the Japanese school of Sōtō Zen Buddhism. Tradition says he was born of an aristocratic family, orphaned, and at the age of twelve joined the Tendai Buddhist monastic community on Mt Hiei in northeastern Kyoto. In search of an ideal teacher, he soon wandered off from the central community on the mountain and ended up in a small temple in eastern Kyoto, Kennin-ji.Comment (from this Blueprint): Excerpts from Shōbōgenzō (Repository of the Eye for the Truth), the major philosophical work of Dōgen (1200–1253), founder of the Japanese school of Sōtō Zen Buddhism allowing to deepen his philosophical understanding of nature.Donaldson, Sue, Kymlicka, Will. Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights2011, Oxford University Press-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Björn FreterPublisher’s Note:
Zoopolis offers a new agenda for the theory and practice of animal rights. Most animal rights theory focuses on the intrinsic capacities or interests of animals, and the moral status and moral rights that these intrinsic characteristics give rise to. Zoopolis shifts the debate from the realm of moral theory and applied ethics to the realm of political theory, focusing on the relational obligations that arise from the varied ways that animals relate to human societies and institutions. Building on recent developments in the political theory of group-differentiated citizenship, Zoopolis introduces us to the genuine "political animal". It argues that different types of animals stand in different relationships to human political communities. Domesticated animals should be seen as full members of human-animal mixed communities, participating in the cooperative project of shared citizenship. Wilderness animals, by contrast, form their own sovereign communities entitled to protection against colonization, invasion, domination and other threats to self-determination. `Liminal' animals who are wild but live in the midst of human settlement (such as crows or raccoons) should be seen as "denizens", resident of our societies, but not fully included in rights and responsibilities of citizenship. To all of these animals we owe respect for their basic inviolable rights. But we inevitably and appropriately have very different relations with them, with different types of obligations. Humans and animals are inextricably bound in a complex web of relationships, and Zoopolis offers an original and profoundly affirmative vision of how to ground this complex web of relations on principles of justice and compassion.Comment (from this Blueprint): An introduction to the groundbreaking theory of Zoopolis focussing on developing a political vision of human aninmals and non-human animals living together.Drayson, Zoe, Andy Clark. Cognitive disability and embodied, extended minds2020, In Adam Cureton & David Wasserman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. Oxford University Press, pp. 580-597-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Maria Jimena Clavel VazquezAbstract:
Many models of cognitive ability and disability rely on the idea of cognition as abstract reasoning processes implemented in the brain. Research in cognitive science, however, emphasizes the way that our cognitive skills are embodied in our more basic capacities for sensing and moving, and the way that tools in the external environment can extend the cognitive abilities of our brains. This chapter addresses the implications of research in embodied cognition and extended cognition for how we think about cognitive impairment and rehabilitation, how cognitive reserve mitigates neural impairment, and the distinction between medical and social models of disability.Comment : available in this BlueprintEaton, A. W., I. Gaskell. Do Subaltern Artifacts Belong in Art Museums?2009, In James O. Young & Conrad Brunk (eds.), The Ethics of Cultural Appropriation. Wiley-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Erich Hatala Matthes
Summary: Eaton and Gaskell argue that museums are "instruments of power," and then ask whether it is permissible for them to display the cultural heritage of peoples who have been subordinated. Ultimately, they argue that despite a series of arguments to the contrary, the display of "subaltern" artifacts is not just permissible, "but advantageous to all interested parties." They make the argument by posing and responding to four central objections to this position.Comment : This is a careful and comprehensive look at ethical questions surrounding the display of "subaltern" cultural heritage in museums. If you plan to assign a single reading on this topic, use this one.Elan, Priya. Beyoncé and Jay-Z’s Tiffany Advert Criticized by Friends of Basquiat2021, The Guardian, 7th September 2021-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Quentin Pharr and Clotilde TorregrossaAbstract:
