Vredenburgh, Kate. Bureaucratic discretion, legitimacy, and substantive justice
2023, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 26 (2):251-259
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
Comment : This is a stub entry. Please add your comments to help us expand itWacker, Jeanne. Particular works of art1960, Mind 69 (274):223-233.-
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag Uidhir
Abstract: CRITICS and philosophers of art often appeal to the idea that works of art are particulars. As Mr. Stuart Hampshire says in a passage representative of this sort of appeal, " He (the artist) did not set himself to create Beauty, but some particular thing ". But although being a particular is plainly supposed to be an important fact about works of art, the criterion of particularity to be invoked in this connection is not always clear. I do not mean to suggest that the way out of this difficulty in identifying particular works of art is obvious or that there must be some single answer which will be uniformly satisfactory in connection with each, of the arts. In short, it seems to me that although the search for analogous type-token distinctions may bring fewer returns in connection with some arts than with others, it will hardly ever entirely fail to be worth the effort. A stagger- ing amount of work needs to be done, but it does not seem to me unduly sanguine to say that in this direction the prospects for some interesting philosophical generalizations are tolerably good.Waithe, Mary Ellen. Sex, Lies, and Bigotry: The Canon of Philosophy2020, In Sigridur Thorgeirsdottir and Ruth Edith Hagengruber (eds.), Methodological Reflections on Women’s Contribution and Influence in the History of Philosophy, Springer International Publishing.-
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Added by: Rebecca BuxtonAbstract:
In “Sex, Lies, and Bigotry: The Canon of Philosophy” I explore several questions: What does it mean for our understanding of the history of philosophy that women philosophers have been left out and are now being retrieved? What kind of a methodology of the history of philosophy does the recovery of women philosophers imply? Whether and how excluded women philosophers have been included in philosophy? Whether and how feminist philosophy and the history of women philosophers are related? I also explore the questions “Are there any themes or arguments that are common to many women philosophers?” and “Does inclusion of women in the canon require a reconfiguration of philosophical inquiry?” I argue that it is either ineptness or simple bigotry that led most historians of philosophy to intentionally omit women’s contributions from their histories and that such failure replicated itself in the university curricula of recent centuries and can be remedied by suspending for the next two centuries the teaching of men’s contributions to the discipline and teaching works by women only. As an alternative to this drastic and undoubtedly unpopular solution, I propose expanding the length and number of courses in the philosophy curriculum to include discussion of women’s contributions.Comment (from this Blueprint): In this scathing chapter, Waithe argues that people who have left women out of the history of philosophy are either inempt of bigoted. Rather than being an accidental fact of women's general exclusion, she argues that women philosophers have been ignored intentionally.Walda Heywat (Wäldä Hewat, Mitku), Sumner, Claude. Hatata [II] (~1692)1976, In Ethiopian Philosophy, Vol. 2. Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa University Press-
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Added by: Sara Peppe, Contributed by: Jonathan EgidPublisher’s Note:
Translating to 'an investigation', this is the second of two 17th century ethical and rational treatises from present-day Ethiopia. Walda Heywat (Wäldä Hewat) continued the work of his mentor, Zera Yacob (Zär'a Ya'eqob, Wärqe), and expanded on it, turning it into more of a practical guide. Hatata (II) is considered to be more in line with more traditional views in its approach to topics such as marriage and abortion. However, where as Zara Yacob's ideas were relatively individualistic, Walda Heywat was particularly known for his social ethics. In his writing, he states, "God did not create me only for myself, but placed me in the midst of other created [men] who are equal to me." He also adds, “Man cannot come to existence, grow and serve by himself without the help of other men."
Comment : Covering themes such as abortion, marriage, religion and morality this text represents a way to develop further knowledge of the Ethiopian philosophy in the 1600s. Also, it shows how some philosophical ideas developed from Zera Yacob to Walda Heywat. It may therefore be used as a supplemental text to the previous Hatata in offering an introduction to Ethiopian philosophy. As with the first Hatata, it may also be useful as a tool to explore enlightenment ideals as they predated work by European philosophers, such as Descartes and John Locke.Walker, Rebecca L.. Medical Ethics Needs a New View of Autonomy2009, Journal of medicine and philosophy 33: 594-608.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: The notion of autonomy commonly employed in medical ethics literature and practices is inadequate on three fronts: it fails to properly identify nonautonomous actions and choices, it gives a false account of which features of actions and choices makes them autonomous or nonautonomous, and it provides no grounds for the moral requirement to respect autonomy. In this paper I offer a more adequate framework for how to think about autonomy, but this framework does not lend itself to the kinds of practical application assumed in medical ethics. A general problem then arises: the notion of autonomy used in medical ethics is conceptually inadequate, but conceptually adequate notions of autonomy do not have the practical applications that are the central concern of medical ethics. Thus, a revision both of the view of autonomy and the practice of “respect for autonomy” are in order.Comment : Walker argues against the Black Box view advocated by Beauchamp and Childress. The text is most useful when discussing principlism in biomedical ethics and more general issues related to autonomy and consent. The text works well when read alongside's Onora O'Neill's "Some limits of informed consent."Walsh, Andrea N., Dominic McIver Lopes. Objects of Appropriation2012, In Young, James O., and Conrad G. Brunk, eds. The Ethics of Cultural Appropriation: Blackwell Publishing.-
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Added by: Erich Hatala Matthes
Summary: Walsh and Lopes argue that some appropriation can be beneficial and productive: in particular, the appropriation of elements of dominant culture by members of culturally marginalized groups. They explore this idea through discussion of such appropriative artwork by a number of contemporary First Nations artists, which they argue challenges "the assumed alignment of appropriator with oppressor and appropriatee with victim"(227).Comment : This text serves as a useful counterpoint to the general framework employed in much of the other cultural appropriation literature. It is also a useful selection for course units focusing on art practice.Wang Bi. Clarifying the Images (Ming xiang)2004, In Richard John Lynn (ed.). The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi.-
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Added by: Meilin Chinn
Summary: From Wang Bi’s (226-249) seminal commentary on the Yi Jing (I Ching) or Classic of Changes. Bi catalogues and explains the relationship between images, ideas, language, and meaning. A key text that continues to be of importance in Chinese aesthetics, philosophy of language, and hermeneutics.Comment : This text requires a basic understanding of early Chinese philosophy. It would be appropriate in an advanced undergraduate or graduate seminar on Chinese philosophy and/or aesthetics.Related reading:
- Ch. 26 of the Zhuangzi in Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters. A.C. Graham, trans. Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2001.
Wang, Kaili. On self-deception: from the perspective of Zhu Xi’s moral psychology2021, Asian Philosophy 31 (4):414-429-
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Added by: Xintong WeiAbstract:
In order to construct a satisfactory theory of cheng-yi 誠意, Zhu Xi 朱熹 develops an account of how self-deception is possible—a profound problem that has puzzled many philosophers. In Zhu’s opinion, zhi 知 can be divided into two categories: a priori knowing and empirical knowing. The further division of empirical knowing defines three sorts of self-deception: the self-deception caused by one’s ignorance, the self-deception caused by one’s superficial knowing, and the self-deception that may occur when one acquires genuine knowledge. In this paper, I will construct a theoretical model of self-deception that follows Zhu’s criterial definition of self-deception in Daxue Zhangju 大學章句, thereby accounting for the possibility of these three sorts of self-deception. Better understanding of Zhu’s conception of self-deception could, moreover, open fruitful avenues for further work on his metaphysics and moral psychology.
Comment : available in this BlueprintWang, Robin. Dao Becomes Female2017, In Garry, A., Khader, S.J. and Stone, A (eds.) New York: Routledge, pp. 35–38-
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner
Abstract: Daoism, a Dao based and inspired teaching and practice, has been considered to be the philosophy of yielding in Chinese intellectual history. One important aspect of yielding is being rou 柔—soft, gentle, supple—which the Daodejing couples with the feminine. Not surprisingly, then, the female and femininity have enormous significance for Laozi and Daoism. To highlight this unique philosophical aspect of Daoism, this chapter will place femininity/the feminine/the female center stage to investigate Daoist thought and its possible contribution to feminist thought in a contemporary global setting. In this chapter I promote a somewhat female consciousness of Dao, or a Daoist female consciousness, which may expand, support, or alter feminist assumptions about femininity/the feminine/the female. The overarching focal point of this understanding lies in a depiction of the female and femininity as a cosmic force, a way of knowing, and a strategy for leading a flourishing life. The main points are that Dao does not govern actually existing gender relations—or, at least, that the social and political reality of gender relations is not modeled on Dao, because the patriarchy is not Dao. Highlighting the female or feminine aspect of Dao, or Dao as becoming female, is a feminist intervention, using resources from within classical Daoist thought in order to re-imagine or reconfigure gender for our time.Comment : A useful way of introducing some feminist thought into a course on classical Chinese philosophy. It would fit well either in a unit on Daoism or in a unit on feminism. It would be tough to use this in a feminist course to introduce some Daoist thought; the chapter is tricky without some familiarity with the DaodejingWarren, Karen J.. Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It Is and Why It Matters2000, New York: Rowman & Littlefield.-
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Added by: Rochelle DuFord
Summary: A philosophical exploration of the nature, scope, and significance of ecofeminist theory and practice. This book presents the key issues, concepts, and arguments which motivate and sustain ecofeminism from a western philosophical perspective. Back Matter: How are the unjustified dominations of women and other humans connected to the unjustified domination of animals and nonhuman nature? What are the characteristics of oppressive conceptual frameworks and systems of unjustified domination? How does an ecofeminist perspective help one understand issues of environmental and social justice? In this important new work, Karen J. Warren answers these and other questions from a Western perspective. Warren looks at the variety of positions in ecofeminism, the distinctive nature of ecofeminist philosophy, ecofeminism as an ecological position, and other aspects of the movement to reveal its significance to both understanding and creatively changing patriarchal (and other) systems of unjustified domination.Comment : This book serves as a comprehensive introduction to ecofeminist philosophy. The introductory chapter (1), the chapter on vegetarianism (6), and the chapter on the Land Ethic (7) make excellent stand alone readings in an introductory course on Environmental Ethics.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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