Close friends of artist Jean-Michel Basquiat have spoken out against the advert from jewellers Tiffany which features Beyoncé and Jay-Z posing in front of one of his paintings saying it was “not really what he was about”. Basquiat’s 1982 work Equals Pi sits behind the couple in the campaign as Beyoncé wears a 128.54-carat yellow diamond, the first black woman to have done so.Comment (from this Blueprint): This news item discusses the controversy surrounding a 2021 advert for the high-end jewelry brand Tiffany, featuring Beyoncé and Jay-Z, and, in the background, a rarely seen painting by Basquiat owned by Tiffany. This controversy serves to illustrate both the disappointment that hooks and others feel in how Basquiat's work has been consumed in a emotionally superficial and Eurocentric manner, as well as how his work has come to be a luxury object to be conspicuously consumed primarily by the elite and used for the sake of propagating such consumption of other luxury items to the elite (in this particular instance, a 128.54-carat yellow diamond previously worn by Audrey Hepburn and Lady Gaga). The aesthetic appreciation of the painting, when used as a prop for elite interests, is under scrutiny - and, equally, whether Basquiat's intentions and what he is trying to express through his work are respected in such use and whether should be. Moreover, many of Basquiat's works are privately owned and are not displayed to the public, only to elites. So, using this ad as a case study, we should note that aspects of specific class and status affiliations and interests can affect how appropriately or inappropriately an aesthetic object is consumed, if at all.English, Jane. Abortion and the Concept of a Person1975, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5(2): 233-243.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: William Bauer
Introduction: The abortion debate rages on. Yet the two most popular positions seem to be clearly mistaken. Conservatives maintain that a human life begins at conception and that therefore abortion must be wrong because it is murder. But not all killings of humans are murders. Most notably, self defense may justify even the killing of an innocent per- son.
Liberals, on the other hand, are just as mistaken in their argument that since a fetus does not become a person until birth, a woman may do whatever she pleases in and to her own body. First, you cannot do as you please with your own body if it affects other people adversely. Second, if a fetus is not a person, that does not imply that you can do to it anything you wish. Animals, for example, are not persons, yet to kill or torture them for no reason at all is wrong.
At the center of the storm has been the issue of just when it is between ovulation and adulthood that a person appears on the scene. Conservatives draw the line at conception, liberals at birth. In this paper I first examine our concept of a person and conclude that no single criterion can capture the concept of a person and no sharp line can be drawn. Next I argue that if a fetus is a person, abortion is still justifiable in many cases; and if a fetus is not a person, killing it is still wrong in many cases. To a large extent, these two solutions are in agreement. I conclude that our concept of a person cannot and need not bear the weight that the abortion controversy has thrust upon it.
Comment : This is a classic article on the topic of abortion. English argues that the concept of a person is vague and complex, thus she has a more nuanced approach to personhood than some other theorists. She applies this theory to abortion, arguing that degree of personhood correlates with degree of permissibility of abortion. So her paper can be contrasted with, e.g., Thomson (who isn't concerned with personhood) and Warren (who takes a stricter approach to personhood and a wide view of the permissibility of abortion). It also is useful to contrast with Tooley's account.Estlund, Cynthia. Working Together: Crossing Color Lines at Work2005, Labor History. 46 (1):79-98-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
Amidst signs of declining social capital, the typical workplace is a hotbed of sociability and cooperation. And in a still-segregated society, the workplace is where adults are most likely to interact across color lines. The convergence of close interaction and some racial diversity makes the workplace a crucial institution within a diverse democratic society. Paradoxically, the involuntariness of workplace associations—the compulsion of economic necessity, of managerial authority, and of law—helps to facilitate constructive interaction among diverse co-workers. Where racial diversity is a fact of organizational life (and the law can help to make it so), then employers and workers have their own powerful reasons—psychological and economic—to make those relationships constructive, even amicable. I contend here that it is where we are compelled to get along, and not where we choose to do so, that we can best advance the project of racial integration.Comment (from this Blueprint): This text raises interesting questions about the relationship between diverse workplaces and democratic practices, and in particular, makes an interesting argument about the implications for racial integration. It can therefore be used to prompt students to think generally about democratic political structures, citizenship, and equality, while also encouraging discussion in particular about the role that work plays in promoting good civic practices.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
-
-
-
This site is registered on Toolset.com as a development site. -
-
-
-
-
-